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Moral Character as Professional Credential
Moral character as a professional credential has an extended historical
lineage. For lawyers, the requirement dates to the Roman Theodesian
Code, and its Anglo-American roots reach to thirteenth century England.'
In this country, every state bar currently makes certification of character a
prerequisite for practice, and most other nations and licensed professions
impose a similar mandate.2 Yet despite the pervasiveness of these require-
ments, their content and implementation have attracted remarkably little
serious scholarly interest. There has been no comprehensive historical or
empirical research on the American bar's character mandates, and no sys-
tematic scrutiny of their underlying premises. Except for a brief flutter of
interest during the McCarthy and Watergate eras, certification has pro-
voked little debate.
The following analysis seeks to reopen that dialogue. It begins with a
brief historical overview of character mandates in both admission and dis-
ciplinary contexts. Drawing on a variety of secondary source materials as
well as primary empirical research, subsequent discussion focuses on the
more recent implementation of character requirements. Through inter-
views with bar examiners in all fifty states, surveys of reported cases and
character application forms, and interviews with selected law school ad-
ministrators, this study presents the first comprehensive profile of the cer-
tification process. In addition, analysis of disciplinary actions for miscon-
duct occurring within and outside lawyer-client professional relationships
offers some insight into prevailing double standards for aspiring and ad-
mitted attorneys.
After a brief description of the survey methodologies and current certifi-
cation procedures, the study addresses structural and substantive problems
in character assessment: the subjectivity of standards, the inadequacy of
information and predictive techniques, and the costs of moral oversight in
both economic and constitutional terms. A final section explores a variety
of alternatives, ranging from abolition of bar character procedures to mod-
ifications of their scope and format.
By focusing in depth on the administration of bar character mandates,
this study raises certain fundamental questions about the premises and
practices of our licensing structures. Throughout its history, the moral
fitness requirement has functioned primarily as a cultural showpiece. In
that role, it has excommunicated a diverse and changing community, vari-
ously defined to include not only former felons, but women, minorities,
adulterers, radicals, and bankrupts. Although the number of applicants
1. Tippen, Introduction, B. EXAMINER, Aug. 1982, at 6; Comment, Good Moral Character and
Admission to the Bar: A Constitutionally Invalid Standard?, 48 U. CIN. L. REV. 876, 876 (1979).
2. THE BAR EXAMINERS' HANDBOOK (S. Duhl 2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as BAR EXAMIN-
ERS' HANDBOOK].
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formally denied admission has always been quite small, the number de-
terred, delayed, or harrassed has been more substantial. In the absence of
meaningful standards or professional consensus, the filtering process has
proved inconsistent, idiosyncratic, and needlessly intrusive. We have devel-
oped neither a coherent concept of professional character nor effective pro-
cedures to predict it. Rather, we have maintained a licensing ritual that
too often has debased the ideals it seeks to sustain.
I. AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CHARACTER REQUIREMENTS
A. The Origins of a Professional Culture: English Antecedents
Although formal character requirements for practicing attorneys span
almost two millenia, little is known about their content or effect prior to
the last century. What scant historical material is available suggests that
such formal mandates have had little practical significance. Certainly the
English traditions from which the American bar drew gave no priority to
systematic character certification.
By the eighteenth century, the British legal profession had a bifurcated
structure. The upper branch was composed largely of barristers, whose
practice consisted of in-court representation, and who were regulated by
autonomous Inns of Court.' The lower branch, consisting of solicitors,
was governed by professional associations and rules of court, supple-
mented by statutory enactments.
Among barristers, fitness for practice was largely a matter of wealth
and social standing. A career in the upper branch began with attendance
at one of four Inns of Court, typically followed by a clerkship with a
practicing barrister.4 During the eighteenth century, some Inns waived
certification requirements for sons of powerful members, or for those with
letters of recommendation from judges.5 For a substantial period, barris-
ters also effectively excluded from Inn membership certain presumptively
unfit groups, including Catholics, tradesmen, journalists, and solicitors.6
Income was an equally significant filtering device. The expense of legal
education and establishing a practice at the Inns of Court largely re-
stricted access to those from families of considerable means.7
3. Although the upper branch technically consisted of 11 distinct classes, including various royal
appointments, barristers were the most numerous members. See 12 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 3-101 (1938).
4. W. READER, PROFESSIONAL MEN: THE RISE OF THE PROFESSIONAL CLASSES IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 121 (1966).
5. 12 W. Ho..swORTH, supra note 3, at 22-23.
6. Id. at 19; M. BIRKS, GENTLEMEN OF THE LAW 133 (1960).
7. H. COHEN, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH BAR AND Attornatus TO 1450, at 500-501 (1929)
(only wealthy became barristers in 15th century); 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 3, at 436 (1924)
(only wealthy became barristers in 17th century); R. POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO
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Apart from these caste-bound restraints, the profession's upper branch
made little systematic effort to probe the personal attributes of its mem-
bers. In the early nineteenth century, the Inns began requiring applicants
to obtain references from two barristers prior to admission, but there is no
evidence that this mandate functioned other than to solidify the class bias
of the admissions structure.' Nor does it appear that barristers during this
period were much interested in formally disciplining moral lapses, except
where they affected the internal atmosphere of the Inns. Unbecoming be-
havior could trigger expulsion, but publicly sanctioned offenses typically
involved breaches of etiquette rather than serious ethical lapses.'
Of course, the absence of recorded disciplinary cases or formal character
screening cannot be taken to imply an absence of moral oversight. The
Inns constituted a small, homogeneous community, in which deviant be-
havior was unlikely to escape notice. The requirement that students eat a
precribed number of dinners at their Inn permitted some professional so-
cialization, as well as de facto screening of potential clerks. And in many
instances, collegial opprobrium undoubtedly proved as effective a discipli-
nary mechanism as formal sanctions. What remains less clear is the extent
to which character mandates had content apart from etiquette and social
status.
Membership in the lower branch of the profession was governed less by
class and more by formal regulation. During the early eighteenth century,
the abysmal level of practice among solicitors prompted Parliament to
pass a comprehensive statute requiring, inter alia, five years of appren-
ticeship and judicial examination of fitness and capacity for practice."
Whether framers of the Act intended an explicit inquiry into moral char-
acter is uncertain, but it does not appear that searching scrutiny took
place. At best, judges attempted to determine whether the candidate had
served his apprenticeship and obtained the necessary affidavits." Disci-
pline for immoral conduct was equally lax. Disbarment rarely occurred
even for the most egregious offenses, and the profession enjoyed little pub-
lic respect.
1 2
MODERN TIMEs 100 (1953); W. READER, supra note 4, at 120 (mid 19th-century estimate of mini-
mum cost of becoming barrister approximately 1000 pounds). Similar barriers may have confronted
the aspiring Scottish attorney, for whom dancing and fencing lessons were "absolutely necessary." A.
Patterson, The Legal Profession in Scotland 5 (1984) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
8. 12 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 3, at 26.
9. Id. at 21, 27-28. Punishable offenses included discharging firearms, setting bonfires, or bring-
ing dogs inside the Inns.
10. See 12 W. HoLDswoRTH, supra note 3, at 54; W. READER, supra note 4, at 28-29. Prior to
the passage of that legislation, "[a]nyone could call himself a solicitor, and of those who did the vast
majority . . . [had] no legal knowledge and little regard for their clients' interests." M. BIRKs, supra
note 6, at 105.
11. 12 W. HOLDSwORTH, supra note 3, at 61-62.
12. M. BIRKS, supra note 6, at 109.
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In response to this regulatory vacuum, a Society of Gentlemen Prac-
tisers was organized during the early part of the eighteenth century to
upgrade the standards and standing of solicitors."3 But during the forma-
tive stages of the American bar, the regulatory structures of the British
bar had given little meaning to the concept of character as a professional
credential.
B. The Evolution of Character Standards
Within the American bar, moral character requirements have been a
fixed star in an otherwise unsettled regulatory universe. Educational stan-
dards came and went, but, at least after the colonial period, virtue re-
mained a constant prerequisite, in form if not in fact.
Jurisdiction over bar admissions and discipline traditionally has re-
flected a compromise between various interested constituencies. The
courts, while asserting inherent power to determine standards for individ-
uals practicing before them, have generally accepted legislative specifica-
tions of minimum requirements.' 4 The legislatures, in turn, have tolerated
a large degree of professional autonomy over membership determinations
in both admissions and disciplinary contexts. Over the last two centuries,
the administration of character requirements has been delegated increas-
ingly to the organized bar, subject to varying degrees of judicial oversight.
The morality of attorneys has been of public concern since the mid-
seventeenth century. A number of colonies attempted to ban the profession
entirely, and in the post-Revolutionary period, animus against lawyers'
"blood-suck[ing]" practices frequently ran high.' 5 Against this backdrop,
it is scarcely surprising that legislatures sought to impose character re-
quirements for admission to the bar. For example, during the eighteenth
century, Massachusetts demanded references from three ministers; Vir-
ginia mandated certification from a local judge; and New York and South
Carolina provided for examination by the court to determine whether the
13. Id. at 144-53; 12 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 3, at 63-74.
14. See J. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 279 (1950); Is Admis-
sion to the Bar a Judicial or a Legislative Function?, 1 B. EXAMINER 222 (1932), and cases cited
therein. Most decisions accepted a legislative mandate as an "act of grace" on "principles of comity."
Id. at 226 (citing In re Cate, 270 P. 968 (Cal. App. 1928)). Some decisions reasoned that specifica-
tions of minimum requisites operated as a limitation "not on the courts but on individual citizens."
Id. at 224 (citing In re Bailey, 30 Ariz. 407, 248 P. 29 (1926) (emphasis in original)).
15. 2 A. CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA 17 (1965) (quoting 1 J.
MCMASrER, A HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO
THE CIVIL WAR 302 (1927)); see also L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 83 (1973)
(lawyers as "'cursed hungry caterpillars' whose fees 'will eat out the very Bowels of our Common-
wealth"') (quoting H. LEFLER, NORTH CAROLINA HISTORY AS TOLD BY CONTEIPORARIES 87
(1956)).
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candidate was "virtuous and of good fame" or manifested "probity, hon-
esty and good demeanor.""8
Similar standards remained in place for the next two centuries.1" Even
during the Jacksonian period, when most states deleted or severely diluted
all educational prerequisites for the practicing bar, moral character man-
dates were retained.18 Prior to the twentieth century, however, it does not
appear that these statutory prescriptions had significant force. Although a
few states categorically excluded individuals convicted of certain crimes, 9
the mobility of applicants and the absence of centralized records made
such strictures difficult to enforce. Moreover, most jurisdictions vested dis-
cretion to assess character in the courts, which often subsequently dele-
gated their screening functions to the local bar. Neither constituency ap-
pears to have been particularly interested in the enterprise. Reported cases
reveal almost no instances of denial of admission on character-related
grounds, and the anecdotal evidence available suggests that few candidates
were foreclosed from practice for character deficiencies.20
The only substantial group effectively excluded on grounds of character
seems to have been women. To nineteenth century jurists, the "natural
and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex" dis-
abled it from legal practice; the "peculiar qualities of womanhood, its gen-
tle graces, its quick sensibility, its tender susceptibility, its purity, its deli-
cacy, its emotional impulses, its subordination of hard reason to
sympathetic feeling, [were] surely not qualifications for forensic strife."21
Apart from this categorical exclusion, the character mandate had little
practical import. Affidavits from personal references generally satisfied
16. G. GAWALT, THE PROMISE OF POWER: THE EMERGENCE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN
MASSACHUSETTS 1760-1840, at 10 (1979); W. BRYSON, LEGAL EDUCATION IN VIRGINIA:
1779-1979, A BIOGRAPHICAL APPROACH 11 (1982); 2 A. CHROUST, supra note 15, at 247-48,
267-68. By the late 18th century, the ministers dropped out of the Massachusetts process and appli-
cants were subject to a statutory requirement that they be of "good moral character." Blackard, Re-
quirements for Admission to the Bar in Revolutionary America, 15 TENN. L. REV. 116, 118 (1938).
17. For discussion of the relevant statutes, see 2 A. CHROUST, supra note 15, at 224-80.
18. For discussion of the Jacksonian democratization, see G. GAWALT, supra note 16, at 140-45;
J. HURST, supra note 14. Representative statutory provisions appear id. at 250, 280.
19. See, e.g., 2 A. CHROUST, supra note 15, at 261 (Virginia statute barring admission of those
convicted of treason, felonies, forgery, or willful and corrupt perjury).
20. One Illinois practitioner's examination for admission consisted of answering questions about
his age, residency, one or two fundamental points of law, and the correct spelling of his name. Smith,
Abraham Lincoln as a Bar Examiner, B. EXAMINER, Aug. 1982, at 35, 37. In Kentucky, a candidate
unable to supply any correct answers to comparable legal questions was nonetheless admitted on the
theory that "no one would employ him anyhow." 2 A. CHROUST, supra note 15, at 38 (quoting
Smith, Admission to the Bar in New York, 16 YALE L.J. 514, 518 (1907)); see also J. HuRsr, supra
note 14, at 281 (candidate with little legal education admitted because judge/examiner knew him
"personally and very well").
21. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring); In re
Goodell, 39 Wis. 232, 245 (1875).
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admission requirements, and such documents were easily obtained.22 The
bar evidenced no greater enthusiasm for policing the mores of practicing
colleagues. Only the most egregious conduct, such as leading a lynch
mob's courthouse assault, would typically trigger disbarment."
As was true for England, however, the apparent inadequacy of formal
oversight should not obscure the role of other filtering devices. For exam-
ple, in many Southern colonies, the common mode of preparation for
practice was attendance at the British Inns of Court,2 4 an option not read-
ily available to those from lower socioeconomic brackets. More signifi-
cantly, the apprenticeship system, which was the primary means of train-
ing for the bar prior to the twentieth century, also performed significant
screening functions. Undoubtedly, most attorneys made some inquiry into
an applicant's background and reputation before permitting him access to
their affairs. If, during the course of training, the apprentice displayed
moral lapses, his master generally was in a position to terminate employ-
ment and block admission at least to the local bar.25 Finally, and most
important, the context of most eighteenth- and nineteenth-century practice
made reliance on formal disciplinary and admissions measures an uncer-
tain, and to some extent unnecessary, approach. Lawyers generally func-
tioned within small professional communities where reputation was a
matter of common knowledge and informal exclusionary devices were
often effective. Those with an unhappy history in one jurisdiction might
find it expedient to migrate elsewhere. By the same token, the mobility of
practitioners and absence of centralized regulatory structures made over-
sight by local jurisdictions of limited practical use.26 As the profession
grew in size and diversity, the perceived inadequacy of formal character
screening became a serious professional issue.
C. The Formalization of Character Screening
The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed a marked
increase in interest in character certification. That interest was by no
22. See Lightner, A More Complete Inquiry into the Moral Character of Applicants for Admission
to the Bar, 38 REP. A.B.A. 775, 781-82 (1913) (affidavits most common mechanism for testing char-
acter); Committee on Legal Education of the Massachusetts Bar Association, Training for the Bar
with Special Reference to the Admission Requirements in Massachusetts, MASS. L.Q., Nov. 1929, at
18-19 (affidavit system inadequate) [hereinafter cited as Mass. Comm. Rep.].
23. Although the lynch mob leader was disbarred from practice in federal courts, the local com-
munity took a somewhat different view. He was never disbarred by the state courts and was subse-
quently elected to the local bench. See Ex Parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1883), discussed in H.
DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 44-45 & n.19 (1953).
24. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 84. In Maryland and South Carolina during the early 18th
century, preparation at the Inns was a prerequisite to admission. M. BIRKS, supra note 6, at 257.
25. See G. GAWALT, supra note 16, at 134.
26. See J. HURST, supra note 14, at 280 ("decentralization promoted laxity because it diffused
responsibility").
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means unique to the bar. During the same period, other professional
groups also began tightening entry standards,27 and occupational licens-
ing, often accompanied by character requirements, first achieved a firm
foothold.2 Over the next half century, those subjected to moral mandates
included barbers, beauticians, embalmers, engineers, veterinarians, optom-
etrists, geologists, shorthand reporters, commercial photographers, boxers,




Within the legal profession, certification standards gradually stiffened.
Between 1880 and 1920, states adopted additional entry procedures, such
as publication of applicants' names, probationary admissions, recommen-
dations by the local bar, court-directed inquiries, and investigation by
character committees.30 By 1917, three-quarters of the states had central-
ized certification authority in boards of bar examiners.3 " A decade later,
close to two-thirds of all jurisdictions had made further efforts to
strengthen character inquiries through mandatory interviews, character
questionnaires, committee oversight, or related measures.3 2 These certifi-
cation requirements continued to stiffen through the 1930's, largely in re-
sponse to efforts by the newly formed National Conference of Bar Exam-
iners, and various bar associations."3
The degree of character oversight varied considerably over time and ju-
risdictions, but certain common concerns were apparent. Much of the ini-
tial impetus for more stringent character scrutiny arose in response to an
influx of Eastern European immigrants, which threatened the profession's
public standing. Nativist and ethnic prejudices during the 1920's, coupled
27. C. GILB, HIDDEN HIERARCHIES: THE PROFESSIONS AND GOVERNMENT 61-64 (1966).
28. See Friedman, Freedom of Contract and Occupational Licensing 1890-1910: A Legal and
Social Study, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 487 (1965).
29. Statutes typically required good moral character or provided for denial or revocation of li-
censes based on crimes of moral turpitude. Some vocations also required an oath of allegiance. See
Genusa v. City of Peoria, 475 F. Supp. 1199, 1207, 1209-21 (C.D. Ill. 1979) (vendors of erotica),
affd in part and rev'd in part, 619 F.2d 1203 (7th Cir. 1980); Ali v. Division of State Athletic
Comm., 316 F. Supp. 1246 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (boxers); Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214,
227-228, 461 P.2d 375, 385, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175, 185 (1969) (citing statutes governing various profes-
sions); Tanner v. De Sapio, 2 Misc. 2d 130, 133, 150 N.Y.S.2d 640, 644 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (beauti-
cians); Guariglia v. North Dakota State Bd. of Architecture, 268 N.W.2d 478, 480 (N.D. 1978)
(architects); W. GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS 129-30
(1956); Gellhorn, The Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 10-19, 25-27 (1976).
The scant evidence available does not reveal rigorous enforcement of such requirements. As the pre-
ceding sources reflect, reported license denials were intermittent and idiosyncratic. Vocational boards
requiring personal references often simply collected rather than evaluated the requisite forms. See W.
MOORE, THE PROFESSIONS: ROLES AND RULES 125 (1970).
30. Lightner, supra note 22, at 781-82.
31. R. STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850'S TO THE
1980's, at 105 n.23 (1983); C. GILB, supra note 27, at 63.
32. See Mass. Comm. Rep., supra note 22, at 44-78 (summarizing state procedures).
33. See Collins, Foreword, 1 B. EXAMINER 1 (1931); R. STEVENS, supra note 31, at 99-100.
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with economic pressures during the Depression, fueled a renewed drive
for entry barriers.
At the close of the nineteenth century, the recently-founded American
Bar Association, joined by various state and local organizations as well as
law schools, began spearheading a campaign for higher professional stan-
dards. While the quest was "aimed in principle against incompetence,
crass commercialism, and unethical behavior," the ostensibly "ill-
prepared" and "morally weak" candidates were often in fact "of foreign
parentage, and, most pointedly, Jews."'34 Although most of the profes-
sion's efforts focused on strengthening educational requirements and ethi-
cal codes rather than on screening for character, the enterprises were by
no means unrelated. Proposals mandating a prescribed number of years of
college and law school education would impede access for those lacking
personal resolve and private means.3 5 In particular, such minimum re-
quirements, coupled with stiffer entry examinations and ethical canons,
could help stem the flood of those whose "eager quest for lucre" or inade-
quate command of the "King's English" had allegedly debased the profes-
sion in the eyes of the public. 8 It was also assumed that "thoro [sic] edu-
cational training" for applicants would "stiffen their moral backbone and
enlarge their range of information to prevent their going astray.
'3
Not all segments of the profession, however, were convinced that educa-
tional and ethical standards would prove adequate prophylactic measures;
some bar members recommended rigorous character investigation to elimi-
nate those lacking "proper antecedents, home environment, education, and
social contacts." 8 Of course, as other bar spokesmen took pains to empha-
size, those attributes were not always related. At the first National Bar
Examiners Conference in 1933, the former Chairman of the ABA's sec-
tion on Legal Education and Admission acknowledged that "[s]ometimes
you have wonderful character evidence displayed even though the appli-
34. M. LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM 173 (1977).
35. In 1920, the ABA approved recommendations by the Root Committee mandating two years of
college and three years of full time legal study. J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 112-14 (1976).
Such proposals generated vigorous opposition, see id.; R. STEVENS, supra note 31, at 115, 125 n.18,
and states were slow to implement requirements regarding undergraduate training and attendance at
an approved law school.
36. Report of the Committee on Code of Professional Ethics, 29 REP. A.B.A. 600, 601 (1906); J.
AUERBACH, supra note 35, at 49, 315 n.18 (quoting Isidor J. Kresel, Chief Counsel, New York State
Bar Ass'n). Of course, antisemitism in the legal profession was common before this period. In 1874,
George Strong advocated "either a college diploma or an examination including Latin" as require-
ments for admission to Columbia Law School, on the ground that this would "keep out the little
scrubs [German Jews mostly] whom the school now promotes from the grocery-counters . . . to be
'gentlemen of the Bar.'" Weisberg, Barred from the Bar: Women and Legal Education in the United
States 1870-1890, in 2 WOMEN AND THE LAW 231, 252 (D. Weisberg ed. 1982).
37. Vald, Improving North Dakota Bar Admission Requirements, 13 N.D.Q. 69 (1923).
38. See J. AUERBACH, supra note 35, at 49 (summarizing statements of Isidor J. Kresel).
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cant is not well educated or his parents were born in Russia." 9 The neg-
ative pregnant remains instructive, and there is little doubt that some ef-
forts to stiffen character screening were colored by class and ethnic bias.
The clearest illustration of such sentiments was Pennsylvania's imple-
mentation of a registration and preceptorship system in 1928. Under this
system, prospective candidates faced a character investigation both at the
beginning of law school and at the time of applying for admission to the
state bar. In addition, applicants were required to find a preceptor with
five years experience as a lawyer to monitor their conduct through law
school and a six-month clerkship. 0 The initial character interview af-
forded an opportunity to dissuade the "unworthy" from pursuing a legal
career, an enterprise in which Jewish lawyers particularly were urged to
join."1
The definition of "unworthy" was quite elastic. Those rejected by one
county board in 1929 included individuals deemed "dull," "colorless,"
"subnormal," "unprepossessing," "shifty," "smooth," "keen," "shrewd,"
"arrogant," "conceited," "surly," and "slovenly." '42 A substantial number
of candidates reportedly lacked a "proper sense of right and wrong";
others had no "moral or intellectual stamina," appreciation of "social
duty," or "well-defined ideas on religion," or were "[n]ot seeking admis-
sion for [the] best motives." 43 Among those denied admission were appli-
cants who saw "no wrong" in advertising, and one who sought "fame as
[a] woman attorney and . . . public offic[ial]."'44 Other individuals were
tainted by association; their sponsors were "unreliable," or their family
members had "unsavory" backgrounds or "poor business reputation[s]. 45
Insofar as the system was designed to filter out the most lumpen of the
proletariat, it had modest success. During the first eight years of the Phil-
adelphia program, about 7% of all candidates withdrew or were rejected,
and some additional number were undoubtedly discouraged from apply-
ing.4 The proportion of Jews admitted dropped sixteen percent, and al-
most no blacks gained entry.
47
39. Character Examination of Candidates, 1 B. EXAMINER 63, 72 (1932) (quoting George H.
Smith) [hereinafter cited as Character Exam.].
40. See E. BROWN, LAWYERS AND THE PROMOTION OF JUSTICE 125-26 (1938).
41. Character Exam., supra note 39, at 68.
42. Douglas, The Pennsylvania System Governing Admission to the Bar, 54 REP. A.B.A. 701,
703-05 (1929).
43. Id.
44. Id. The rejection of the woman attorney was reversed by the State Board.
45. id.
46. E. BROWN, supra note 40, at 126.
47. J. AUERBACH, supra note 35, at 127-28.
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The extent to which comparable biases colored other states' character
decisions remains unclear. Although widely praised by the profession's
elite, the Pennsylvania precept system found less favor in legislative and
judicial circles.4 Many jurisdictions did, however, experiment with law
student registration systems, following ABA endorsement of the proposal
in 1938.4' And the scant evidence available suggests that the profession's
concern with competition during the Depression had some effect on the
attitudes of local certification committees. As examiners frequently argued,
"with an overcrowded bar [and] an abundance of candidates who have
unquestioned character," any doubts should be resolved against admis-
sion.50 Among those raising doubts were non-conformists of various hues:
radicals, religious fanatics, divorcees, fornicators, and any individual who
challenged the profession's anticompetitive ethical canons.5 '
As subsequent discussion will reflect, character certification after the
1930's grew more rigorous in form, though not necessarily in effect. In
most states, review became increasingly systematic, and definitions of vir-
tue shifted with the national mood, but the number of individuals for-
mally denied admission remained minimal.52 Of course, such statistics by
no means capture the full instrumental or symbolic consequences of certi-
fication; rather, as later discussion will suggest, the system's greatest sig-
nificance may lie in its deterrent and legitimating dimensions.
Bar disciplinary processes evolved in similar fashion, although policing
practitioners has traditionally met with less enthusiasm than restricting
entry. For most of this century, grievance committees typically exercised
"sporadic and haphazard" control.53 Although the growth of integrated
bar associations during the mid-twentieth century gradually expanded the
profession's housekeeping authority, gross inadequacies in the structure,
resources, and jurisdiction of oversight agencies remained."' Moreover,
48. See, e.g., Appel, The Pennsylvania System, 3 B. EXAMINER 10 (1933); Mass. Comm. Rep.,
supra note 22; The Problem of Character Examination, 3 B. EXAMINER 59 (1934). Only Delaware
now imposes a preceptor requirement. See RULES OF THE BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS OF THE
STATE OF DELAWARE Rule BR-52.7-52.9.
49. See infra pp. 519-29.
50. An Answer to the Problem of the Bootlegger's Son, 1 B. EXAMINER 109, 110 (1932) (recom-
mending denying admission to applicant whose family ran a still); see also A Standard for Character
Committee, I B. EXAMINER 311 (1932) (because of "abundance of attorneys already admitted, and
many excellent candidates," recommending denying admission to individual guilty of embezzlement 10
years earlier who had no subsequent offenses).
51. See Douglas, supra note 42, at 703-04 (rejecting those guilty of fornication, of associating
with firms as a runner, and of disagreeing with bar policies on advertising and ambulance chasing);
Character Exam., supra note 39, at 65 (facts developed in divorce proceeding "might" bar admission).
For discussion of admission cases involving political association and belief during 1920 to 1970, see
infra pp. 566-70.
52. See infra note 116.
53. J. HURST, supra note 14, at 365-66.
54. For a discussion of bar oversight prior to the 1970's, see Steele, Cleaning Up the Legal Profes-
sion: The Power to Discipline-The Judiciary and the Legislature, 20 ARiz. L. REv. 413 (1978). For
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bar discipline often reflected the same sorts of biases that characterized
certification efforts. Interest centered on promotional activities among the
lower echelons of the bar, and social deviance at its fringes.55 Except in
the most egregious cases, client grievances and abuses by prominent prac-
titioners ranked lower on the professional agenda. Excommunications re-
mained rare, and heretics formed a motley collection of convicted felons,
suspected subversives, indiscrete adulterers, and champertous
entrepreneurs.
56
The following discussion examines the structures, standards, and justifi-
cations under which such character oversight has proceeded. A recurring
question is whether the increasing formalization of bar inquiry represents
a significant advance in professional regulation.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE CERTIFICATION PROCESS
A. The Survey Methodology
To obtain information concerning the moral character screening pro-
cess, I compiled data from bar examining authorities, reported judicial
cases, and accredited law schools. The inquiry focused primarily on new
applicants to the bar.5 For comparative purposes, however, some infor-
mation was collected from reported admission and disciplinary decisions
involving attorneys guilty of misconduct in both professional and nonpro-
fessional capacities.
Assembling a comprehensive account of bar activity required several
stages of investigation. With the assistance of student research assistants, I
compiled data in 1982 and 1983 from bar applications and from inter-
views with bar examiners in all fifty states and the District of Columbia.5 8
more recent indictments, see infra notes 250-55 and accompanying text.
55. For example, of some 150 opinions by the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics and Griev-
ances between 1924 and 1936, almost half (46%) dealt with advertising, solicitation, lay competition,
and fees. The vast bulk of the remainder dealt primarily with conflicts of interest and conduct in
litigation. See J. HURST, supra note 14, at 331. Other surveys of state and local bar associations
revealed comparable priorities. See id. at 331-32 (New York); Shuchman, Ethics and Legal Ethics:
The Propriety of the Canons as a Group Moral Code, 37 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 244, 245, 255-56
(1968). For discussion of early 20th-century cases involving discipline for sexual and political conduct,
see infra pp. 551-55.
56. See H. DRINKER, supra note 23; Shuchman, supra note 55; infra pp. 552-55.
57. The petitions of attorneys seeking readmission or admission in a new jurisdiction raised issues
regarding previous professional misconduct that were distinct from the considerations present for new
applicants or for practitioners disciplined for activity arising outside the lawyer-client relationship.
58. Bar applications were collected between Fall 1982 and Spring 1983. Kansas, which had just
completed a revision process, provided its 1984 application. Bar application data are compiled in
Appendix I.
All bar examiners were contacted by phone. Except in the few cases -in which respondents re-
quested written questionnaires, the interview was completed orally. In all but four jurisdictions, cen-
tral administrative officials provided the requested data by phone or mail. Lack of centralized infor-
mation in Illinois, Missouri, New York, and Virginia made it necessary to seek assistance from local
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In particular, I sought information concerning the questions put to all
candidates, the type and volume of cases triggering non-routine inquiry,
and the form that such additional investigation would take. In order to
obtain more detailed information about the review process, I also sought
data from bar administrators or committee chairmen involved in the high-
est level of review in fourteen representative states. These states were cho-
sen to provide reasonable representation from the nation as a whole, after
controlling for population, industrialization, urbanization, per capita in-
come, racial composition, and a number of other variables.59 No jurisdic-
tion refused to respond, although some individuals, largely because of con-
cern for confidentiality or lack of information, could not provide all the
data requested.
To complete the survey of bar certification processes, I also surveyed all
reported judicial opinions over the last 50 years (1932-82) concerning de-
nials of admission on grounds of moral character, some 100 cases. To
obtain a sense of what character attributes have been thought disabling for
practitioners as well as new entrants, I then reviewed a selected sample of
disbarments for nonprofessional misconduct, i.e., misconduct occurring
outside a lawyer-client relationship. 0
It became apparent during the course of the study that bar examiners
rarely exclude candidates on grounds of character, and generally report
encountering few cases of serious misconduct. That raised a question as to
whether law schools were performing a preliminary screening function.
Accordingly, I first surveyed admission forms for all 169 accredited law
schools to determine what personal information they routinely requested.
committee chairmen. In Virginia and Missouri, with 31 and 43 local committees respectively, inter-
viewers contacted representatives of sample districts: the two largest urban areas and two randomly
selected rural districts. In Illinois, data were collected from Chicago, which processes 85% of the
state's applications, and from a less metropolitan area, the district that includes Peoria. Since New
York has only nine character committees, each of which handles a substantial volume of applicants,
the chairman of each committee was interviewed. A variant of the basic questionnaire was used for
those jurisdictions. A representative interview questionnaire appears in Appendix II.
As in any empirical survey relying in part on individual recollections, the findings will not yield
precision. Since not all respondents were able to answer every question, changes in the sample base
are noted in parentheticals following percentage calculations.
59. I initially contacted representatives from 16 jurisdictions: Alabama, California, Idaho, Illinois,
Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Tennessee, and West Virginia. The methodology involved in selecting these jurisdic-
tions is described in Kagan, Cartwright, Friedman & Wheeler, The Business of State Supreme
Courts, 1870-1970, 30 STAN. L. REV. 121, 125 n.10 (1977). Two of these states, Rhode Island and
South Dakota, had not recently conducted hearings or interviews. In each of the remaining fourteen, I
obtained data from bar examiners or committee chairmen involved in the highest level of review. In
Alabama, New Jersey, and Oregon, those providing information were involved in what is technically
the second highest level of review since the final level is either rarely operational or essentially per-
functory. Alabama data were obtained from a state bar character committee rather than the state's
board of examiners.
60. For discussion of the methodology involved in those aspects of the survey, see infra notes
258-60 and accompanying text.
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To attain some appreciation of how moral character issues figure in law
schools' admission and disciplinary processes, and the extent of congru-
ence between bar and academic decisionmaking, I also interviewed a non-
random sample of administrators from eighteen accredited schools.61 In
selecting those institutions, I sought to insure representation along a vari-
ety of dimensions, including size, public or private status, prestige rank-
ings, average LSAT scores of admittees, the percentage of applicants re-
jected, the presence of an evening school, religious affiliation, and
geographic location.62
B. Screening Procedures
An overview of various state certification processes reveals a shared
structural premise but considerable diversity in implementation. In all ju-
risdictions, the bar retains control of character screening. Initial review
powers typically reside in boards of bar examiners or character commit-
tees, subject to judicial oversight. Apart from the lower-level administra-
tive staff, no non-lawyers are involved in the review process in over three-
quarters of the states (39/50). Where non-attorneys serve on character
committees or boards, they comprise, on the average, less than a quarter
of the membership and are almost always chosen by the profession (i.e.,
courts or bar associations).6"
More detailed data from fourteen representative jurisdictions suggest
that the individuals involved in the character screening process do not nec-
essarily reflect the composition of the bar. Although the relevant commit-
tees and boards include substantial percentages of women (15%) and mi-
norities (11%), there is relatively little representation from the third of the
profession that is in solo practice (7%), or from the third employed by
corporate, academic, or public interest organizations, or government
(8%).6' The forty percent of the bar that is under age thirty-five is simi-
61. The law schools were University of Chicago, De Paul, Idaho, Lewis & Clark, Maine, Minne-
sota, Richmond (T.C. Williams), Samford (Cumberland), Seton Hall, South Dakota, Stanford, Van-
derbilt, University of Virginia, Wake Forest, Washburn, Wayne State, West Virginia, and Whittier.
62. The measure of prestige was taken from J. GOURMAN, THE GOURMAN REPORT: A RATING
OF GRADUATE AND PROFESSIONAL PROGRAMS IN AMERICAN AND INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITIES
71-77 (1983). To insure geographic and demographic diversity, I surveyed schools from each of the
16 states listed supra note 59, except Nevada and Rhode Island, which have no law school. I also
added two institutions from Virginia, which accepts certification by law school deans as proof of moral
character for graduates of in-state schools.
63. Lay members are chosen by the Governor in Maine and Alaska, subject to legislative ap-
proval; see also infra note 66 (discussing selection procedures).
64. For demographic figures on the profession, see Schwartz, The Reorganization of the Legal
Profession, 58 TEX. L. REV. 1269, 1274-75 (1980); B. Curran, The Legal Profession in the 1980's:
Selected Statistics from the 1984 Lawyer Statistical Report 4-7 (June 9, 1984) (unpublished manu-
script on file with author).
The Yale Law Journal
larly underrepresented (16%).65 Since bar organizations play a dominant
role in selecting members, committees may also be skewed toward estab-
lished, mainstream practitioners with the time and inclination for continu-
ing involvement in professional associations.6 6 Given the broad discretion
exercised by these committees, any bias in their composition is likely to
have some bearing on the form of misconduct they find disabling and the
degree of scrutiny they accord candidates with particular backgrounds and
law firm affiliations.
6 7
Although all states have a similar, professionally controlled certification
structure, their procedures vary in centralization, scope, and formality.
The review process begins with candidates' submission of applications, re-
quiring various character-related information. The scope of inquiry, dis-
cussed in detail in Parts III and IV, differs among jurisdictions, but typi-
cally encompasses a wide range of criminal and civil misconduct, mental
health matters, physical addictions, and educational, employment, and fi-
nancial background. In some two-thirds of the states (64%; N=51), the
staff of the board of bar examiners initiates further review by flagging
applications with possible character difficulties. About another fifth of the
states (22%) require interviews of all applicants, while the remainder gen-
erally rely on screening by various combinations of local committees, hired
interviewers, and bar examiners.6 8 Montana has no established procedures
for review and has not, in recent memory, conducted an investigation. Vir-
ginia relies on in-state law schools to screen their graduates; local commit-
tees are responsible for those with out-of-state degrees.
Even among jurisdictions with comparable screening structures, the
procedures for reviewing problem applicants differ considerably. Although
all judicial denials of admissions must meet minimum due process
standards of notice and an opportunity to be heard, bar administrative
processes reflect quite different levels of procedural safeguards concerning
evidentiary requirements, the scope and availability of hearings, adminis-
trative appeals, and written opinions.6 9 In addition, the standard of review
65. B. Curran, supra note 64, at 3, 17.
66. In five of the 14 sampled states, the bar selects members, and in eight states the supreme court
appoints them, in some instances on recommendation of the bar. Prior service to the bar is often the
basis for appointment. As the Executive Director of the Oregon Board of Bar Examiners explained,
individuals selected are those who have served in other capacities, such as graders of bar exams, so
"the Board knows their work." Interview, Exec. Dir., Or. Bd. of B. Examiners (July 11, 1983).
67. See Shuchman, supra note 55, at 268-69 (big law firms control the organized bar and are
thus able to impose their ethics on the profession).
68. Five jurisdictions (10%) have state or local committees screen applicant files, two (4%)-in-
cluding California-rely on hired investigators or counsel, and two (4%) delegate the task to members
of the Board of Bar Examiners. Since in Illinois an administrator screens Chicago applicants and local
committees interview the remainder, the state is included in both the two-thirds and the one-fifth
categories noted in text.
69. See Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963). When the applicant
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for committee determinations varies across jurisdictions. Some state courts
defer to the bar's assessments absent an "abuse of discretion, arbitrary
action, fraud, corruption or oppression. "70 Other jurisdictions will deter-
mine applicants' qualifications de novo or resolve reasonable doubts in
their favor.7 Whether the difference in standards makes for a substantial
difference in outcomes is doubtful, given the inherent subjectivity of char-
acter determination at both the administrative and judicial levels. Thus,
for example, in cases where a primary issue is rehabilitation and one
might expect greatest deference to findings of fact, courts over the last
half-century have disagreed with committees twice as often as they have
agreed.72 Indeed, as the following discussion suggests, such disputes are
inevitable under a structure that cannot adequately define or assess the
character attributes on which decisions turn.
III. THE CERTIFICATION PROCESS RECONSIDERED
A. The Central Premises of Character Review
1. Protecting the Public
Those involved in the character certification process have almost uni-
formly identified its central justification as protecting the public. George
Sharswood, author of a seminal nineteenth-century essay on professional
ethics, put the claim expansively: Since our "fortunes, reputations, domes-
tic peace . ..nay, our liberty and life itself" rest in the hands of legal
questions the truth of adverse information, the Willner decision suggests that he must have an oppor-
tunity to cross-examine the witness against him. See id. at 103-06.
Eight state bars make no provision for individual hearings or interviews (hereinafter referred to as
hearings) (16%; N=51). Three of the states employing mandatory interviews have no further direct
contact with the applicant (New York, Rhode Island, and Virginia). Five jurisdictions make no provi-
sion for hearings at any stage of the process (Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, and
Washington).
About 40% of all states provide for one level of hearings; slightly over a third have two; and a few
states (8%) have three. A more detailed analysis of the review process in the 14 representative states
reveals further variation. Five states employ a trial format, three simply question the applicant, and
the remainder proceed much like administrative agencies (e.g., the applicant can present witnesses and
evidence subject to examination by committee or board members). About two-thirds of the jurisdic-
tions permit the bar to present evidence (9/14), and three-quarters (11/14) keep a formal record. For
discussion of the scope of interviews, see pp. 514-15, 575-76.
With respect to disposition, some jurisdictions provide written opinions in instances of denial; others
simply issue an order or recommendation.
70. In re Monaghan, 122 Vt. 199, 205, 167 A.2d 81, 86 (1961); see also In re Application of
Warren, 149 Conn. 266, 273, 178 A.2d 528, 532 (1962) (issue in review is whether committee "acted
arbitrarily or unreasonably or in abuse of its discretion or without a fair investigation of the facts");
In re Latimer, 11 111. 2d 327, 330, 143 N.E.2d 20, 22 (review available only in cases of "an arbitrary
refusal of a certificate"), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 82 (1957).
71. Compare Application of Levine, 97 Ariz. 88, 397 P.2d 205 (1964) and Application of
Courtney, 83 Ariz. 231, 319 P.2d 991 (1957) with Greene v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 4 Cal. 3d
189, 480 P.2d 976, 93 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1971).
72. See Table 6, infra p. 536.
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advocates, "[tlheir character must be not only without a stain, but without
suspicion.'"" Variations on that theme have reechoed for a century in ju-
dicial decisions and scholarly comment. In Justice Frankfurter's view,
lawyers stood
"as a shield" . . . in defense of right and to ward off wrong. From a
profession charged with such responsibilities there must be exacted
those qualities of truth-speaking, of a high sense of honor, of granite
discretion, of the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility, that
have, throughout the centuries, been compendiously described as
"moral character.17 4
Those currently administering certification requirements generally ar-
ticulate a similar rationale for the process, although with less fulsome rhe-
torical flourish.7 5 In response to open-ended questions concerning their
objectives in character review, bar examiners generally stressed a need to
safeguard the public from the "morally unfit" lawyer; their goal was both
to exclude individuals with "unsavory characters" or traits "not appropri-
ate" for practitioners, and to deter those with "obvious" problems from
seeking a license. 6
More specifically, courts and commentators have traditionally identified
two prophylactic objectives for the certification process. The first is shield-
ing clients from potential abuses, such as misrepresentation, misappropri-
ation of funds, or betrayal of confidences. Since the "technical nature of
law" and the attorney's "peculiar position of trust" place clients in a vul-
nerable position, individuals whom the state certifies as fit to practice
73. G. SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 172 (3d ed. Philadelphia 1869) (Ist
ed. n.p. 1854).
74. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
see also In re Monaghan, 126 Vt. 53, 64, 222 A.2d 665, 674 (1966) (when courts review rejected
applicants, "the standing of the profession must not be disregarded, nor must the court shrink from
the performance of a clear duty however embarrassing"); Raymond, The Role of the Law School
Respecting Character and Fitness, 35 B. EXAMINER 3, 3 (1966) (lawyer must "have such character
and moral fitness as to bear the stamp of honesty so that he may be safely entrusted with his clients'
property, their lives and their honor").
75. Interviewers asked those involved in the first level of screening in all 51 jurisdictions how they
perceived their role in the certification process. In addition, bar committee or board chairpersons at
the highest stage of review in representative jurisdictions were asked what they saw as the main
purposes of the character and fitness process. Of those who identified a rationale for screening
(N=21, first level; N= 13, highest level), most offered somewhat conclusory statements about insur-
ing the fitness of lawyers (41%), certifying those who meet the standard for admission (21%), or
protecting the public (24%). A small percentage mentioned some other purpose, such as maintaining
an appropriate public appearance or avoiding discredit to the bar. For discussion of responses re-
ceived, see infra pp. 510-11.
76. Interview, Exec. Sec., Tenn. Bd. of B. Examiners (Oct. 15, 1982); Interview, Admin. Ass't,
S.C. Comm. on B. Admiss. (Sept. 23, 1982); Interview, Chairman, S. Alabama Char. and Fitness
Comm. (July 7, 1983); Interview, Member, Mich. Bd. of B. Examiners (July 12, 1983).
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should be worthy of the confidence reposed in them.7" A second concern
involves safeguarding the administration of justice from those who might
subvert it through subornation of perjury, misrepresentation, bribery, or
the like .
7
To achieve "[t]he greatest protection for the public, the courts, and po-
tential clients," bar spokesmen have advocated "eliminating the diseased
dogs before they inflict their first bite."179 As a practical matter, it is
thought "easier to refuse admittance to an immoral applicant than it is to
disbar him after he is admitted."80 The vast majority of attorney miscon-
duct remains undetected, unreported, or unprosecuted, and bar discipli-
nary authorities have proved highly reluctant to withdraw individuals'
means of livelihood."' Given the difficulties of ex post policing, entry re-
strictions appear to be a logical means of maximizing public protection.
The critical empirical question, however, is the effectiveness of current
procedures in identifying those likely to engage in future misconduct.
2. Preserving Professionalism
A second, although less frequently articulated, rationale for character
screening rests on the bar's own interest in maintaining a professional
community and public image. In both its instrumental and symbolic
dimensions, the certification process provides an opportunity for affirming
shared values. As sociologists since Durkheim have argued, the concept of
a profession presupposes some sense of common identity. Excluding cer-
tain candidates on character grounds serves to designate deviance, thus
establishing the boundaries of a moral community.82 So too, requiring all
applicants to account and, in some instances, to atone publicly for past
misconduct is thought to serve important socialization and prophylactic
77. In re Fla. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 358 So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. 1978); Alderman, Screening for
Character and Fitness, B. EXAMINER, Feb. 1982, at 23, 24. See also Barnes, Character Investigation
within the Model Code for Admissions, 38 B. EXAMINER 71, 71 (1969) ("[Tlhe public has a right to
trust people who are admitted to the bar ...."); Comment, Character Fitness for Admission to the
Bar, 2 UCLA L. REV. 224, 224 (1955) ("[I]t is of the utmost importance that the lawyer should in
every way warrant the faith reposed in him by his client.").
78. See Alderman, supra note 77, at 24; Walker, Texas' Tests of Character Come Too Late, 3
TEX. B.J. 177 (1940).
79. Weckstein, Recent Developments in the Character and Fitness Qualifications for the Practice
of Law: The Law School Role; The Political Dissident, 40 B. EXAMINER 17, 23 (1971).
80. Alderman, supra note 77, at 24; see infra notes 241-60 and accompanying text.
81. See infra pp. 548-50.
82. See generally H. BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE (1963); E.
DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (1933); E. DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
AND CIVIC MORALS (1957); P. ELLIOT, THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS (1972); K. ERIKSON,
WAYWARD PURITANS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE (1966); Becker, The Nature of a
Profession, in NATIONAL SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF EDUCATION, EDUCATION FOR THE PROFES-
SIONS 27 (1962); Goode, Community within a Community: The Professions, 22 AM. Soc. REV. 194
(1957).
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purposes."3 Taken together, the application, affidavit, and interview
processes also accords a certain formality to the profession's rites of entry
that some members wish to preserve. As one New York Character Com-
mittee Chairman put it, "After all, this is a profession. Obtaining a li-
cense to practice law is not like getting a driver's licence [sic] .... "8"
Moreover, the appearance of moral exclusivity pays service to an ideal
that retains some toehold in professional culture. Bar rhetoric traditionally
has cast lawyers as "sentinels" and "high priests" at the portals of jus-
tice. 5 That self-portrait demands at least the pretense of purity. Those
charged with upholding the law should not have defiled it; social pariahs
ought not to serve as handmaidens of justice. As one former Executive
Secretary of Manhattan's Character Committee explained, "A lawyer
should be like Caesar's wife."8 6
Weeding out the unworthy also helps to legitimate a status in which
practitioners have strong psychological as well as economic stakes. An
overriding objective of any organized profession is to enhance its members'
social standing, and the bar is scarcely an exception."7 To the contrary,
this nation's historic ambivalence toward the legal profession has inspired
particular concern among its elect. Although in fact, as de Tocqueville
observed a century ago, attorneys may comprise "the American aristoc-
racy" and its "political upper class," ' their position has been a matter of
perennial public resentment. Animus toward lawyers has persisted for de-
cades, and lawyers' presumed character deficiencies have inspired a well-
worn literary genre. The public's "low regard for the profession," re-
83. See Carothers, Character and Fitness: A Need for Increased Perception, B. EXAMINER, Aug.
1982, at 25, 31 (noting that board will frequently interview applicants whose admission it nonetheless
recommends, in order to confront them "with the unmistakable fact that their conduct is
unacceptable").
84. Baris, Why the Character Committee Interview is Unfit, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 28, 1980, at 15, col.
4 (quoting Arthur Schwartz).
85. See, e.g., T. STRONG, JOSEPH H. CHOATE 130 (1917) (quoting Choate: lawyer is a "priest
and possibly a high priest in the Temple of Justice"); Jackson, Law and Lawyers: Is the Profession of
the Advocate Consistent with Perfect Integrity?, excerpted in THE LEGAL MIND IN AMERICA, supra,
at 274, 283 ("sentinel," "guardian of morality," and "conservator of right"); Kent, An Address Deliv-
ered before the Law Association of The City of New York, October 2, 1836, 16 AM. JURIST 471, 472
(1836) ("sentinels"); Story, Address Delivered before the Members of the Suffolk Bar, excerpted in
THE LEGAL MIND IN AMERICA: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE CIVIL WAR 63, 71 (P. Miller ed.
1962) ("sentinels" and "faithful guardians"); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Chair-
man's Introduction, at iii (Proposed Final Draft, May 30, 1981) ("ministers"); Report of the Commit-
tee on Code of Professional Ethics, 29 REP. A.B.A. 600, 601 (1906) ("high-priests").
86. Papke, The Watergate Lawyers All Passed the Character and Fitness Committee, 2 COLUM.
U.F. 15, 19 (1973) (quoting Theodore Freschi).
87. See generally B. BLESTEIN, THE CULTURE OF PROFESSIONALISM 98-105 (1976) (symbols of
professional authority invoked to maintain dependence of clients); C. GILB, supra note 27, at 21-22
(suggesting that professionals are in some instances more powerful than government agencies with
which they deal).
88. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 268 (G. Lawrence trans., J. Mayer ed.
1969) (1st ed. n.p. 1864).
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flected in recent public opinion polls, is a matter of acute concern to prac-
ticing lawyers; ABA members have ranked it as the most urgent issue
facing the bar, and ABA presidents have repeatedly pledged to make im-
proving lawyers' image one of their highest priorities.8"
How exactly that improvement can be secured is a matter of dispute,
but bar examiners frequently present character certification as part of the
general campaign. In their view, a single unethical lawyer brings "disre-
pute to the whole profession," penalizing the thousand who slave "might-
ily and righteously." 90 To the extent that character review can "screen[]
out . . . moral risks before they are admitted to practice . . ., the profes-
sion's priceless reputation" is well-served.9 Moreover, irrespective of the
success of certification procedures in minimizing subsequent abuse, their
existence may help to maintain confidence in lawyers' self-governance
structures. As one examiner explained, it is important that the public "see
we're trying to catch people"; such efforts are critical in "assur[ing] [sic] a
credible bar."9 2
From that perspective, certification appears to be an integral part of the
general effort to legitimate the profession's regulatory autonomy and eco-
nomic monopoly. The appearance of moral oversight may help both to
preempt the call for external involvement in bar governance processes, and
to buttress justifications for banning unregulated (and hence potentially
unethical) competitors. As a former chairman of the Committee on Char-
acter and Fitness Examination of the National Conference of Bar Exam-
iners pointedly observed, "[m]ovements are on foot in many states to
stamp out the unauthorized practice of law by the layman. If these move-
ments are to receive the sympathetic support of the general public, is it
not desirable that the lawyer, in addition to being well educated, be also a
man of character?" 9'
89. Harris and Gallup public opinion data are summarized in Those #*XI!!! Lawyers, TIME,
Apr. 10, 1978, at 56; see also Bodine, People of Wisconsin Trust Lawyers, Bar Survey Finds, Nat'l
L.J., Jan. 28, 1980, at 6, col. 1 (reporting state survey results). For representative responses to the
public image problem, see Project '77 Results: Incompetence Rising, Jusis DocrOR, July-Aug. 1977,
at 23 (results of legal periodical's survey of its readers); Barrett, Our Common Goal, 44 TEx. B.J.
1331 (1981) (state bar president pledging to improve lawyers' image); Casey, President's
Message-We Have Miles to Go, Much to Do, 50 CAL ST. B.J. 455 (1975) (acknowledging public
criticism of legal profession); Keating, Where We Are; Where We Should Aim, 60 MICH. B.J. 722
(1981) (same); Souers, Annual Report of the President, 54 OHIo ST. B. ASS'N Rrs,. 961 (1981)
(same).
90. Barnes, supra note 77; Interview, Member, Ill. Char. and Fitness Comm., 3d Dist. (July 18,
1983) (explaining role of character process improving "image of the profession which ... is not the
best image"); Interview, Chairman, Nev. Bd. of Law Examiners (July 12, 1983) (identifying avoid-
ance of discredit to bar as major objective).
91. Farley, Character Investigation of Applicants for Admission, 24 B. EXAMINER 147, 158
(1955).
92. Interview, Member, Mich. Bd. of B. Examiners (July 12, 1983); Alderman, supra note 77, at
25 (character evaluation protects "integrity and credibility" of bar).
93. Character Investigation, 18 B. EXAMINER 89, 90 (1949). For justifications of the professional
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Even as a theoretical matter, however, this rationale for character
screening remains problematic. While these professional interests help ex-
plain, they fail adequately to justify the bar's attachment to character
screening. To prevent or deter individuals from entering a profession in
order to promote the reputation, autonomy, or monopoly of existing mem-
bers is troubling on constitutional as well as public policy grounds. Taken
to its logical extreme, this rationale would support exclusion of any appli-
cant whose conduct the local bar deemed unbecoming or likely to taint its
public image. Particularly in a profession charged with safeguarding the
rights of the unpopular, the price of such unbounded licensing discretion
could be substantial. And it is difficult to construe the bar's parochial con-
cerns as the kind of legitimate state interest normally required to restrain
vocational choice.94
In any event, as an empirical matter, it is questionable whether the
certification process as currently administered inspires public confidence,
and whether the system defines a moral community consistent with the
profession's most enlightened instincts and ideals. As the following sec-
tions suggest, both structural and substantive constraints render current
character screening procedures a dubious means of either protecting the
public or preserving professionalism.
B. Structural Problems in Current Procedures
1. Resource Constraints and the Limits of Character Investigation
Among surveyed bar examiners, the most commonly cited problem in
the certification process is the inadequacy of time, resources, staff, and
sources of information to conduct meaningful character inquiries.9 Coin-
monopoly predicated on the bar's special ability to ensure ethical representation, see Rhode, Policing
the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice
Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1, 90 n.369 (1981).
94. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252, 263 (1957) (definition of "good moral
character" may reflect prejudices); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957)
(any state qualification for bar admission must "have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness
or capacity to practice law").
95. Interview, Chairman, Ill. Char. and Fitness Comm., 1st Dist. (July 11, 1983) (lack of infor-
mation); Interview, Member, Ill. Char. and Fitness Comm., 3d Dist. (July 13, 1983) (usually only
information is from applicant); Interview, Chairman, Me. Bd. of B. Examiners (Aug. 2, 1983) (lim-
ited resources to get information and short time period); Interview, Chairman, Kan. Bd. of Admis-
sions (July 8, 1983) (constraints of time and expense); Interview, Chairman, Mich. Char. and Fitness
Comm. (July 8, 1983) (inadequate time and too small an investigative staff); Interview, Supervising
Attorney, Cal. Pre-Admission Investigation (Oct. 20, 1982) (investigations of out-of-state applicants
difficult); Interview, Dir., Minn. B. Admissions, (Oct. 18, 1982) (insufficient staffing); Interview,
Sec., Neb. St. B. Comm. (Sept. 23, 1982) (inadequate time and staff); Interview, Exec. Dir., Nev. St.
B. (undated) (inadequate investigations); Interview, Chairman, N.Y. Char. and Fitness Comm., 6th
Dist. (june 10, 1983) (process too cursory); Interview, Chairman, N.Y. Char. and Fitness Comm.,
2d, 10th & llth Dists. (june 11, 1983) (too large a workload); Interview, Admin. Ass't, S.C. Comm.
on B. Admissions (undated) (inadequate facilities to investigate out-of-state residents); Interview,
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pounding those inadequacies is the unevenness of screening within and
across jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions invest "minimal" effort in the en-
terprise (e.g., five hours a year for the total pool of applicants); others
involve the equivalent of five full-time employees and thousands of hours
of volunteer effort. 6
Particularly in less urban regions with decentralized committee systems,
review can be quite cursory; in Missouri, for example, investigation may
cease with a check on residency or a phone call to someone who knows or
knows of the applicant.9 7 Some examiners, who thought well of the candi-
date's law school or law firm, simply assumed that these institutions had
adequately screened for character difficulties, or would contact the bar if
there was cause for concern. 8 In other jurisdictions, review is more sys-
tematic. Half the states routinely check police records and contact at least
some previous employers. Almost all jurisdictions demand personal refer-
ences of varying number, and a substantial minority solicit other sources
of information.9
Chairman, Tenn. Bd. of B. Examiners (July 20, 1983) (uneven assistance from many local bars);
Interview, Member, Va. Temporary Char. and Fitness Comm., 27th Dist. (July 6, 1983) (process not
very thorough).
96. Administrators in Idaho, Maine, and Nevada reported minimal activity. See Interview, Bar
Counsel, Idaho (Aug. 17, 1982); Interview, Sec., Me. Bd. of B. Examiners (Aug. 1, 1983); Interview,
Exec. Dir., Nev. St. B. (July 8, 1983). A Kansas examiner gave the five-hour figure, and Montana
reportedly conducts no investigations. See Interview, Disciplinary Admin., Kan. (July 7, 1983); Inter-
view, Deputy Clerk, Mont. Sup. Ct. (June 8, 1983). The five-employee figure came from Washing-
ton, while Pennsylvania indicated up to eight hours per applicant. See Interview, Exec. Dir., Wash.
St. B. (Aug. 23, 1982); Interview, Office Mgr., Pa. Bd. of Law Examiners (Oct. 19, 1982). Most
respondents, however, were unable to provide meaningful estimates, given their decentralized struc-
tures, the overlap of personnel involved in character and competence screening, or reliance on uncom-
pensated interviewers.
Chairpersons of bar fitness committees or boards of bar examiners from the 14 selected states in-
vested anywhere from 8 to 500 hours a year in reviewing problem cases; the average was 108 hours
(N= 10).
97. Interview, Member, Mo. Screening Comm., 38th Cir. (june 9, 1983); Interview, Special
Rep., Mo. B., 21st & 22d Dists. (June 20, 1983); Interview, Pres., Mo. Bd. of B. Examiners (June 7,
1983); see also Interview, Member, Ill. Char. and Fitness Comm., 3d Dist. (July 13, 1983) (noting
quick procedure in most cases); infra p. 515.
98. Interview, Special Rep., Mo. B., 21st & 22d Dists. (june 20, 1983); Interview, Pres., Mo.
Bd. of B. Examiners (june 7, 1983); see also Interview, Pres., W. Va. Bd. of B. Examiners (July 8,
1983) (fact that good law firm hired candidate relevant to decision to admit); Interview, Disciplinary
Admin., Kan. (July 7, 1983) (relying on close contact with deans of state law schools). Similarly,
examiners in New York's Manhattan district reportedly felt little need to scrutinize applicants with
references from large corporate firms. See Papke, supra note 86, at 20.
A review of earlier examiner commentary reveals occasional intimations that those from "inferior"
or night schools warrant closer scrutiny than other applicants. See Character Investigation, supra note
93, at 91 (remarks of William M. James, Comm. on Char. and Fitness Examination of the National
Conf. of B. Examiners); Stevens, Two Cheers for 1870: The American Law School, in 5 PERSPEC-
TIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 405, 463 n.79 (1971) (citing Richards, Progress in Legal Education,
HANDBOOK OF A.A.L.S. 15 (1915)).
99. Such sources include motor vehicle records (42%); law school deans (34%); members of the
bar (through published announcement of applicants) (7%); local banks (2%); high schools (2%); and
records of litigation (6%) and military service (4%) (N=51).
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The usefulness of much of this effort is, however, open to dispute. Most
examiners found employers or personal references were "only rarely" or
"virtually never" of assistance."' In some jurisdictions, the "helpfulness"
of references may consist largely in pedigreeing applicants with main-
stream professional and law school connections, while occasionally raising
questions about those with less acceptable associations. The amount of
adverse factual information revealed through personal recommendations is
questionable. In California's experience, such references are useful in less
than one percent of cases; employers are almost always positive or non-
committal, and applicants are unlikely to list an individual who may pro-
vide adverse information.10 1
Although ten states supplement their investigations with mandatory in-
terviews for all bar applicants, it is doubtful how much these personal
interchanges add to the reliability of character assessment. 0 2 Since the
vast majority of applications present no evidence of misconduct, and ex-
aminers have no other sources of information, discussion is frequently per-
functory or somewhat desultory. Conversation will center on "what it
means to be a lawyer," the candidate's background, his reasons for legal
study, or areas in which he appears to need "guidance. '10 3 In certain
New York districts, interviews consume only eight to fifteen minutes, and
some of that time is spent discussing the weather, mutual acquaintances,
and the applicant's future job prospects.104 In other jurisdictions, substan-
tive interchange is even more limited. According to one Virginia commit-
tee chairman, his "only purpose" is to determine whether the applicant
100. When asked how frequently employers provided information resulting in investigation, a
little over a third of respondents said occasionally (39%); the remainder said rarely (23%) or virtually
never (39%) (N=44). For obvious reasons, the references that applicants supply are of still more
limited value. Only a quarter of respondents found such sources helpful even occasionally (25%); most
said they were rarely (28%) or virtually never (47%) of assistance (N=43).
101. Interview, Supervising Attorney, Cal. Pre-admission Investigation (Oct. 20, 1982). Accord
Interview, Chairman, N.Y. Char and Fitness Comm., 3d Dist. (June 10, 1983); see also The Special
Committee on Professional Education and Admissions of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York & The Committee on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar of the New York State
Bar Association, Committee Report: The Character and Fitness Committees in New York State, 33
THE RECORD 20, 48 (1978) (recommending deletion of third-party affidavits requirement since they
do not develop useful information) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. Comm. Rep.]. Publishing candidates'
names appears even less likely to prove illuminating. In Oregon, the practice has generated one phone
call in the last four years. In short, as several examiners acknowledged, applicants who fail to disclose
compromising conduct will frequently remain undetected.
102. Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode
Island, and West Virginia require interviews for all applicants. All Illinois applicants except those
from the 1st District (Chicago) must be interviewed, and Virginia committees interview those from
out-of-state law schools.
103. Interview, Sec., N.Y. Char. Comm., 2d Jud. Dep't (July 1983); Interview, Chairman, N.Y.
Char. and Fitness Comm., 8th Dist. (July 15, 1983); Interview, Admin., N.H. Char. and Fitness
Comm. (Aug. 19, 1982).
104. N.Y. Comm. Rep., supra note 101, at 34.
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has complied with residency requirements or committed a felony."0 5 The
objectives of other examiners are less apparent. One New York inter-
viewer could not remember what his function was; he would have "to go
back and read the books."' 08 As another individual acknowledged, "a lot
of lawyers don't know what they're supposed to do in these interviews. "107
Thus, limited resources and sources of information severely restrict the
effectiveness of bar evaluative processes. The result, as some examiners
noted, is that applicants can often "get by" through lying.' Yet, given
other difficulties in the review system, it is unclear that a substantially
greater investment of effort would significantly improve the reliability of
character predictions.
2. The Timing of Review and the Infrequency of Character Denials
An inherent inadequacy in the certification process stems from the point
at which oversight occurs. In essence, the current process is both too early
and too late. Screening takes place before most applicants have faced situ-
ational pressures comparable to those in practice, yet after candidates have
made such a significant investment in legal training that denying admis-
sion becomes extremely problematic.
Screening law school graduates, whose median age is about twenty-
seven, 09 is in many respects premature. Most attorney misconduct in-
volves white collar offenses, and most applicants have not yet occupied
positions of trust that create the possibility for such abuses." 0 Other
chronic problems, such as alcoholism, from which later difficulties in
practice might stem, are simply not predictable from applicant records."'
As examiners frequently noted, candidates are generally too young to have
made a record for themselves." 2 Several respondents felt they were re-
viewing "virgin babes in the woods," whose life histories gave little indi-
cation of how they would perform as attorneys.""
105. Interview, Chairman, Va. Temporary Interviewing Comm., 4th Dist. (June 20, 1983).
106. Interview, Chairman, N.Y. Char. and Fitness Comm., 6th Dist. (June 10, 1983).
107. Interview, Exec. Dir., Ind. Bd. of B. Examiners (Aug. 16, 1982).
108. Interview, Sec., N.Y. Char. Comm., 2d Jud. Dep't (July 1983); see also Interview, Member,
Ill. Char. and Fitness Comm., 3d Dist. (July 18, 1983); Interview, Office Mgr., Pa. Bd. of Law
Examiners (Oct. 19, 1982).
109. See Law School Admissions Services, Inc., Law School Admission Bulletin, Oct. 1984, at 5
(statistics on age of applicants to law school in spring 1984).
110. See infra p. 559; Center for Public Representation, Inc., Memorandum and Proposal for
Change in the Good Moral Character Requirement for Bar Admission in Wisconsin 3 (June 16,
1976) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
111. Interview, Chairman, N.C. Bd. of B. Examiners (July 8, 1983).
112. See Character Investigation of Law Students, 18 B. EXAMINER 189, 190 (1949) (panel dis-
cussion, remarks of Burton R. Sawyer, Minnesota bar examiner); see also Farley, supra note 91, at
158 ("Many applicants at the time of admission are so young they have not yet developed traits of
character which can be detected and taken into account in the admission process.").
113. Interview, President-Eleci, Idaho Bd. of Comm'rs (July 14, 1983); see also Farley, supra
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Yet in another sense, bar screening is too belated. Once individuals have
invested three years and thousands of dollars in their legal education,
many examiners are reluctant to withhold certification." 4 That reluctance
undoubtedly helps account for the low incidence of applications denied on
character grounds. In 1981, in the thirty-eight jurisdictions for which sta-
tistics were available, about 6.5% of all eligible candidates, approximately
1,931 individuals, were subject to non-routine character investigation. 5
About 1.6% of all eligible candidates, roughly 594 individuals (N=45),
received some form of administrative hearing. Forty-one percent of all
states (N=41) rejected no applicant on grounds of moral character; the
percentage of denials ranged from zero to two percent and the maximum
number of individuals excluded in any jurisdiction was estimated at
twelve to fifteen (California). In the forty-one states that could supply
1982 information, bar examiners declined to certify the character of ap-
proximately .2% of all eligible applicants, an estimated fifty-odd individu-
als. The only other empirical data available suggest that this percentage
has remained relatively constant over the last quarter century. 6
Not only are denials of admission infrequent, but not all rejected appli-
note 91, at 158 (many applicants too young to have developed character traits); Interview, Exec. Dir.,
Alaska B. (Oct. 5, 1982) ("some really bad apples have whistle clean written records"); Interview,
Chairman, N.C. Bd. of B. Examiners (July 8, 1983) (how people will behave depends on problems
that arise five years later).
114. See Interview, Chairman, N.Y. Char. and Fitness Comm., 7th Jud. Dist., 4th App. Dep't
(Dec. 20, 1982). The point has frequently been made elsewhere. See, e.g., Donnelly, Qualifications of
Applicants Seeking to Take a Bar Examination, 31 B. EXAMINER 78, 89 (1962) (examiners reluctant
to jeopardize law students' investment); Glenn, Registration at Beginning of Law Study and Charac-
ter Examination, 23 B. EXAMINER 35, 37 (1954) (earlier screening would help eliminate pressure
toward leniency); Powell, Comments on the Subject of the Panel Discussion, 34 B. EXAMINER 116,
119 (1965) (because of likelihood of examiners' leniency, law schools should "screen out
undesirables").
115. Those percentages remain approximate due to the limitations of the data available. "Eligible
candidates" refers to the number of individuals subject to character review. Depending on when states
begin their screening process, this figure includes either all applicants to the bar or only those who
have passed the exam. For the 45 states supplying 1981 review data, statistics on the 1981 applicant
pool were used. For the four states supplying 1982 survey figures, the applicant pool was calculated
on the basis of 1982 figures. For statistics regarding the number of persons taking and passing the
1981 and 1982 bar examinations, see 1981 Bar Examination Statistics, 51 B. EXAMINER, May 1982,
at 25-27; 1982 Bar Examination Statistics, 52 B. EXAMINER, May 1983, at 24-26.
Since not all states could provide information concerning the number of investigations, hearings,
and denials, it was necessary to restrict the eligible applicant pool to include candidates only in the
jurisdictions for which data were available. Certain further adjustments were made to reflect limita-
tions in two states' statistics: New York could provide screening information only for certain districts,
and South Carolina had data only on individuals taking the July exam. With those adjustments, the
total number of eligible applicants in the 38 states supplying information about investigations was
29,500. In the 45 states providing statistics about hearings, the number of applicants was 38,063. The
number of applicants in the 41 states supplying information about denials was 30,869.
116. See, e.g., Brown & Fassett, Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 480,
497 (1953) (estimates from New York, Illinois, and California indicating that less than .5% of appli-
cants rejected on character grounds); Shafroth, Character Investigation-An Essential Element of the
Bar Admission Process, 18 B. EXAMINER 194, 198 (1949) (California data suggest that about .5% of
applicants were denied admission and .5% abandoned their applications for moral character reasons).
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cants are ultimately foreclosed from practice. Some individuals will seek
reconsideration, a practice encouraged in jurisdictions such as California,
where candidates may reapply within two years without retaking the bar
examination.' Other individuals may migrate to less stringent jurisdic-
tions or challenge their denials in court."" Although the latter practice is
relatively rare, those who appeal adverse decisions have a fair chance of
success. A systematic survey of all state and federal cases involving appli-
cants to the bar reveals only 102 reported decisions in the half century
between 1932 and 1982, of which roughly half (52) occurred during the
last decade. In many of those cases, judges are even more reluctant than
examiners to withhold certification. During that fifty-year period, over a
third (37%) of applicants gained admission, and an additional seven per-
cent had their cases remanded.
These figures cannot, however, be taken as a measure of the screening
process' overall effect. Statistics on denials afford no indication of the de-
terrent impact of licensing procedures, an impact compounded by other
structural features of the certification process.
3. The Uneven and Uncertain Scope of Scrutiny: The In Terrorem
Effect of Certification
Although no state ultimately withholds certification from large numbers
of individuals, there is considerable variation in the frequency and form of
review and its potential effect on the applicant pool. The percentage of
applicants subject to non-routine investigation in any single state varies
from zero to almost half, and the percentage of candidates receiving hear-
ings ranges from zero to twelve percent. These differential screening rates
are not without significance, since applicants who are investigated often
drop out at an intermediate stage of the review process." 9
In addition, as some examiners pointed out, a substantial group of indi-
viduals may be deterred from applying to law school or to a particular
state bar out of concern that they will not be certified. 20 This deterrent
117. RULES REGULATING ADMISSION TO PRACTICE LAW IN CALIFORNIA Rule X § 104(A).
118. See infra pp. 529-31; see also In re Monaghan, 126 Vt. 53, 222 A.2d 665 (1966) (applicant
who reapplied in same jurisdiction ultimately admitted); In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945) (unsuc-
cessful challenge of denial of admission); Application of Ronwin, 113 Ariz. 357, 555 P.2d 315 (1976)
(same), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 907 (1977), discussed infra note 364.
119. See Interview, Chairman, Tenn. Bd. of B. Examiners (July 20, 1983) (some applicants with-
draw after report of the bar association); cf. Interview, Chairman, Ill. Comm. on Char. and Fitness,
1st Dist. (July 13, 1983) (twenty-five percent of applications trigger some form of investigation but
relatively few receive hearing).
120. Cf Custer, Georgia's Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants, 51 B. EXAMINER, Aug.
1982, at 17, 21 (1982) ("The mere fact that the [flitness [process] exists has doubtless resulted in a
great number of applications never being filed."); Interview, Member, Mich. Bd. of B. Examiners
(July 12, 1983) (discussing "chilling effect" and "self-selection").
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effect is enhanced by the general lack of information concerning certifica-
tion criteria and administration. Only three states have published policies
or guidelines on the specific types of conduct that prompt investigation,
and no jurisdiction issues statistics on the number of character investiga-
tions or denials of certification. With relatively few exceptions, definitive
advance rulings by character committees are also unavailable.12'
This absence of notice did not appear to be a major concern to most
current bar administrators. Although a few respondents expressed frustra-
tion at the absence of guidelines for their own decisionmaking, only one
identified indeterminacy for applicants as a problem in the screening pro-
cess. 22 The prevailing assumption appeared to be that bar standards were
self-evident; if the applicant had a character and fitness problem he
"should know it."' 2' 3
In fact, as subsequent discussion will suggest, the subjectivity and in-
consistencies in certification assessments make predictions-by the appli-
cants or bar examiners-highly uncertain. That indeterminacy, together
with the general lack of reliable information about the frequency and fo-
cus of adverse rulings, may dissuade some risk-averse individuals from
attending law school or seeking to practice in a particular state, although
their chances of rejection would in reality be minimal. Conversely, some
small but not insignificant number of applicants each year overestimate
their ability to obtain certification. To minimize such misjudgments, bar
spokesmen have frequently advocated an earlier screening mechanism.
4. The Limitations of Preliminary Screening: Law Schools and Pre-
Registration Procedures
Given the costs and difficulties of denying admission to those with sub-
stantial sunk costs in their legal education, bar examiners have often
urged law schools to take an active role in character screening. Alterna-
tively, some bar examiners have encouraged states to establish systems for
registering and investigating the character of first-year law students. On
the whole, neither proposal has met with great enthusiasm.
Many states experimented with law student registration procedures fol-
lowing endorsement of that approach in 1938 by the ABA and National
121. See infra p. 572-73.
122. Only the chairman of Oregon's Board of Bar Examiners expressed doubt that applicants had
sufficient information about board criteria. Interview, Chairman, Or. Bd. of B. Examiners (July 19,
1983); cf. Interview, Chairman, Va. Temporary Char. and Fitness Comm., 26th Dist. (June 21,
1983) (lack of guidance as to meaning of interviewing process is problem).
123. Interview, Sec., Ariz. Char. and Fitness Comm. (Aug. 17, 1982).
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Conference of Bar Examiners."" The rationale for registration was that it
would enable administrators to conduct a thorough inquiry into a stu-
dent's background before he invested substantial time, effort, and re-
sources in his legal education.' 2 5 Examiners would then inform applicants
whether they might later have difficulty obtaining certification. Once bar
officials had given such advice, they would feel "less pressure" to be "un-
duly lenient" in the final admission determination. 2 In addition, by
drawing students' attention to the character inquiry, a registration pro-
gram might help instill "professional attitudes" and deter "any kind of
trouble or disturbance in the law school."12 7 That such a system might
also chill protected but controversial activity, or force premature character
assessments, seems not to have been of major concern to most state bars.
Rather, dissatisfaction with the program stemmed from more pragmatic
considerations; few jurisdictions remained willing to conduct investigations
both at law school entrance and graduation.'28 Only nine states currently
have student registration and screening systems.' 29
Given the absence of preliminary bar certification procedures, examin-
ers have often advocated more serious attempts by law schools to "separate
the sheep from the goats."' 30 The response within academic institutions
has been mixed. Although almost all law schools perform some screening,
124. See BAR EXAMINER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 126; Shafroth, supra note 116, at 205;
Proceedings of the House of Delegates, 63 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 143, 176 (1938).
125. See sources cited supra note 114; Underwood, Address at Joint Luncheon, 39 B. EXAMINER
128, 131 (1970) (addressing National Conference of Bar Examiners and Section of Legal Education
and Admission to the Bar).
126. Donnelly, supra note 114, at 84; Glenn, supra note 114, at 37.
127. Stevens, Registration and Character Examination at Beginning of Law Study, 24 B. EXAM-
INER 35, 43-44 (1955).
128. Donnelly, supra note 114, at 88-9; BAR EXAMINERS' HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 126.
129. Alabama, California, Florida, Iowa, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, and Texas screen students at the time of registration. RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO
THE ALA. STATE BAR Rules 1A, 1B; RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA RELATING TO
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, Article 2, §§ 1, 5; RULES RELATING TO ADMISSION TO THE IOWA BAR
Court Rule 112(1); Interview, Clerk, Iowa Sup. Ct. (Aug. 30, 1982); RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION
TO THE MISSISSIPPI STATE BAR Rule III §§ 1, 3, Rule VIII § 4; Interview, Exec. Ass't, Miss. Bd. of
B. Admission (Aug. 30, 1982); RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE BAR IN MISSOURI Rules
8.04, 8.07; SUPREME COURT RULES FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE BAR OF OHIO Rule 1 §§ 2, 3;
RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA Rule 4 § 2;
Interview, Admin. Dir., Okla. Bd. of B. Examiners (undated); RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO
THE BAR OF TEXAS Rule III §§ (a)(1), (d); BAR EXAMINERS' HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 160.
California requires students to register but does not conduct preliminary investigations. RULES
REGULATING ADMISSION TO PRACTICE LAW IN CALIFORNIA Rules V, VI; Interview, Supervising
Attorney, Cal. Pre-admission Investigation (Oct. 20, 1982). Although Maryland nominally requires
law student registration, see BAR EXAMINERS' HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 126, the process takes
place only a year before the bar examination and essentially operates as the candidate's application to
the bar. See RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE BAR OF MARYLAND.
130. Character Investigation, supra note 93, at 91 (quoting W. James, Chairman, Comm. on
Char. and Fitness Examination, Nat'l Conference of Bar Examiners).
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most lack the "investigatory capabilities or inclination" to implement bar
admission standards.''
In the vast majority of accredited law schools, character plays some role
in admissions determinations. A 1970 poll revealed that eighty-five per-
cent of administrators at those institutions believed character qualifications
were relevant in the assessment of applicants. 2 All but six current ad-
missions applications have some questions concerning character; Table 1
summarizes the most common inquiries. As is apparent, the scope of con-
cern varies considerably. Although the vast majority of schools are inter-
ested in adult (88%) or juvenile (81%) crimes and university disciplinary
actions (81%), there is less consensus as to the relevance of physical and
psychiatric problems (61%), arrests (14%) and charges (15%), pre-college
academic discipline (41%), military offenses (55%), and personal refer-
ences that speak to character issues (45%).'3'
The extent to which such character information affects the composition
of law school student bodies is difficult to gauge. Some individuals are
reportedly deterred from seeking admission either by the disclosures de-
manded in application forms, or by advice from bar and law school ad-
ministrators. 34 The in terrorem effect of these warnings, coupled with bar
examiners' general disinclination to provide definitive policies or advance
rulings, may help account for the small number of law school applicants
rejected on character grounds. Among the eighteen surveyed schools, ad-
ministrators estimated that less than one percent of applications presented
131. Interview, Dean of Students, Stanford Law School (July 19, 1983); see also BAR EXAMIN-
ERs' HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 136 (unrealistic to expect law schools "to become significantly
involved in making a judgment for which they are ill-equipped and at a time that may well be
premature").
132. Weckstein, supra note 79, at 18. That response reflects a decline from a 1965 poll in which
96% of law school deans surveyed indicated that character qualifications were relevant to law school
admissions. Id. See also Kempner, Current Practices of Law Schools with Respect to Character Quali-
fications of Students, 34 B. EXAMINER 106, 106-07 (1966) (discussing 1965 poll).
133. A minority of schools is interested in criminal charges (15%), arrests (14%), guilty or nolo
contendere pleas (5%), indictments (4%), imprisonment (4%), or involvement as a party to criminal
and/or civil proceedings (5%). A handful of schools also ask about probation, summons, warning,
questioning, investigations, or the like.
134. About 12% of the schools include such advice on the application form or in the accompany-
ing informational materials, and others have a similar warning in their bulletin. A few respondents
reported counseling potential candidates to contact the bar, and some of these candidates reportedly
withdrew or failed to complete their applications. Interview, Dir. of Admissions, Wake Forest Univ.
School of Law (Aug. 9, 1983) (refers candidates to bar; reports withdrawals); Interview, Assoc. Dean,
West Virginia Univ. College of Law (Aug. 3, 1983) (refers candidates to bar); accord Interview,
Assoc. Dean, Washburn Law School (Aug. 1, 1983) (students directed to contact bar themselves); see
also Interview, Admissions Dir., Wayne State Univ. Law School (Aug. 2, 1983) (students must sign
release authorizing dean to disclose any disciplinary measures that may be taken); Interview, Ass't
Dean, Univ. of Maine School of Law (Aug. 1, 1983) (students urged to contact state bar examiners if
they have questions about potential barriers to admission).
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TABLE 1
ACCREDITED LAW SCHOOL APPLICATION FORMS (1983)
Percentage of Schools Inquiring about Criminal
and Non-criminal Conduct (N=170)
CRIMINAL
Criminal convictions 74%
Including all misdemeanors 69%
Explicitly excluding juvenile offenses 5%
Criminal charges 15%
Arrests 14%
Guilty/No Contest pleas 5%
Indictments 4%
Imprisonment 4%
Involvement as party to
criminal or any legal proceeding 5%
Any inquiry as to criminal involvement 88%
CIVIL
Civil litigation 12%
Involvement in any case 8%
Fraud or other "dishonorable" conduct 4%
Academic disciplinary 81%
Pre-college incidents included 40%
Problems in the military 55%
Employment discharges 12%
Professional discipline 4%
License revocations and denials 4%
Physical & psychological problems or
interruptions in study or work: e.g., 61%
Serious health conditions 14%
Institutionalization 6%
Treatment for mental or emotional problems 5%
Bankruptcy 2%
serious moral character questions, and only about .3% resulted in deni-
als. 13 5 Extrapolated to all accredited law schools, these percentages would
suggest that some 1,000 individuals are prejudiced and 330 are denied
admission each year on character grounds.1 6
135. Based on estimates from the 18 surveyed schools, their applicant pool totaled approximately
28,814 individuals, and about .3%, or 86, candidates were denied admission on character grounds.
136. ABA figures reflect that 111,118 individuals applied to accredited law schools in 1983. A
Review of Legal Education in the United States Fall, 1983 Law Schools and Bar Admission Require-
ments, 1984 A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDuc. & ADMISSIONS TO THE B.; telephone interview with Jerry
521
The Yale Law Journal
Apart from self-selection by applicants, there are a number of other
explanations for the low incidence of problem cases. Law schools gener-
ally lack the resources or inclination to conduct serious independent inves-
tigation. On the average, surveyed schools made character inquiries be-
yond those on the application for only about .1% of applicants, and in
two-thirds of those cases consulted no sources beyond the candidate. If
applicants withhold evidence of compromising conduct, it can easily re-
main undetected under current procedures. More importantly, the stan-
dard admissions criteria severely restrict the pool of applicants presenting
serious character difficulties. For example, as one associate dean ex-
plained, problem candidates generally have criminal convictions, "messed
up" lives and spotty undergraduate records. 137 Applicants with a "smok-
ing gun" and unblemished academic credentials are rarely encountered.' 8
And to the extent that institutions require a smoking gun before seriously
prejudicing candidates, problem cases will arise infrequently.
When asked what sorts of conduct have raised significant moral charac-
ter cases over the past five years, most administrators identified either
criminal convictions (64%) or academic violations (36%). Some respon-
dents mentioned questions of mental stability (14%) or candor on the ap-
plication (21%). Of the reported candidates in 1983 denied admission for
character-related reasons, over four-fifths (83%) had criminal convictions,
typically felonies such as embezzlement or drug-related crimes. The re-
maining cases involved fraud, honor code problems, and mental
breakdowns.
To obtain more detailed information, interviewers also inquired how
law schools would probably respond to particular types of conduct by an
applicant or current student. Table 2 summarizes these responses.
As these data suggest, and subsequent discussion will confirm, the con-
cerns of law schools are not entirely congruent with those of bar examin-
ers. In admitting candidates, educational institutions attach higher priority
to academic misconduct and nondisclosure on law school application forms
than do most state bars."3 9 Indeed, prior surveys of accredited schools in
the 1960's and 1970's disclosed that such conduct was one of the most
likely factors to preempt admission on character grounds. 40 Moreover,
most law schools expressed relatively little concern regarding matters that
can be significant in bar character screening, such as bankruptcies, traffic,
Caulfield, ABA Consultant on Legal Education (July 17, 1984).
137. Interview, Assoc. Dean, Whittier College School of Law (July 28, 1983).
138. Interview, Assoc. Dean, Univ. of Minnesota Law School (July 28, 1983).
139. State bars are concerned, however, with lack of candor on their own applications. See infra
p. 532-37.
140. See Kempner, supra note 132, at 108; Weckstein, supra note 79, at 19-20.
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TABLE 2
















Criminal Conviction 88% 50% 100%
(assault, theft)
Lack of Candor on 78% 73% 63%
Application
Academic Misconduct 69% 73% 94%
Unauthorized Practice 64% 57% 76%
Drug Conviction 44% 13% 94%
Draft Offense 38% 0% 81%
Driving Offense 25% 0% 28%
Financial Mismanagement 20% 0% 29%
Psychological Treatment 13% 0% 6%
Other (sexual activity,
political activity, 0% 0% 0%
bankruptcy)
drug or draft offenses, psychiatric treatment, and sexual or political con-
duct. 4" As Table 1 reflects, many law school applications make no in-
quiries in these areas. According to some administrators, neither drug pos-
session nor bankruptcy is particularly reflective of character, and selective
service resistance might assume positive weight.14
A comparable divergence in attitude between the bar and its educators
141. Compare Tables 1 and 2 with Tables 3 and 4 and accompanying text, infra pp. 532-34. For
example, only 2% of schools ask specifically about bankruptcy, and only 8% ask about all civil litiga-
tion. Almost 40% do not inquire about mental health problems. See, e.g., Interview, Admissions Dir.,
Wayne State Univ. Law School (Aug. 2, 1983) (school would generally have no information about
criminal convictions, or driving or draft offenses).
142. Attitudes toward drugs and bankruptcy are discussed infra pp. 525-26; Interview, Assoc.
Dean, Univ. of Idaho Law School (Aug. 3, 1983) (draft resistance could carry affirmative weight);
Interview, Chairman, Admissions Comm., Washburn Law School (Aug. 1, 1983) (draft resistance
would not count against anyone); cf. Interview, Chairman, Admissions Comm., Stanford Law School
(July 18, 1983) (draft resisters have been admitted); Interview, Ass't Dean, Univ. of Maine School of
Law (Aug. 1, 1983) (draft offenses probably would not affect admission).
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is apparent from law schools' approach to misconduct among admitted
students. Again, the responses in Table 2 suggest that academic miscon-
duct or dishonest applications would be far more likely to trigger aca-
demic sanctions or expulsion than much of the criminal or civil conduct
that state character committees find most problematic. " 3 Rarely will law
schools expel students, even for offenses that might have preempted ad-
mission. 144 By contrast, bar examiners are more likely to attach signifi-
cance to offenses that occur during, rather than before, legal education.
1 4 5
Such differences in perspective are apparent even as to conduct on
which the academy and the profession seem most united: felony convic-
tions and unauthorized practice of law. For some administrators, the issue
was not whether a former convict should, or would, be able to obtain bar
certification, but whether his presence would disrupt the school environ-
ment.14 6 Similarly, unauthorized practice of law was a common concern
since it could "imping[e] directly on the school"; violations of student
practice rules might jeopardize an academic institution's ability to offer
clinical education.14 7 Yet such violations were not universally thought to
reflect character and fitness to practice. Although some administrators
would give unauthorized practice "heavy consideration," and one Virginia
dean believed it would be more likely to result in denial of admission than
any other factor, about one-third of surveyed law schools would not con-
sider it a significant factor in admission, 14  and a quarter would not re-
port it to the bar on character certification forms.
143. Compare Table 3 responses regarding criminal convictions, unauthorized practice, bank-
ruptcy, and psychological problems with Table 2 responses regarding same. Survey data indicate that
any criminal conduct is far more likely than academic misconduct or misrepresentation to result in bar
investigation or non-certification, whereas such academic offenses were more likely than criminal con-
duct to bar an applicant from admission to law school.
144. See Table 2, supra p. 523. For example, students guilty of theft, embezzlement, or drug
violations while attending law school have been permitted to graduate. Interview, Ass't Dean, Univ. of
Maine School of Law (Aug. 1, 1983); Interview, Chairman, Admissions Comm., Stanford Law School
(July 18, 1983).
145. See, e.g., In re Application of K.B., 291 Md. 170, 180, 434 A.2d 541, 546 (1981) (relevant
that applicant had engaged in criminal activity in his senior year of law school, after having had "the
benefit of four years of exposure to the ethics and traditions of the profession"); In re Application of
David H., 283 Md. 632, 637-39, 392 A.2d 83, 86-87 (1978) (quoting report of State Board of Bar
Examiners holding that law school record indicated rehabilitation of applicant with record of pre-law-
school arrests).
146. Interview, Ass't Dean, Univ. of Maine School of Law (Aug. 1, 1983); Interview, Ass't Dean,
Univ. of Chicago Law School (July 7, 1983); Interview, Chairman, Admissions Comm., Stanford
Law School (July 18, 1983).
147. Interview, Ass't Dean, Wayne State Univ. Law School (Aug. 4, 1983); Interview, Dean of
Students, Stanford Law School (July 19, 1983).
148. Compare Interview, Assoc. Dean, Whittier College School of Law (July 28, 1983) (unautho-
rized practice would not affect admission) with Interview, Chairman, Admissions Comm., Univ. of
South Dakota School of Law (Aug. 17, 1983) (unauthorized practice would be given heavy considera-
tion in admission determinations) and Interview, Ass't Dean, Univ. of Virginia School of Law (Aug.
5, 1983) (unauthorized practice would prevent admission). See Table 2, supra p. 523.
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Particular criminal offenses evoked comparable disagreement. One dean
could not recall admitting any applicant with a felony or misdemeanor
conviction and assumed that it was "the same at all selective law
schools."149 In fact, respondents from two of the top law schools in con-
ventional prestige rankings reported accepting students with drug and
theft offenses. 150 While some administrators had denied or reportedly
would deny admission to those guilty of selling or possessing drugs, pass-
ing bad checks, driving while intoxicated, or theft, 51 other institutions had
or would come to contrary decisions.1 52 Arrests in connection with politi-
cal activity might prove prejudicial at some institutions and helpful at
others.153 In part, such disparities reflect differences in individual admin-
istrators' attitudes toward rehabilitation. While some administrators were
unwilling to prejudice applicants who had "served their punishment and
learned their lesson," others were less inclined to overlook a serious of-
fense, particularly if comparably qualified candidates were available.
1 54
There was equally little consensus concerning the relevance of various
noncriminal conduct. Financial mismanagement, such as a history of bad
checks, would not affect admission at a third of the schools, would be
149. Interview, Ass't Dean, Univ. of Virginia School of Law (Aug. 5, 1983). Convictions stem-
ming from college political demonstrations were among those he considered to raise a moral turpitude
issue warranting serious review.
150. Interview, Chairman, Admissions Comm., Stanford Law School (July 18, 1983) (drugs);
Interview, Ass't Dean, Univ. of Chicago Law School (July 28, 1983) (theft). The Chicago case in-
volved an individual who used a "black box" to make long distance phone calls without paying for
them.
151. Interview, Ass't Dean, Univ. of Virginia School of Law (Aug. 5, 1983) (possession or sale of
drugs and history of bounced checks); Interview, Chairman, Admissions Comm., Univ. of South Da-
kota School of Law (Aug. 17, 1983) (sale of drugs); Interview, Assoc. Dean, Washburn Univ. School
of Law (Aug. 1, 1983) (conviction for bounced check one factor); Interview, Assoc. Dean, Univ. of
Idaho College of Law (Aug. 3, 1983) (driving while intoxicated); respondent who preferred not to be
identified (embezzlement); see also Table 3, infra p. 533.
152. Interview, Dean, T.C. Williams School of Law, Richmond (Aug. 16, 1983) (drugs); Inter-
view, Dean of Admissions, Seton Hall Univ. School of Law (July 29, 1983) (drugs); Interview, Assoc.
Dean, Univ. of Idaho College of Law (Aug. 3, 1983) (drugs, larceny); Interview, Chairman, Admis-
sions Comm., Univ. of South Dakota School of Law (Aug. 17, 1983) (bounced check); Interview,
Chairman, Admissions Comm., Stanford Law School (July 18, 1983) (assault, theft); Interview, Ass't
Dean, Univ. of Chicago School of Law (July 28, 1983) (theft). Some institutions do not ask about
most offenses. See Interview, Admissions Dir., Wayne State Univ. Law School (Aug. 2, 1983); see
also supra p. 522.
153. Compare Interview, Ass't Dean, Univ. of Virginia School of Law (Aug. 5, 1983) (arrest
would not affect admission decision) with Interview, Assoc. Dean, Washburn Univ. School of Law
(Aug. 1, 1983) (arrest might be given "affirmative weight"). See also Interview, Chairman, Admis-
sions Comm., Stanford Law School (July 18, 1983) (admission might depend on whether destruction
of property involved); Interview, Ass't Dean, Univ. of Maine School of Law (Aug. 1, 1983) (disclos-
ing political activity might depend on whether violence or subversive intent present).
154. Compare Interview, Chairman, Admissions Comm., Stanford Law School (July 18, 1983)
(expressing doubt whether one who has "paid his debt to society" should be excluded) and Interview,
Admissions Dir., Wayne State Univ. Law School (Aug. 2, 1983) (same) with BAR EXAMINERS'
HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 135 (noting concern that limited places should go to those of proven
good character) and Interview, Assoc. Dean, De Paul Univ. College of Law (July 28, 1983) (noting
that felony offenders are likely to be excluded).
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significant at a fifth, and might prove important at the remainder. Admin-
istrators divided almost evenly as to whether such conduct might result in
discipline or disclosure to the bar; some schools declined to become in-
volved in "collection" problems, whereas others felt that such matters
warranted attention, since they have a "great deal to do with a person's
character and integrity."'
1 55
Mental health issues were similarly divisive. To some administrators,
treatment for psychological or emotional disorders would be relevant in
assessing the ability of an applicant or lawyer to withstand pressure, and
they would report serious mental health problems to the bar.156 Other
institutions do not ask about the issue, and their administrators would be
unsure what to do with the answers if they did. 5 " Some respondents felt
that such matters were confidential, and noted that individuals who have
had psychological or psychiatric treatment might cope with stress as well
as, or better than, those who have not sought assistance.'58
Similar disparities in attitude have emerged in prior surveys of law
school administrators. For example, research in the 1970's revealed that
accredited law schools were sharply divided over whether to exclude or
discipline individuals who had sold hard drugs, engaged in disruptive po-
litical demonstrations, or been convicted of offenses involving moral turpi-
tude. 5 One more recent survey found that plagiarism is equally contro-
155. Interview, Assoc. Dean, Univ. of Idaho College of Law (Aug. 3, 1983). Compare Interview,
Dean of Students, Stanford Law School (July 19, 1983) (no involvement in "private transactions"
raising "collection problems") and Interview, Dean of Admissions, Seton Hall Univ. School of Law
(July 29, 1983) (noting instance in which bad check had not affected character recommendation to
bar) with Interview, Assoc. Dean, Univ. of Idaho College of Law (Aug. 3, 1983) (mismanagement
"would get attention") and Interview, Assoc. Dean, Seton Hall Univ. School of Law (July 29, 1983)
(any serious mismanagement might raise disciplinary issue). See also Interview, Chairman, Admis-
sions Comm., Univ. of South Dakota School of Law (Aug. 17, 1983) (faculty concerned with misman-
agement); Interview, Ass't Dean, Univ. of Maine School of Law (Aug. 1, 1983) (financial misman-
agement of concern).
156. Associate Deans at De Paul, South Dakota, and Whittier indicated that treatment had been
or would be a factor in admissions, and Associate Deans at Idaho and Vanderbilt would report serious
problems. Interview, Assoc. Dean, De Paul Univ. College of Law (July 28, 1983); Interview, Chair-
man, Admissions Comm., Univ. of South Dakota School of Law (Aug. 17, 1983); Interview, Assoc.
Dean, Whittier College School of Law (July 28, 1983); Interview, Assoc. Dean, Univ. of Idaho Col-
lege of Law (Aug. 3, 1983); Interview, Assoc. Dean, Vanderbilt Univ. School of Law (Aug. 10,
1983).
157. See supra p. 522; Interview, Admissions Dir., Wayne State Univ. Law School (Aug. 2,
1983); Interview, Chairman, Admissions Comm., Stanford Law School (July 18, 1983).
158. Interview, Chairman, Admissions Comm., Stanford Law School (July 18, 1983); Interview,
Dean of Students, Stanford Law School (July 19, 1983).
159. See Weckstein, supra note 79, at 19-21 (51% would exclude individuals convicted of selling
hard drugs, 57% would exclude those with moral turpitude offenses, 56% would discipline students
convicted of a felony, and 35-39% would discipline students engaged in disruptive activity); see also
Kempner, supra note 132, at 107-08 (noting variety of schools' approaches to such issues). During
the mid-1960's and early 1970's, a significant minority of law schools reported that they would deny
admission to applicants with misdemeanor convictions, selective service offenses, or large numbers of
traffic violations, and would take "a hard look at sexual misbehavior or homosexual activity." Wek-
stein, supra note 79, at 19-21; Kempner, supra note 132, at 109 (discussing expulsion due to sexual
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versial. 60 Such diversity in perspectives reflects not only the inherent
subjectivity of character determinations, but also fundamental disagree-
ments regarding the general role of law schools in the certification process.
As these prior studies reflect, academic institutions traditionally have been
ambivalent about their obligations to screen potential practitioners. In one
1970 survey, accredited law schools were almost evenly divided over
whether they would admit an academically qualified applicant who posed
no threat of danger to the academic community but who probably would
be denied admission to the bar on grounds of moral character. 1 '
That disagreement persists. Of the twenty-three faculty and administra-
tors interviewed in this study, ten (43%) believed they should not perform
a screening function for the bar. In their view, academic institutions
should assess fitness for the study of law, as opposed to the practice of
law.' 62 Their role was not to act as a "police body" for the profession, or
to "crank out" only practicing attorneys, but rather to provide legal edu-
cation for individuals "capable of receiving it and using it in some socially
beneficial way."' 63 By contrast, thirteen faculty and administrators (57%)
felt that law schools had an obligation to assess character and fitness.
Some respondents felt that eligibility for practice should play a role in
allocating limited educational opportunities. 64 Others were reluctant to
graduate individuals who might "disserve the general public"; potential
practitioners should be "persons of good moral character. . . able to han-
dle a position of trust [in] dealing with people[']s money, property and
affairs."'16 5 Thus, one director of admissions indicated that she would like
to see the law schools "play a much stronger role than [they] do ....
There are so many lousy lawyers who, I imagine, grew out of lousy little
boys."'
6
Yet even among those institutions committed to screening potential
practitioners, not all were inclined or equipped to apply bar standards.
behavior).
160. Comment, Plagiarism in Legal Scholarship, 15 U. TOL. L. REV. 233 (1984).
161. Weckstein, supra note 79, at 25 (40.3% would admit such an applicant; 45.5% would not).
162. Interview, Chairman, Admissions Comm., Univ. of South Dakota School of Law (Aug. 17,
1983).
163. Interview, Assoc. Dean, West Virginia Univ. College of Law (Aug. 3, 1983). See Interview,
Ass't Dean, Univ. of Maine School of Law (Aug. 1, 1983); Interview, Ass't Dean, Univ. of Minne-
sota Law School (July 28, 1983); see also Interview, Former Assoc. Dean, Seton Hall Univ. School of
Law (July 29, 1983) (responsibility for screening practitioners lies with state bar); Interview, Dean of
Students, Stanford Law School (July 19, 1983) (law schools should not screen students for bar
admission).
164. Interview, Assoc. Dean, Seton Hall Univ. School of Law (July 29, 1983); Interview, Dir. of
Admissions, Vanderbilt Law School (July 29, 1983); see also note 154.
165. Interview, Assoc. Dean, Whittier College School of Law (July 28, 1983); Interview, Dean,
Cumberland School of Law, Samford Univ. (Aug. 9, 1983); accord Interview, Assoc. Dean, Wake
Forest Univ. School of Law (Aug. 9, 1983).
166. Interview, Admissions Dir., Wayne State Univ. Law School (Aug. 2, 1983).
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Two-thirds of the surveyed schools lacked information about how state
bars would respond to particular forms of misconduct, and only eleven
percent indicated that the bar's reaction would be likely to affect their
admissions decisions. Over four-fifths of the law schools had no contact
with character and fitness committees regarding general admissions prac-
tices or individual cases. Even with more information, the "haphazard"
and "unpredictable" character of Teported decisions might present
problems for schools seeking to apply bar standards.
117
Nor have law schools played an active role in informing bar character
committees about potential problems. Surveyed schools reported disclosing
character-related matters on application forms for an average of only .4%
of their graduates over the past five years. During that period, only two
law schools had voluntarily initiated contact with the bar regarding a par-
ticular candidate.168 Those statistics are particularly striking, given that
thirty states require applicants to present certificates of character from
their law schools.
A number of factors may contribute to the infrequency of adverse dis-
closure. As noted earlier, many administrators either are disinclined to
serve a policing function for the profession, or dispute its vision of proba-
tive conduct. Yet even law schools most sensitive to bar standards face
severe constraints in applying them; many are not in a position to learn
about matters that could raise serious concerns.1 6 9 For example, in Vir-
ginia, where certification by in-state law schools operates as proof of fit-
ness to practice, interviewed administrators raised questions about the ad-
equacy of their screening role. As the Dean of the University of Virginia
Law School noted, bar examiners "seem to think of law schools as small
homey places where everyone knows everyone. . . .The belief that I am
a good judge of character of the 375 students that emerge from here every
year is mind-boggling . . . .I am not a good judge of candor, let alone
character. 1 7 0 During his six-year tenure, the Dean of the T.C. Williams
School of Law in Richmond has never failed to certify a student.1 '
In short, although law schools obviously perform some character screen-
ing, they are unlikely to assume more major responsibilities in certifying
the moral fitness of their graduates. A substantial number of academic
institutions are opposed in principle to assuming that function, and all
167. Interview, Former Assoc. Dean, Seton Hall Univ. School of Law (July 29, 1983).
168. Wayne State had made such contacts concerning about .5% of its applicants. Interview, Ad-
missions Dir., Wayne State Univ. Law School (Aug. 2, 1983). De Paul had done so with respect to
about .1% of students. Interview, Assoc. Dean, DePaul Univ. Law School (July 28, 1983).
169. Interview, Dean, Univ. of Virginia School of Law (Aug. 9, 1983); Interview, Dean of Stu-
dents, Stanford Law School (July 19, 1983).
170. Interview, Dean, Univ. of Virginia School of Law (Aug. 9, 1983).
171. Interview, Dean, T.C. Williams School of Law, Richmond (Aug. 16, 1983).
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face considerable practical difficulties in applying bar standards. Most ad-
ministrators lack adequate information concerning applicants, students,
and bar character criteria, and many do not share examiners' perceptions
about disabling conduct. Once they have admitted a student, law schools
are unlikely to expel him for nonacademic offenses, or to disclose to bar
examiners prejudicial information apart from criminal sanctions. Given
these constraints, examiners will inevitably confront some applicants with
blots on their record and substantial sunk costs in their education. As the
following section will suggest, the results of those confrontations have not
been entirely satisfactory.
C. Substantive Problems in Character Assessment
1. The Subjectivity of Admission Standards
As the most recent Bar Examiners' Handbook candidly concedes: "No
definition of what constitutes grounds for denial of admission on the basis
of faulty character exists. 1' 72 On the whole, judicial attempts to give con-
tent to the standard have been infrequent and unilluminating. In part, the
problem stems from the inherent subjectivity of any concept of moral fit-
ness. Character requirements are, as the Supreme Court once acknowl-
edged, "unusually ambiguous. . . . [A]ny definition will necessarily reflect
the attitudes, experiences, and prejudices of the definer. 1 73 In Justice
Holmes's phrase, the standard expresses "an intuition of experience which
outruns analysis.1 174 Perhaps for that reason, the Court has largely
avoided the analytic enterprise. Rather, the majority has rested with the
general observation that any criteria of character must have a "rational
connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law.
175
More specifically, in Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, the Court
focused on whether a "reasonable man could fairly find that there were
substantial doubts about [the applicant's] 'honesty, fairness and respect for
the rights of others and for the laws of the state and nation.' "17 Follow-
ing Konigsberg, a number of courts have applied analogous standards.
1 77
172. BAR EXAMINERS' HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 123.
173. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252, 263 (1957) (footnote omitted); see also
Application of Klahr, 102 Ariz. 529, 531, 433 P.2d 977, 979 (1962) ("[Tjhe concept of 'good moral
character' escapes definition in the abstract. Instead . . .an ad hoc determination in each instance
must be made by the court.").
174. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 248 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(quoting Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585, 598 (1907)).
175. 353 U.S. at 239 (majority opinion).
176. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252, 264 (1957) (quoting explanation of "good
moral character" presented in oral argument by State Bar).
177. See Reese v. Board of Comm'rs, 379 So. 2d 564, 568-69 (Ala. 1980); Florida Bd. of Bar
Examiners. Re. G.W.L., 364 So. 2d 454, 458-59 (Fla. 1978); In re Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners,
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The difficulty, of course, is that reasonable men can readily disagree
about what conduct would raise substantial doubts, a point amply demon-
strated by the divergence of views among judges, bar examiners, and law
school administrators.
Nor have alternative legislative and judicial formulations added greater
determinacy to the character requirement. The most facially precise ap-
proach is to catalogue relevant traits such as honesty, candor, trustworthi-
ness, and respect for law.""' A few states also specify certain discrete acts
that will preempt admission: advocacy of violent revolution, failure to dis-
close information relating to civil, criminal or disciplinary proceedings,
disbarment by another state, or conviction of a felony without restoration
of civil rights."7 No state, however, restricts the bar's power to exclude
applicants to those who have committed such offenses, and trait-based
standards are highly indeterminate in practice. Some of the criteria are
particularly subjective (e.g., taking "unfair advantage of others," being
"disloyal to those to whom loyalty is legally owed," or acting "irrespon-
sibl[y] in business or professional matters" 8 ). Moreover, the definitional
framework specifies no way of differentiating between mortal and venial
sins, or of assessing countervailing factors such as the remoteness of the
offense and evidence of rehabilitation. Since such factors will be evaluated
with reference to the applicant's "entire life history" rather than as iso-
lated events,18 1 cataloguing traits does little to constrain bar discretion.
Even greater indeterminacies characterize the most common alternative
approach, which is to invoke some broad conclusory definition of virtue.
For example, the Oregon Supreme Court demands "ethically cognizant
and mature individuals [able] to withstand . . . temptation[]." ' " Other
373 So. 2d 890, 892 (Fla. 1979); In re Latimer, 11 11. 2d 327, 336, 143 N.E.2d 20, 25 (1957);
Application of Gahan, 279 N.W.2d 826, 829 (Minn. 1979).
178. RULES RELATING TO ADMISSION TO THE IOWA BAR Rule 103; Tennessee State Bd. of Law
Examiners, Memorandum to Local Bar Associations (undated).
179. See ARKANSAS RULES OF THE COURT REGULATING PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF ATTOR-
NEYS AT LAW Rule X (disbarment); RuLES REGULATING ADMISSION TO PRACTICE LAW IN CALI-
FORNIA Rule X § 101(b) (overthrow of government grounds for denying admission); RULES OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF KENTUCKY RELATING TO THE ADMISSION OF PERSONS TO PRACTICE LAW
Rule 2.010(1) (overthrow of government); RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE MISSISSIPPI
STATE BAR Rules IV § 2, VIII § 6 (failure to disclose information relating to criminal or disciplinary
proceedings); RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE STATE OF NORTH
CAROLINA Rule .0603 (failure to disclose misconduct); Florida Board of Bar Examiners, Application
for Admission to the Florida Bar (March 1981) (conviction of felony without restoration of civil rights
or reprehensible conduct that would warrant disbarment); see also RULES OF THE NEVADA SUPREME
COURT Rule 52 § 5 (false statement on application sufficient cause for denial of admission); Wyo.
STAT. § 33-5-107 (1977) (fraudulent application sufficient cause for revoking admission).
180. RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE BAR OF THE STATE OF COLORADO Rule 212;
RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE MISSISSIPPI STATE BAR Rule 8 § 6.
181. Florida Board of Bar Examiners, supra note 179; Commonwealth of Massachusetts Board
of Bar Examiners, Evaluation of Moral Character (undated memorandum on file with author).
182. In re Application of Alpert, 269 Or. 508, 518, 525 P.2d 1042, 1046 (1974); In re Lubonovic,
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states, such as North Carolina and Arizona, have emphasized affirmative
qualities:
[Upright character] is something more than an absence of bad char-
acter. . . [A candidate] must have conducted himself as a man of
upright character ordinarily would, should or does. Such character
expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line of least
resistance, but quite often in the will to do the unpleasant thing, if it
is right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing, if it is wrong.1 83
Yet, by presupposing a consensus on what conduct reflects ethical or
upright character, these definitions simply finesse the question at issue.
Moreover, the requirement of affirmative qualities invites hypocrisy.
None of the states in which that mandate is applicable conducts a mean-
ingful review of the positive, self-sacrificing attributes that the definition
presumably encompasses. The applicants denied admission in these juris-
dictions, like those excluded elsewhere, have committed some discrete,
negative act such as driving while intoxicated, selling marijuana, evading
income taxes, avoiding draft registration, or failing to disclose relevant
facts. 1
4
Finally, many courts have avoided difficulties of definition by simply
dispensing with the formality. During 1970-80, approximately half of the
reported moral character decisions failed to specify the criteria applied.
Judges have often simply announced that the candidate does or does not
have the requisite character, occasionally without even indicating the con-
duct at issue."8
Although such laconic approaches raise obvious due process issues, it is
dubious whether the more facially forthcoming alternatives would afford
greater guidance to applicants or significantly affect decisionmaking. In-
248 Ga. 243, 244, 282 S.E.2d 298, 300 (1981); In re Cason, 249 Ga. 806, 809, 294 S.E.2d 520, 523
(1982); see also In re Ascher, 81 111. 2d 485, 500, 411 N.E.2d 1, 8 (1980) (to secure admission,
applicant must have "capacity to make those ethical judgments required of an attorney in the course
of his practice and the performance of his fiduciary responsibilities").
183. In re Application of Farmer, 191 N.C. 235, 238, 131 S.E. 661, 663 (1926).
184. In re Willis, 288 N.C. 1, 215 S.E.2d 771, appeal dismissed sub nom. Willis v. North Caro-
lina State Bd. of Law Examiners, 423 U.S. 976 (1975) (candor; driving while intoxicated); Applica-
tion of Walker, 112 Ariz. 134, 539 P.2d 891 (1975) (failure to register for draft; candor); In re
Application of Greenberg, 126 Ariz. 290, 614 P.2d 832 (1980) (illegal sale of marijuana; failure to
report income to IRS; candor).
185. See, e.g., Application of Appleman, 280 A.D. 865, 113 N.Y.S.2d 780 (N.Y. App. Div. 1952)
(no discussion of applicant's conduct or of rationale for decision); In re Weinstein, 150 Or. 1, 9, 42
P.2d 744, 747 (1935) ("It would be of no interest to the public and would not help the petitioner, who
is a young man with a future that could be turned to good account. . ., to set out the acts. . . which
impelled the referee to report adversely on his hearing."); see also Carothers, Character and Fitness:
A Need for Increased Perception, 51 B. EXAMINER, Aug. 1982, at 25, 32 (courts too often order
admission without explaining basis for further action).
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deed, as the discussion below suggests, certification decisions have proved
highly idiosyncratic, whatever the substantive standard.
2. The Idiosyncracies of Implementation
a. The Focus of Professional Concern
At an abstract level, courts and bar committees have similar convictions
about what traits are undesirable in candidates for their profession. Con-
duct evidencing dishonesty, disrespect for law, disregard for financial obli-
gations, or psychological instability triggers serious concern. Yet, at a
more concrete level, there is considerable divergence of views as to what
prior acts are sufficiently probative to warrant delaying or withholding
certification. From a public policy perspective, the justifications for certain
of the bar's concerns are less than convincing.
As Appendix I reflects, bar applications request a wide array of infor-
mation regarding personal background, education, employment, civil or
criminal involvement, and mental health. To obtain some sense of how
this information is used, interviewers asked bar administrators in all fifty
states to identify the types of conduct most commonly resulting in charac-
ter investigations and denials of certification, as well as how they would
likely respond to certain specified activities. Similar questions were put to
bar committee and board chairmen involved in the highest stages of review
in fourteen selected jurisdictions."8 6
As a comparison of Tables 3 and 4 makes evident, and as examiners
confirmed, bar investigations extend to matters that rarely preempt admis-
sion and almost never trigger inquiry for practicing attorneys. For exam-
ple, most states would investigate bounced checks (76%), marijuana pos-
session (67%), involvement in litigation (52%), and high levels of debt
(56%). Examiners in other jurisdictions might investigate these matters, as
well as other activity implicating privacy and First Amendment concerns,
such as psychiatric treatment (98%), misdemeanor convictions arising
from a sit-in (80%), and sexual conduct or lifestyle (49%).
There was, however, little consensus as to what types of conduct were
most likely to prove disabling. Among the responding states, the only fac-
tor commanding close to a majority was a criminal record (47%). And as
subsequent discussion will indicate, views concerning particular forms of
illegal activity varied widely. A review of reported judicial decisions over
186. Most chairmen of state bar committees and boards of examiners were unwilling definitively
to predict the consequences of specified activity. Their most useful responses came in reference to a
question asking what sorts of conduct their committees would find most troubling. See Table 3, col. 3.
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TABLE 3























Criminal Record 63% 47% 38%
Drug Problems
or Charges 29% 11% 38%
Traffic Offenses 29% -
Shoplifting 7% 5% 8%
Dishonesty
Misrepresentation
or Non-disclosure 29% 16% 31%
Unauthorized
Practice of Law 7% 16% 8%
Bankruptcy 2% 11% 15%
Psychological
Problems 20% 11% 15%
Alcoholism 10% 5% 38%
Involvement in
Civil Litigation 15% - 8%
Fraud 5% 5% 15%
Cheating/Plagiarism 15% 5% 8%
1. Other conduct likely to result in investigation included financial irresponsibility (2%); dishon-
ored checks (2%); school discipline (2%); unexplained periods between employment.
2. The questionnaire asked what forms of conduct the committee would find most troubling.
Conduct beyond that listed included: serious crimes (15%); murder (15%); series of resisting
arrest (8%); breaking and entering (2%); job misconduct (8%); mishandling other individuals'
money (8%).
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TABLE 4













Activity (N=44)1  25% 55% 20%
Allegations of Unautho-
rized Practice (N=49) 84% 12% 4%
Bankruptcy (N=51) 59% 33% 8%
Problems with Bounced
Checks (half a dozen) 76% 20% 4%
(N=49)
Driving while
Intoxicated (N=49) 63% 35% 2%
High Levels of Debt
(N=43) 56% 39% 5%
Involvement in
Litigation (N=46) 52% 43% 5%
Marijuana Possession
(Misdemeanor) (N=48) 67% 27% 6%
Psychiatric Treatment
(N=47) 72% 26% 2%
Sexual Conduct or
Lifestyle (N=39) 2  10% 39% 51%
1. E.g., sit-ins resulting in misdemeanor charges, membership in a radical political
organization.
2. E.g., homosexuality, cohabitation.
the last half-century reflects similar diversity in perspective. Tables 5 and
6 reveal that courts reversed or remanded bar determinations in 43% of all
cases, a percentage that has remained relatively constant over the half-
century studied. Criminal convictions, the most common form of miscon-
duct at issue during the last decade, provoked reversals or remands in 46%
of the thirty-nine appeals. Overall, the most frequently litigated issue, lack
of candor, was involved in fifty-two of ninety-four cases; in more than
one-third (36%; 19/52) of these cases, applicants gained admittance or
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TABLE 5




Admitted1 Denied Remanded Reversed Cases
Criminal Record 3 7 - 3 10
Felonies 1 2 - 1 3
Non-felonies 2 4 - 2 6
Unspecified - 1 - - 1
Additional factors involved - 4 - - 4
Rehabilitation discussed 3 - - 3 -
Lack of Candor 2  9 20 2 9 31
Additional factors involved 5 15 - 6 20
Financial Irresponsibility - 2 - - 2
Personal obligations - 2 - - 2
Additional factors involved - 2 - - 2
Misuse of Legal Process 3 3 - 3 6
Lay participant 2 0 - 2 2
Unauthorized practice 1 3 - 1 4
Additional factors involved 2 2 - 2 4
Sexual Misconduct 1 - - 1 1
Political Activity & Affiliation 3 6 - 4 9
Academic Misconduct 2 3 - 3 5
Other3  3 4 - 3 7
Rehabilitation Discussed 6 - 1 6 7
TOTALS4  16 26 2 175 44
1. Remands with instruction to admit are coded as admitted.
2. Includes eight cases in which lack of candor was discovered after the applicant had been admit-
ted. Five cases resulted in revocation and two in two-year suspensions (coded as denial); one
resulted in admission.
3. Includes use of aliases, disregard for oath, false testimony, forged checks, and unspecified mis-
conduct. Eleven additional cases in this period involved procedural or due process questions and
are excluded from the categorical breakdowns.
4. Totals include cases involving more than one category of misconduct.
5. Includes two cases in which the highest committee approved, and the court denied, admission.
Committee determinations were reversed or remanded in 43% (19/44) of all cases. Cases in
which the procedural posture was unclear were treated as though the committee denied.
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 94: 491, 1985
TABLE 6




Admitted Denied Remanded Reversed Cases
Criminal Record 13 12 2 12 27
Felonies 3 1 2 2 6
Non-felonies 3 3 - 21 6
Unspecified 7 8 - 82. 15
Additional factors involved 6 8 1 4 15
Rehabilitation discussed 8 5 2 83 15
Lack of Candor 7 13 1 5 21
Additional factors involved 5 10 1 3 16
Financial Irresponsibility 2 8 - 2 10
Personal obligations 2 6 - 2 8
Professional obligations - 2 - - 2
Additional factors involved 2 6 - 2 8
Misuse of Legal Process - 6 - - 6
Lay participant - 5 - - 5
Unauthorized practice - 1 - - 1
Additional factors involved - 4 - - 4
Sexual Misconduct 1 - - 1 1
Mental or Emotional Disorders - 2 - - 2
Political Activity & Affiliation 2 - - - 2
Academic Misconduct - 2 - - 2
Other4  1 1 - 1 2
Rehabilitation Discussed 8 5 2 83 15
TOTALS5  196 276 3 183 49
1. Includes one case in which the highest committee approved and the court denied admission.
2. Includes two cases in which the highest committee approved and the court denied admission.
3. Includes three cases in which the highest committee approved and the court denied admission.
Committee decisions were reversed or remanded in 43% (21/49) of all cases. Cases with unclear
procedural posture coded as if highest committee denied.
4. "Other" includes irresponsible conduct, unethical business practices, and lack of remorse.
5. Totals include cases involving more than one category of misconduct. Six cases involving proce-
dural and constitutional questions and three certified questions were not included in the categor-
ical breakdowns.
6. Includes one case in which the highest committee denied, and a lower court panel approved.
Remands with instructions to admit were coded as admitted.
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remands. Candidates with the poorest chances of success were those with
histories of financial irresponsibility (ten of twelve denied); of the more
recent cases, misuse of legal processes created the greatest risk of exclusion
(six of six denied).
With few exceptions, courts and committees have developed no categori-
cal policies toward particular offenses. Although a few jurisdictions have
formally stated or informally determined that certain conduct will not be a
matter for concern (e.g., sexual relationships, a single misdemeanor mari-
juana charge, conduct "in the nature of horseplay"), 187 most examiners
indicated that their decisions would depend on a broad range of factors,
including the nature, number, and proximity of offenses, the applicant's
age when they were committed, and evidence of rehabilitation. But while
agreeing on those common criteria, courts and committees have arrived at
quite different conclusions regarding comparable attitudes and activities.
The following analysis reviews the nature of bar oversight and the extent
to which it advances the primary objective of certification-protecting the
public. Whether certain forms of bar inquiry are consistent with other
societal values will be the subject of Part IV.
b. Criminal Conduct and Abuse of Legal Processes
A threshold difficulty in applying character standards stems from the
inclusiveness of "disrespect for law" as a ground for excluding applicants.
The conventional view has been that certain illegal acts-regardless of the
likelihood of their repetition in a lawyer-client relationship-evidence atti-
tudes toward law that cannot be countenanced among its practitioners; to
hold otherwise would demean the profession's reputation and reduce the
character requirement to a meaningless pretense. The difficulty, of course,
is that this logic licenses inquiry into any illegal activity, no matter how
remote or minor, and could justify excluding individuals convicted of any
offense that affronted the sensibilities of a particular court or character
committee. In fact, bar inquiry frequently extends to juvenile offenses and
parking violations, and conduct warranting exclusion has been thought to
include traffic convictions and cohabitation.188
187. See RULES REGULATING ADMISSION TO PRACTICE LAW IN CALIFORNIA Rule X § 101 (a);
RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE Mississippi STATE BAR Rule VIII § 6; Custer, supra note
120, at 19.
188. Only three jurisdictions specifically exclude juvenile offenses and 10% specifically include
them; 16% inquire about parking violations. See Appendix I. In some New York districts, candidates
with unpaid tickets will not be processed. See N.Y. Comm. Rep., supra note 101, at 28; In re Willis,
288 N.C. 1, 215 S.E.2d 771, appeal dismissed sub nom. Willis v. North Carolina State Bd. of Law
Examiners, 423 U.S. 976 (1975) (Board could legitimately conclude, in rejecting application, that
driving while intoxicated and driving in violation of license restrictions evidenced moral turpitude);
Raymond, The Role of the Law School Respecting Character and Fitness, 35 B. EXAMINER 3, 8
(1966) (traffic offenses possible ground for non-certification). Cohabitation cases are discussed infra
537
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When disagreeing with board determinations, courts have occasionally
stressed the need for some rational relationship between the conduct at
issue and fitness to practice."8 9 Yet those decisions do not renounce the
standards that render such disputes inevitable. "Disrespect for law" as a
criterion for exclusion necessarily yields highly idiosyncratic determina-
tions of what acts are sufficiently damning to warrant non-certification.
Violation of a fishing license statute ten years earlier was sufficient to
cause one local Michigan committee to decline certification.19 But, in the
same state, at about the same time, other examiners on the central board
admitted individuals convicted of child molesting and conspiring to bomb a
public building.' 9
Decisions concerning drug and alcohol offenses have proven particu-
larly inconsistent. Convictions for marijuana are taken seriously in some
jurisdictions and overlooked in others; much may depend on whether the
examiner has, as one put it, grown more "mellow" towards "kids smoking
pot."' 92 According to its Executive Director, the Nevada Board of Exam-
iners functions under "a double standard. . . . Board [members] say noth-
ing about the guy who gets in brawls and fist fights in bars because they
figure he's just a good ol' boy, . . . but the Board gets upset about drugs,
even in small amounts."'9 3 So too, courts frequently have divided over
drug and alcohol addiction: For some, it constitutes an adequate mitigat-
ing circumstance; for others it is an independent basis for denial.'94
pp. 578-80.
189. See Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 65 Cal. 2d 447, 459-61, 421 P.2d 76, 83-85,
55 Cal. Rptr. 228, 237-39 (1966) (rational relationship necessary between requirement and ability to
practice law); Cord v. Gibb, 219 Va. 1019, 1022, 254 S.E.2d 71, 73 (1979) (applicant could not be
denied admission because of cohabitation; no rational relationship between that living status and re-
quirement of good character).
190. Interview, Member, Mich. Bd. of B. Examiners (July 12, 1983). The state board rejected
the local committee's recommendation.
191. Id.
192. Interview, Sec., N.M. Bd. of B. Examiners. Compare Interview, Staff Member, Mich. Char.
and Fitness Comm. (Aug. 30, 1982) (convictions for marijuana possession taken seriously) with Inter-
view, Sec., Ark. Bd. of Law Examiners (Aug. 25, 1982) ("[I]f misdemeanor marijuana possessions
were considered, hell, I'd be knocking out one-half the applicants. Well, that's an exaggeration, but
[not much].") and Interview, Admin. Dir., Conn. Bd. of B. Examiners (Aug. 30, 1982) (noting liber-
alization of committee's attitude toward marijuana possession charges and convictions). Compare also
Application of Leff, 127 Ariz. 62, 618 P.2d 232 (1980) (failure to report marijuana sales on income
tax form and to admit sales to committee warranted denial of admission) with In re Dileo, 307 So. 2d
362 (La. 1975) (failure to pay transfer tax on marijuana inadequate basis for denial of admission).
193. Interview, Exec. Dir., Nev. St. B. (Aug. 16, 1982).
194. Compare In re Application of A.T., 286 Md. 507, 408 A.2d 1023 (1979) (drug addiction
treated as mitigating condition) with In re Monaghan, 122 Vt. 199, 167 A.2d 81 (1961) (alcoholism)
and In re Willis, 288 N.C. 1, 215 S.E.2d 771 (driving while intoxicated), appeal dismissed sub nom.
Willis v. North Carolina State Bd. of Law Examiners, 430 U.S. 976 (1975). Compare also Barnes,
supra note 77, at 78 (suggesting that bar should not hold applicant to higher standard than it prac-
tices, and that "our profession is not exactly a dry profession") with Green, Procedures for Character
Investigations, 35 B. EXAMINER 10, 13 (1966) (more than one drunk driving charge would probably
prevent admission).
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Attitudes toward sexual conduct such as cohabitation or homosexuality
reflect similar diversity. Some bar examiners do not regard that activity as
"within their purview," unless it becomes a "public nuisance" or results
in criminal charges. 195 Thus, the Arizona committee does not "set itself up
as a morals judge," in part because "in this day and age living to-
gether. . .is accepted."' 19  In other jurisdictions, as discussion in Part VI
reflects, cohabitation and homosexuality can trigger extensive inquiry and
delay, and some slight possibility of denial. 197 In the remaining states,
examiners reported few applications presenting evidence of "living in sin"
or homosexuality. According to one Board of Bar Examiners president,
"Thank God we don't have much of that [in Missouri]."' 98 How these
individuals would view such conduct if brought to their attention remains
unclear. Most invoked vague generalities about whether such non-
traditional sexual activity would interfere with the individual's fitness to
practice and "ability to be an ethical lawyer," or whether it would reflect
a "contumacious attitude toward the law."' 99
Not only does the "disrespect for law" standard invite inconsistencies in
application, it permits a hierarchy of concerns that are at best tenuously
related to the primary justification for character review-protecting the
public. It bears note that the conduct generating the greatest likelihood of
investigation was unauthorized practice of law: Eighty-four percent of all
jurisdictions would inquire into such activity, and it was the second most
likely offense to preempt admission.2"' Yet as some examiners implicitly
acknowledged, such misconduct, by definition, could not recur after certi-
fication.20' And it is doubtful that the general public would view most lay
195. Interview, Special Rep., Mo. B., 21st & 22d Dists. (June 20, 1983); Interview, Admin.
Asst., Col. Bd. of Law Examiners (Oct. 14, 1982).
196. Interview, Sec., Ariz. Char. and Fitness Comm. (Aug. 17, 1982); Custer, supra note 120, at
20 (noting that, although fornication is misdemeanor in Georgia, Board does not inquire into "live-in"
relationships). One New York interviewer who inquired too deeply into a domestic arrangement felt
"I had trod on territory I shouldn't have trod on." Interview, Chairman, N.Y. Char. and Fitness
Comm., 3d Dist. (June 10, 1983).
197. See infra pp. 578-82.
198. Interview, Pres., Mo. Bd. of B. Examiners (June 7, 1983).
199. Interview, Sec., Md. State Bd. of Law Examiners (Aug. 17, 1983); Interview, Chairman,
Mo. Cir. B. Comm., 9th Dist. (June 14, 1983); Interview, Chairman, Va. Temporary Char. and
Fitness Comm., 26th Dist. (June 21, 1983).
200. See Tables 4 & 5, supra pp. 534, 535. In Pennsylvania, unauthorized practice was one of
two offenses that would prompt investigation, and many respondents indicated they might deny an
applicant guilty of such conduct. Interview, Office Mgr., Pa. Bd. of Law Examiners (Oct. 19, 1982).
See, e.g., Interview, Sec., N.Y. Char. Comm., 2d Dep't (July 1983); Interview, Member, I11. Char.
and Fitness Comm., 3d Dist. (July 18, 1983); Interview, Chairman, N.C. Bd. of B. Examiners (July
8, 1983); Interview, Exec. Dir., Alaska St. B. (Oct. 5, 1982); Interview, Chairman, Nev. Bd. of Law
Examiners (July 12, 1983).
201. Idaho committees would probably do nothing about unauthorized practice on the theory that
"Hell, it's about time [the applicant] got himself a license." Interview, President-Elect, Idaho Bd. of
Comm'rs (July 14, 1983); see also Interview, Chairman, Va. Temporary Char. and Fitness Comm.,
26th Dist. (June 21, 1983) (relevant only as it "reflects an attitude toward the law"). Only if the
The Yale Law Journal
legal assistance as evidencing serious and generalizable moral deficiencies.
Vast numbers of nonlawyers (most obviously accountants, bankers, real
estate brokers, and insurance agents) routinely violate unauthorized prac-
tice statutes, as do attorneys who occasionally give legal advice outside the
jurisdiction in which they are admitted.2 0 2 On the rare occasions when
consumers' views have been solicited, they have expressed overwhelming
support for lay legal assistance.203 To the extent that character committees
are simply shoring up unauthorized practice enforcement, their efforts are
highly self-serving and of dubious societal value. Moreover, as subsequent
discussion will stuggest, it is equally doubtful that many of the other non-
criminal matters with which decisionmakers have been concerned are ei-
ther sufficiently predictive of subsequent professional conduct or suffi-
ciently damning in the eyes of the public to justify the costs of moral
scrutiny.
c. Noncriminal Conduct
Other major areas of concern to courts and bar committees have been
psychological instability, financial irresponsibility, and radical political in-
volvement, although again attitudes vary widely as to the significance of
particular conduct. For example, as Appendix I indicates, the bar applica-
tions of some jurisdictions make no inquiries as to mental health; others
require a psychiatrist's certificate and in some cases an examination for
candidates who have a history of treatment. 0 4 Applicants with "mental
problems are usually denied" admission in Michigan, whereas Idaho
would probably exclude only "a homicidal maniac or a schizo who loses
touch for a week at a time. '20  The few reported cases on point also re-
flect quite different perspectives. The Nevada Supreme Court does not
consider mental illness a ground for denial, while Wyoming, Arizona, and
Illinois have excluded applicants evidencing "religious fanaticism," per-
sonality disorders involving "hypersensitivity, unwarranted suspicion, and
excessive self-importance," or a "propensity to unreasonably react" to
perceived opposition.20 6
applicant had fraudulently misrepresented his status could analogous post-certification offenses occur.
202. See Rhode, supra note 93.
203. Id. at 3-4.
204. See MICHIGAN BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS, GUIDELINES FOR LOCAL CHARACTER AND
FrrNuss COMMriTEES § 5 (1981) [hereinafter cited as MICHIGAN GUIDELINES]; N.Y. Comm. Rep.,
supra note 101, at 23.
205. Interview, Member, Mich. Bd. of B. Examiners (July 9, 1983); Interview, President-Elect,
Idaho Bd. of Comm'rs (July 17, 1983). Many applications do not request information regarding
psychiatric treatment. See infra Appendix I.
206. Compare In re Petition of Schaengold, 83 Nev. 65, 422 P.2d 686 (1967) with Application of
Ronwin, 113 Ariz. 357, 555 P.2d 315 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 907 (1977) and In re Martin-
Trigona, 55 Ill. 2d 301, 302 N.E.2d 68 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974).
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Financial mismanagement provokes comparable disagreement. Most ju-
risdictions (73%) make no inquiries concerning debts past due, while
others demand detailed information ranging from parking fines to child
support obligations. 07 Two respondents would be opposed to admitting a
"deadbeat" or someone with a "pattern" of bounced checks, and three
respondents reported instances of denying or deferring such applicants.2"8
Other jurisdictions were far more tolerant. Idaho examiners see financial
management problems so often that "we're ignoring it. It's so expensive to
get through law school."' 09 And, as the Administrative Director of the
Connecticut Board of Bar Examiners observed, "after all, we all bounce a
few checks once in a while."21
Attitudes toward bankruptcies also varied. Some respondents appeared
to assume that applicants who "don't have a conscience when it comes to
paying their own bills . . . may not have a conscience when it comes to
their fiduciary responsibilities to their clients."21 Discharges to avoid stu-
dent loans have resulted in denial in some jurisdictions. 1 Yet about a
third of all state bar applications made no inquiries in the area, and some
examiners, particularly those who handle bankruptcies in private practice,
felt that individuals had a right to such remedies: Exercise of this preroga-
tive during periods of "tough going" was not an indication of character.2"3
At most, these committee members would regard the applicant as guilty of
207. For a discussion of the range of inquiries, see infra pp. 576-77. Michigan suggests that its
local committees may want to adjourn an interview and require the applicant to submit documenta-
tion that his or her child support payments are current. See MICHIGAN GUIDELINES, supra note 204,
at § 4(K); see also N.Y. Comm. Rep., supra note 101, at 23; In re Beasley, 243 Ga. 134, 136-37, 252
S.E.2d 615, 617 (1979) (failure to pay court-ordered child support on three occasions constituted
grounds for denial).
208. Those jurisdictions opposed to admission included New York and Nevada. See Interview,
Chairman, N.Y. Comm. on Char. and Fitness, 3d Dist. (June 10, 1983); Interview, Sec., N.Y. Char.
and Fitness Comm., 2d Jud. Dep't (July 1983) (reporting probable views of committees); Interview,
Chairman, Nev. Bd. of Law Examiners (July 12, 1983). Arizona and Washington both reported that
they would flag such applications. See Interview, Exec. Dir., Wash. St. B. (Aug. 23, 1982); Interview,
Sec., Ariz. Char. and Fitness Comm. (Aug. 17, 1982). Oregon, New Jersey, and New York reported
instances where applicants withdrew or were denied. See Interview, Exec. Dir., Or. Bd. of Bar Exam-
iners (July 11, 1983); Interview, Chairman, N.J. Statewide Comm. on Char. (July 20, 1983); Inter-
view, Chairman, N.Y. Char. and Fitness Comm., 8th Dist. (July 15, 1983). Since in Alabama bounc-
ing checks could constitute a felony, the character committees would regard them with a "jaundiced
eye"; such conduct reflects individuals' "inability to be responsible in their own fiscal affairs-much
less other peoples." Interview, Chairman, S. Ala. Char. and Fitness Comm. (July 7, 1983).
209. Interview, President-elect, Idaho Bd. of Comm'rs (July 14, 1983).
210. Interview, Admin. Dir., Conn. Bd. of B. Examiners (Aug. 30, 1982).
211. Interview, Exec. Ass't, Miss. Bd. of B. Admissions (Aug. 30, 1982); see also Pres., Mo. Bd.
of B. Examiners (June 7, 1983) (bankruptcy "to avoid debts would be a problem").
212. For examples of denials, see Interview, Chairman, N.J. Statewide Comm. on Char. (July
20, 1983); Interview, Office Mgr., Pa. Bd. of Law Examiners (Oct. 19, 1982); see also sources cited
infra note 216.
213. Interview, Chairman, Me. Bd. of B. Examiners (Aug. 2, 1983); see Table 4, supra p. 534;
Interview, Member, Mich. Bd. of B. Examiners (July 12, 1983).
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"poor financial planning or succumbing to the American way of
life-buy, buy, buy and pay later."21
For a final group of respondents, a candidate's individual circumstances
would be controlling. Applicants who had not "abused" the system or
sought "to avoid debts" would not be penalized.2 15 What exactly would
constitute "abuse," or what would motivate a bankruptcy apart from debt
avoidance, was not apparent.
Judicial decisions regarding bankruptcy have yielded equally inconsis-
tent results. For example, applicants who discharged student loans have
been admitted or excluded depending on a highly selective assessment of
whether "undue hardship" justified the default.216 Not only dois such an
approach leave applicants in considerable uncertainty about the price of
exercising federally protected rights, its public policy rationale is by no
means self-evident. In what sense does pursuit of a lawful discharge on
one's own behalf reflect an "[in]ability to perform the duties of a lawyer,"
if the same action, undertaken for a client, would be entirely consistent
with the attorney's professional responsibility under prevailing ethical
codes?2.
A third area in which the bar has shown interest is the ideology of its
applicants. Religious fanatics, suspected subversives, and "rabble rousers"
have been delayed, deterred, and occasionally excluded under both admis-
sion and disciplinary standards.21 Although existing caselaw constrains
states' ability to deny entry solely for political associations,21 ' it has done
little to curb investigation into political offenses. Responses to such activity
are highly idiosyncratic. The Secretary of Arkansas' Board of Law Exam-
iners "tend[s] to look at political dissent with a blink," while in other
jurisdictions, such as Nevada, misdemeanor arrests arising out of protest
214. Interview, Exec. Sec., Wyo. State Bd. of B. Examiners (Aug. 23, 1982).
215. Interview, Chairman, Ala. Char. and Fitness Comm. (July 7, 1983); Interview, Pres., Mo.
Bd. of B. Examiners (June 7, 1983).
216. In Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners v. Groot, 365 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1978), the Court admitted
an applicant who had discharged student loans because his support obligations to his children and ex-
wife could appropriately take precedence over repayment of past debts. Yet that same court, the same
year, denied another .andidate who, while he lacked such family obligations, had other equitable
factors in his favor. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners v. G.W.L., 364 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1978). Whereas
Groot had voluntarily left two jobs that would have enabled him to meet past as well as present
obligations, G.W.L. had been unable to obtain employment. See Comment, Good Model Character
and Admisssion to the Bar: A Constitutionally Invalid Standard?, 48 U. CIN. L. REV. 876, 876-77
(1979) (critiquing Florida decisions); see also In re Gahan, 279 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1979) (denying
applicant who had discharged loans).
217. In re Gahan, 279 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1979); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY AND CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT DR-7-101; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.2. That is not to imply endorsement of the bar's prevailing partisanship norms. See Rhode,
Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REv. (1985) (forthcoming); Simon, The Ideology
of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 30.
218. See infra notes 270 & 351-62 and accompanying text.
219. See infra notes 355-59 and accompanying text.
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activity "would raise eyebrows," and have caused some applicants to be
"harried. ' 220  Any "disruptive" activity will trigger review in one
Missouri district.22' Yet in Idaho, it would take something akin to mem-
bership in the "Red Brigade" to arouse interest, and in some Virginia
areas, even such associations would not be "any of [the committee's] busi-
ness." 222 To the former Executive Secretary of Manhattan's Character
Committee, "sit-ins aren't politics. They involve interfering with the gov-
ernment and breaking the law. '22' To the California Supreme Court, acts
of civil disobedience may reflect the "highest moral courage. "224 So too,
avoidance of military service would be received sympathetically in some
jurisdictions and found disabling in others.225
The First Amendment implications of some of these cases will be ad-
dressed at greater length in Part VI. For present purposes, what bears
emphasis is not only the inconsistent, subjective, and conclusory quality of
decisionmaking, but also its attenuated relationship with the stated ration-
ale for moral oversight. Denying or delaying admission is typically justi-
fied not in terms of the likely risk to the public, but rather by reference to
vague generalities about respect for law. Yet in many instances, the ap-
pearance of such respect seems to assume greater significance than the
values it is designed to reflect.
d. Remorse, Rehabilitation, and Cooperation with the Committee
A final context in which decisionmaking has proven particularly idio-
syncratic involves candidates' apparent attitudes toward their prior con-
duct and committee oversight. Arrogance, "argumentativeness," "rude-
ness," "excessive immatur[ity]," "lackadaisical" responses, or intimations
that a candidate is "not interested in correcting himself" can significantly
color character assessments.226
220. Interview, Sec., Ark. Bd. of Law Examiners (Aug. 25, 1982); Interview, Exec. Dir., Nev. St.
B. (Aug. 16, 1983). Arrests for a nuclear protest would flag applications for review in Washington.
See Interview, Exec. Dir., Wash. St. B. (Aug. 23, 1982).
221. Interview, Chairman, Mo. B. Comm., 9th Dist. (June 14, 1983).
222. Interview, President-Elect, Idaho Bd. of Comm'rs (July 14, 1983); Interview, Chairman,
Va. Temporary Char. Comm., 4th Dist. (June 20, 1983).
223. Papke, supra note 86, at 19 (quoting Theodore Freschi).
224. Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 65 Cal. 2d 447, 462, 421 P.2d 76, 87, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 228, 239 (1966).
225. Compare Interview, Chairman, Me. Bd. of B. Examiners (Aug. 2, 1983), quoted infra p.
572 with In re Application of Brooks, 57 Wash. 2d 66, 355 P.2d 840 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
813 (1961).
226. Interview, Sec., N.Y. Char. Comm., 2d Jud. Dep't (July 1983); Interview, Admin. Sec., Ala.
Bd. of B. Examiners (Aug. 19, 1982).
Some members of the Illinois bar committee that denied George Anastaplo admission were troubled
more by his seeming arrogance than his potential communist sympathies. By one interviewer's ac-
count, Anastaplo was "'trying to be a smart aleck' "; "'[the bar has] too many lawyers already, we
didn't need a smart aleck.'" Patner, The Quest of George Anastaplo, CHICAGO, Dec. 1982, 185, 189;
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The ultimate sin in many jurisdictions is a failure to seem "up front"
with the committee.227 Nondisclosure, even about relatively trivial matters,
may evidence the wrong "mental attitude," and "glib, equivocal re-
sponses," even if technically accurate, may prove more damning than the
conduct at issue.228 As Part VI reflects, those who have refused on princi-
ple to respond to questions regarding political associations have often paid
a heavy professional price.
229
In some, particularly criminal, cases, the applicant's efforts to atone for
prior conduct are of equal concern. Tables 5 and 6 indicate that evidence
of rehabilitation was explicitly discussed in about a quarter (24%) of the
reported cases over the last half century and in over a majority (56%) of
the criminal cases during the last decade. Yet what evidence will suffice to
establish redemption varies considerably. Written testimonials and charac-
ter witnesses are taken seriously in some cases and discounted in others;
much may depend on the status of the reference as well as the biases of
the decisionmaker. 23 0 For the Georgia Board, evidence that the individual
has "[led] a crime-free life, earning a living and supporting his family"
will not suffice.2 1 Rather, he must demonstrate that he has "become a
useful and significant member of society by some positive action, hopefully
for the betterment of both the applicant and his community. '232 Church
and civic activities have not, however, always proved adequate. Thus, one
former Florida felon, perhaps in an abundance of caution, atoned for sev-
see also Papke, supra note 86, at 18 (Anastaplo always conducted himself before committee as if he
"'was better than us' "); Patner, supra, at 188 (quoting Sawyier: "[Tihere was a feeling that George
should have gotten down on his knees and asked to be admitted to the bar as if it were some kind of
fraternity. George just would not kow tow.") (emphasis in original).
227. Interview, President-elect, Idaho Bd. of Comm'rs (July 14, 1983); see also Interview, Dir.,
Ga. B. Admissions (Aug. 25, 1982) ("Ninety percent of all the problems I've seen ...would not
have been problems if [the applicants] had only been honest on the application."); Interview, Chair-
man, N.C. Bd. of B. Examiners (July 8, 1983) ("lying to the Board. . .in itself can trigger denial").
228. Interview, Chairman, Ill. Char. and Fitness Comm., 1st Dist. (July 11, 1983) (commenting
on applicant who lied about his residences and where he went to school); see In re Application of
Schaeffer, 273 Or. 490, 541 P.2d 1400 (1975) (investigation warranted for failure to disclose charges
of driving motor vehicle with suspended driver's license); Application of Stone, 74 Wyo. 389, 288 P.2d
767 (1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 815 (1956).
229. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252 (1957) (rejecting state bar's refusal to
certify based on refusal to answer questions); In re Anastaplo, 3 Ill. 2d 471, 121 N.E.2d 826 (1954)
(refusal to answer justifies refusal of certification), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 348 U.S. 946
(1955); infra p. 567.
230. Compare In re Application of K.B., 291 Md. 170, 434 A.2d 541 (1981) (letters from at-
tornies and judges not sufficient for admission) with In re Petition of Waters, 84 Nev. 712, 447 P.2d
661 (1968) (letters from employers, professors, attorneys sufficient for admisssion); see Hallinan v.
Committee of Bar Examiners, 65 Cal. 2d 447, 421 P.2d 76, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1966) (certifying
applicant after receipt of recommendations from judges, professors, state assemblymen); In re Petition
of Diez-Arguelles, 401 So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 1981) (admitting applicant upon character testimony by law
school dean and others).
231. Custer, supra note 120, at 21.
232. Id.
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eral years of imprisonment not only with testimonials and gainful employ-
ment, but also an LL.M. in taxation. 33
Other courts and committees place a high premium on remorse. Invoca-
tions of a "higher personal ethic" or protestations of innocence are gener-
ally inadvisable.2 34 Accordingly, Michigan's bomber was admitted to the
bar, despite several years in a maximum security facility, while North
Carolina's unconfessed "peeping Tom" was thought too great a public
threat to be certified.235 Applicants willing to denounce the "foolish, base-
less hopes regarding the betterment of society" that impelled their youth-
ful Communist Party affiliations are pronounced moral; those who refuse
to renounce or explain their allegedly radical (though concededly nonsub-
versive) affiliations may be deemed unfit.2 3 6 Faced with one recalcitrant
leftist in 1956, the Oregon Supreme Court denied admission on the
ground that the candidate's positive depiction of the "world-wide conspir-
acy" called Communism constituted false testimony under oath.2 37
Not all decisionmakers are impressed, however, by candidates' good
works or public mea culpa's. One Florida applicant was commended for
his insistence on innocence where confession would have been more expe-
dient. 3 " Other courts and committees appear to assume that "a leopard
never changes its spots"; 239 neither civic involvements nor "self-serving
statements" of remorse will adequately atone for certain sins. 240 But
whichever position they adopt on this point, bar decisionmakers are all
operating on one shared empirical premise. Their common assumption is
that certain attitudes and actions are sufficiently predictive of subsequent
233. In re Petition of Diez-Arguelles, 401 So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 1981) (admitting candidate who
obtained B.A., J.D. & LL.M. in taxation during the eight years following his conviction); see also In
re Application of Davis, 38 Ohio St. 2d 273, 313 N.E.2d 363 (1974) (remanding case for further
consideration where, after conviction, petitioner obtained graduate degree in public administration and
financed legal education through work as research assistant).
234. In re Application of Easton, 289 Or. 99, 102, 610 P.2d 270, 271 (denying admission), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 862 (1980); see also In re Elkins, 308 N.C. 317, 328, 302 S.E.2d 215, 221 (protesta-
tions of innocence insufficient to show good moral character), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 490 (1983).
235. Compare Interview, Member, Mich. Bd. of B. Examiners (July 12, 1983) with In re Elkins,
308 N.C. 317, 302 S.E.2d 215, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 490 (1983).
236. Compare Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 251 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (inferences of "questionable character" from youthful Communist Party affiliation un-
warranted) and Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252 (1957) (inferences of bad moral char-
acter from failure to answer questions about political affiliation unwarranted) with In re Anastaplo, 3
Ill. 2d 471, 121 N.E.2d 826 (1954) (refusal to answer questions about membership in Communist
Party justifies denial of certification) and Application of Patterson, 210 Or. 495, 302 P.2d 227 (1956)
(Communist Party membership grounds for denial), vacated, 353 U.S. 952 (1957) (per curiam).
237. Application of Patterson, 210 Or. 495, 302 P.2d 227, 237 (1956), vacated, 353 U.S. 952
(1957).
238. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners Re: L.K.D., 397 So. 2d 673, 676 (Fla. 1981).
239. Application of Guberman, 90 Ariz. 27, 30, 363 P.2d 617, 619 (1961) (rejecting committee's
reasoning and ordering applicant admitted); see also In re Application of K.B., 291 Md. 170, 434
A.2d 541 (1981) (rejecting recommendation of board of examiners and denying admission).
240. Interview, Chairman, Mich. Char. and Fitness Comm. (July 8, 1983).
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misconduct to justify the costs of certification procedures. Yet as the fol-
lowing sections suggest, that premise is empirically unsupported and flatly
at odds with the disciplinary process as currently administered.
IV. THE DISCIPLINARY PROCESS
The inadequacies of bar disciplinary processes have been documented
extensively elsewhere and need not be rehearsed at length here. However,
some brief comparative observations are in order. In particular, the treat-
ment of non-professional conduct, that is, conduct occurring outside an
attorney-client relationship, warrants inquiry, since the justification for
regulating the personal behavior of licensed attorneys is in many respects
analogous to that underlying the certification process.
A. The Double Standard of Denial and Disbarment
The traditional rationale for disciplinary proceedings is not to punish,
but "to ensure that the public, the courts, and the profession are protected
against unsuitable legal practitioners."24 1 As in admissions, the objective is
to exclude those "unsafe . . . to manage the legal business of others, 242
and to maintain public confidence in the "integrity and standing of the
bar." 3 Under this framework, personal activities that might subject the
profession to public "derision and distrust" are appropriate grounds for
disciplinary intervention.244
From the standpoint of maximizing public protection and confidence,
the rationale for moral oversight is much more compelling for those al-
ready admitted to the bar than for those seeking admission. Acts commit-
ted by an individual obligated to function as an officer of the court are
surely more probative of future conduct in that office than conduct occur-
ring prior to the point of licensure. Of course, from a more parochial
perspective, it is true that practicing attorneys have a greater vested inter-
est in their professional license than applicants to the bar. But the time,
money, and energy that candidates invest in legal education are hardly
insubstantial.2 45 And, as a policy matter, the self-interest of incumbents
241. In re Higbie, 6 Cal. 3d 562, 570, 493 P.2d 97, 101, 99 Cal. Rptr. 865, 869 (1972).
242. Ex Parte Wail, 107 U.S. 265, 307 (1883); see also In re Draper, 317 A.2d 106 (Del. 1974);
Florida Bar v. Riccardi, 264 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1972); In re Kirtz, 494 S.W.2d 324 (Mo. 1973); In re
MacLeod, 479 S.W.2d 443 (Mo.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 979 (1972).
243. Mass., S.J.C. Rule 4:01 § 18(4), 213 Mass. 3A (1974); see also Bryant v. State Bar, 21 Cal.
2d 285, 131 P.2d 523 (1942); In re Florida Bar, 301 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 1974); State v. Bieber, 121
Kan. 536, 247 P. 875 (1926); In re Titus, 21 N.Y.S. 724 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1892); In re Gorsuch, 76
S.D. 191, 75 N.W.2d 644 (1956).
244. In re Goldstein, 411 Ill. 360, 367, 104 N.E.2d 227, 230 (1952); see Ex Parte Wall, 107 U.S.
265 (1883); In re Higbie, 6 Cal. 3d 562, 493 P.2d 97, 99 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1972).
245. Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 65 Cal. 2d 447, 452 n.3, 421 P.2d 76, 80 n.3, 55
Cal. Rptr. 228, 232 n.3 (1966); A.B.A. REPORT OF THE ADVISORY AND EDITORIAL COMMITTEE ON
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does not justify a less rigorous moral standard for those granted a public
trust than for those who seek it.
Yet the bar's administration of admission and disciplinary processes has
yielded precisely such a double standard; both substantive and procedural
requirements are more solicitous of practitioners than applicants. In ad-
mission proceedings, the applicant has the burden of establishing good
moral character, frequently under circumstances lacking formal due pro-
cess safeguards. 246 By contrast, in disciplinary proceedings, the bar must
establish unfitness to practice, generally in accordance with more stringent
procedural mandates.247
So too, as courts have frequently noted, the scope of moral inquiry is
broader for applicants than incumbents. 48 Substantive standards gener-
ally restrict disbarment proceedings to specific acts of moral turpitude,
whereas certification investigation may extend to general character traits
inferred from far more venial sins. 249 Except in the most egregious cases,
the bar has always been disinclined to cast out a colleague for abuses
within a lawyer-client relationship. Every major analysis of the discipli-
nary structures has found them grossly insensitive both to serious profes-
sional misconduct and to garden variety problems of delay, neglect, incom-
petence and overcharging.250 Surveys of bar procedures in major states
reveal that some 90% of complaints are dismissed without investigation,
and national statistics reflect that of grievances falling within disciplinary
jurisdiction, less than 3% result in public sanctions and only .8% in dis-
BAR EXAMINATIONS AND ADMISSIONS TO PRACTICE LAW 145 (1951).
246. See supra p. 507 and infra p. 575.
247. See Note, "Good Moral Character" as a Prerequisite to Admission to the Bar: Inferences to
be Drawn from Past Acts and Prior Membership in the Communist Party, 65 YALE L.J. 873, 874 &
nn. 5 & 6 (1956) and cases cited therein. Compare procedures discussed supra pp. 505-07, 513-19
with A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS (adopted Feb.
1979, as amended through 1983).
248. But see Note, Admission to the Bar Following Conviction for Refusal of Induction, 78 YALE
L.J. 1352, 1385 n.166 (1969) (admission and disbarment standards of moral character are "distinc-
tion without a difference").
249. See Note, supra note 247, at 873-74 & nn. 3 & 4. Compare admission cases discussed supra,
notes 190-203, 208-15, 220-25 and accompanying text, and infra, notes 351-55, 407-15 and accom-
panying text, with those discussed in text accompanying Table 7, infra p. 549-50.
250. See A.B.A. SPECIAL COMMIrTEE ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT,
PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 1-2 (1970); Martyn, Lawyer
Competence and Lawyer Discipline: Beyond the Bar?, 69 GEO. L.J. 705, 723-36 (1981); Steele &
Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients, and Professional Regulation, 1976 AM. B.F. RESEARCH J. 919, 993-99.
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barment.251 Even repeated instances of neglect, misrepresentation, and in-
competence will rarely provoke license revocation.2 52
Oversight of prominent attorneys has been particularly myopic. A sam-
ple of 1981-82 cases involving public discipline (disbarment, suspension,
and reprovals) in three jurisdictions that routinely publish such informa-
tion (California, Illinois, and the District of Columbia) revealed that over
80% of those for whom data were available were solo practitioners.2 53 To
be sure, such figures do not of themselves confirm differential treatment of
elite and non-elite offenders. Given the differences in temptations and
pressures between solo and large firm practice, it is quite plausible that
elite attorneys are much less likely to commit the abuses that trigger seri-
ous sanctions.2 54 Yet the definition of which offenses warrant such sanc-
tions may suggest some bias; disciplinary agencies rarely pursue the kinds
of misconduct occurring in large firm practice, such as dilatory tactics,
harassment, and suppression of evidence. 5 5 Even in instances of notorious
misconduct, elite attorneys have retained their licenses. Richard Klein-
dienst, who committed perjury during his confirmation hearings as Attor-
ney General, received a thirty-day suspension.256 A Wall Street senior
partner who lied under oath to conceal discoverable documents was never
251. Steele & Nimmer, supra note 250, at 982 (statistics on dismissals without investigation); see
also Marks & Catchcart, Discipline Within the Legal Profession: Is It Self-Regulation?, 1974 ILL.
L.F. 193, 217. The public sanctions and disbarment figures were computed from available state statis-
tics compiled in STANDING COMMITrEE ON PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE AND THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, STATISTICAL REPORT RE: EXPENSE,
CASE VOLUME, AND STAFFING OF LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT IN STATE JURISDICTIONS
DURING 1982 (1983); STANDING COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE AND THE AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, STATISTICAL REPORT RE: PUBLIC
DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS BY DISCIPLINARY AGENCIES 1978-1982 (1983). These reports are availa-
ble in ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIEILITY, DISCIPLINARY LAW AND PROCEDURE
RESEARCH SYSTEM (Final Supp. 1984).
The public sanction figure (2.7%) reflects the total number of cases in which public sanctions were
instituted (943) divided by the total number of complaints (which, if true, would constitute miscon-
duct) recorded against attorneys (34,667) in the District of Columbia and the 41 states for which both
figures are available. The disbarment figure (.8%) was calculated by dividing the total number of
disbarments plus disbarments by consent (285) by the volume of complaints for the same states. New
York data do not include figures for the 1st Judicial Department (Manhattan and the Bronx).
And, of course, complaints to bar agencies represent only a tiny fraction of actual abuses. As nu-
merous studies reflect, clients and practitioners are rarely inclined to report abuses, grievances, or
misconduct. See Steele & Nimmer, supra note 250, at 957-60.
252. See sources cited supra note 250; cases cited in the bar journals identified infra note 253; see
also cases in CALIFORNIA ST. B., July 1984, at 64 and infra note 450.
253. The survey covered October 1981-December 1982 and relied on cases cited in CALIFORNIA
LAWYER, Vol. 1, Nos. 2-4; Vol. 2, Nos. 1-11 (1981-82); DISTRICT LAWYER, Vol. 6, Nos. 1-6; Vol.
7, Nos. 1-2 (1982-83); and ILLINOIS B.J., Vol. 70, Nos. 2-12; Vol. 71, Nos. 1-4 (1982).
254. See J. CARLIN, LAWYERS ETHICS: A SURVEY OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR (1966); J.
HANDLER, THE LAWYER AND THE COMMUNITY: THE PRACTICING BAR IN A MIDDLE-SIZED CITY
127 (1967).
255. See Rhode, supra note 217, and sources cited supra notes 251 & 253.
256. District of Columbia Bar v. Kleindienst, 345 A.2d 146 (D.C. 1975).
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disbarred, and the list of less celebrated examples is easily expanded.25
Such cases make a mockery of current certification procedures; the bar
denies, delays, or deters applicants with peccadilloes on the theory that
they might commit serious professional abuses, while those who do com-
mit such abuses escape meaningful sanctions.
Moreover, available empirical data suggest that offenses not involving
activity as a lawyer rarely result in loss of a license. Except in the few
states that automatically decertify attorneys convicted of a felony, nonpro-
fessional misconduct typically accounts for only less than 4% of all disbar-
ments, suspensions and resignations.2 58 A review of reported judicial deci-
sions between 1967 and 1981 reveals only 107 cases imposing disbarment
for offenses not involving performance as a lawyer. And as Table 7 indi-
cates, almost all such misconduct (94%) concerned felonies. A similar pro-
file emerges from the sample of 1981-82 cases noted above. Criminal con-
victions included tax evasion, mail fraud, racketeering, bribery, forgery,
perjury, burglary, narcotics violations, rape, and sodomy.'5 9 Offenses for
which applicants are delayed or denied admission-traffic violations,
bankruptcy, nonpayment of debts, failure to answer questions regarding
radical political involvement, personality disorders, consensual sexual ac-
tivity, and petty drug violations-almost never have comparable repercus-
sions for practitioners. 60
The disparity between entry and exclusionary standards raises a num-
ber of awkward questions about the current scope of certification proce-
dures. If certain nonprofessional conduct is sufficiently probative to with-
hold a license, why is it not also grounds for license revocation? As long as
bar members are unwilling to monitor their colleagues' parking violations,
psychiatric treatment, and alimony payments, what justifies their reliance
on such evidence in screening applicants? Insofar as the profession is truly
committed to public- rather than self-protection, the incongruity between
disciplinary and certification procedures is untenable.
257. J. STEWART, THE PARTNERS: INSIDE AMERrcA's MOST POWERFUL LAW FIRMS 364
(1983); see also P. STERN, LAWYERS ON TRIAL 89 (1980) ("Lawyers whose political views and types
of practice are out of the mainstream of the profession are favorite targets of bar disciplinary ac-
tions."); Garbus & Seligman, Sanctions and Disbarment: They Sit in Judgment, in VERDICTS ON
LAWYERS 47, 57 (R. Nader & M. Green eds. 1976) (disciplinary oversight group must be able to
scrutinize more complex transactions of attorneys).
258. Steele & Nimmer, supra note 250, at 995.
259. See supra note 253.
260. See Note, Disbarment: Non-Professional Conduct Demonstrating Unfitness to Practice, 43
CORNELL L.Q. 489, 493 (1958). For example, compare In re Higbie, 6 Cal. 3d 562, 493 P.2d 97, 99
Cal. Rptr. 865 (1972) (failure to pay marijuana transfer tax warranted one year actual suspension
not disbarment), with decisions discussed supra note 192. Admission cases involving bankruptcy and
financial history are discussed infra pp. 576-77, and those concerning homosexuality are discussed
infra pp. 580-81. Contemporary cases reveal no disbarments for bankruptcy or cohabitation, and only
one for homosexual activity with a consenting adult. See Table 7.
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That is not, however, to imply that stricter proctoring of nonprofes-
sional offenses by practitioners would be desirable. To the contrary, the
bar's past involvement in such moral oversight has little to commend it.
TABLE 7
DISBARMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR NON-PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES
1976-1981 (N=108)
Other
MAJOR OFFENSES New York Jurisdictions Total
Larceny, Receipt of
Stolen Property 19% 11% 17%
Controlled Substances 10% 25% 15%
Embezzlement, Theft by
Deception, Fraud (non-tax) 17% 8% 14%
Securities Violations 18% 3% 13%
Tax Fraud or Evasion 10% 8% 9%
Perjury/False Statements 8% 8% 8%
Violent Crime (assault,
murder, accessory to murder) 1% 8% 9%
Criminal Contempt 6% 0% 4%
Sexual Misconduct
(e.g. promoting prostitution,
sexual abuse of children) 0% 8% 3%
Burglary (or conspiracy
to break and enter) 0% 6% 2%
Other' 11% 14% 12%
Felonies 97% 89%2 94%
Non-felonies3  3% 11%4 6%
Non-criminal Factors'
discussed 0% 11% 4%
1. Includes obstruction of justice, illegal gambling, bribery, forgery, price-fixing, conspiracy, ex-
tortion, passing counterfeit bills, bail jumping, and illicit motor vehicle sales.
2. Includes In re Goldman, 124 Ariz. 105, 602 P. 2d 486 (1979) (proof but not conviction of 4
types of felonious conduct).
3. Includes delivery of marijuana, violation of federal securities laws, attempted felonies, theft,
and theft by deception.
4. Includes Committee on Prof. Ethics & Conduct v. Littlefield, 244 N.W.2d 824 (Iowa 1976)
(misdemeanor conviction based on felony attempt); Committee on Prof. Ethics & Conduct v.
Hanson, 244 N.W.2d 822 (Iowa 1976) (misdemeanor conviction based on felony charge).
5. Includes alcoholism, rehabilitation, unauthorized practice in violation of parole, professional
financial misconduct.
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B. The Undisciplined Scope of Professional Discipline
On the whole, bar assessments of moral character have proven as sub-
jective and inconsistent in the context of nonprofessional discipline as in
admissions. In part, the difficulty stems from the inherent indeterminacy
of standards. Relevant considerations typically include subjective assess-
ments regarding not only the culpability of the offender but also the repu-
tation of the profession."8 1 Although some states mandate disbarment for
certain specified offenses, not all misconduct falls in that category. 6 2 And
since disbarment is not necessarily permanent, disputes regarding the
gravity of the offense and the rehabilitation of the offender will often arise
in reinstatement hearings.2 3 Moreover, in most jurisdictions, conduct is
considered disabling only if it involves "moral turpitude," a standard open
to competing interpretations.
For the past century, the Supreme Court has declined to review disbar-
ments for nonprofessional misconduct, and its pronouncements in related
contexts have done little to define the relevant inquiry.2 4 As judges have
frequently observed in cases involving the moral turpitude of aliens, the
standard defies principled application. To Justice Jackson, a formulation
that permits decisions to turn on the reactions of "particular judges to
particular offenses" necessarily invites cliches and caprice.265 Alterna-
tively, if, as Learned Hand believed, the decisionmaker's duty is "to divine
what 'common conscience' prevalent at the time demands," the task be-
comes "impossible in practice."26 Even assuming such judicial prescience,
261. See, e.g., In re Lamberis, 93 Ill. 2d 222, 227, 443 N.E.2d 549, 551 (1982).
262. See, e.g., In re Goldman, 124 Ariz. 105, 108, 602 P.2d 486, 489 (1979) (mandatory disbar-
ment upon conviction of any felony); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Pope, 549 S.W.2d 296 (Ky. 1976) (con-
viction of felonies relating to evasion of taxes warrants disbarment); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§
6101-6102 (West 1974) (conviction of crimes results in suspension and disbarment); N.Y. JUD. LAW
§ 90(4) (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1982-83) (all felonies).
263. See In re Hiss, 368 Mass. 447, 452 n.9, 333 N.E.2d 429, 433 n.9 (1975). At least one of the
attorneys involved in Watergate has subsequently been reinstated. See Morrison, The Lawyers of
Watergate, Nat'l. L.J., June 21, 1982, at 43, col. 1. To be reinstated, attorneys petition the court that
disbarred them, and typically provide evidence regarding their subsequent rehabilitation.
264. In Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954), a divided Court upheld suspension of a
physician who had been convicted of failing to produce papers subpoenaed by the House Un-
American Activities Committee. Whether Barsky remains valid precedent is doubtful since the breadth
of discretion accorded to state licensing activities is difficult to reconcile with the analysis in subse-
quent bar admission cases. See infra pp. 571-72; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrIIONAL LAW § 15-
14, at 951-53 (1978).
265. Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 239 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting). As Justice Jackson
also noted, "If we go to the dictionaries, the last resort of the baffled judge, we learn little except that
the expression is redundant, for turpitude alone means moral wickedness or depravity and moral
turpitude seems to mean little more than morally immoral." Id. at 234 (footnotes omitted).
266. Johnson v. United States, 186 F.2d 588, 590 (2d Cir. 1951); see also Repouille v. United
States, 165 F.2d 152, 154-55 (2d Cir. 1947) (Frank, J., dissenting) (judge has only vague notions of
contemporary public opinion). For an interesting analysis of those cases, see E. CAHN, THE MORAL
DECISION: RIGHT AND WRONG IN THE LIGHT OF AMERICAN LAW 300-09 (1955); Cahn, Authority
and Responsibility, 51 COLUM. L. REV. 838, 841-51 (1951).
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it is by no means clear that popular prejudice is an appropriate discipli-
nary criterion for a profession charged with defending the unpopular.
For purposes of bar discipline, the "moral turpitude" criterion does
nothing to refine inquiry, but merely removes it one step from its an-
nounced concern-fitness for legal practice. Unsurprisingly, analysis has
been conclusory and outcomes inconsistent. Indeed, many of the leading
definitions border on tautology. Thus, the California Supreme Court has
declared: "To hold that an act of a practitioner constitutes moral turpi-
tude is to characterize him as unsuitable to practice law."'267 Other courts
have often simply pronounced, ex cathedra, their assessment of the con-
duct at issue, and comparable abuses have provoked divergent responses
within and across jurisdictions.
During the early part of this century, alcohol cases proved especially
problematic. Habitual drunkards and home brewers fared differently in
different courts.2"8 Marijuana offenses provide the modern analogue, and
while the trend is clearly toward tolerance, a few judges have stoutly re-
sisted the tide of permissiveness.269
Political nonconformity and income tax violations have been equally di-
visive. The ebb and flow of chauvinist sentiment has led to inconsistent
sanctions for allegedly subversive practitioners.270 State courts are cur-
rently split as to whether willful evasion of taxes or failure to file a return
constitutes moral turpitude. 7 1 Even within the same jurisdiction, local
disciplinary committees have different views of comparable cases. The
Boston bar has taken tax violations seriously, and recommended disbar-
ment or suspension, while in some of the surrounding counties, failure to
267. In re Higbie, 6 Cal. 3d 562, 570, 493 P.2d 97, 101-02, 99 Cal. Rptr. 865, 869-70 (1972).
268. Compare Bartos v. United States District Court, 19 F.2d 722, 724 (8th Cir. 1927) (manufac-
turing 700 quarts of beer for home use not moral turpitude) with Rudolph v. United States, 6 F.2d
487, 488 (D.C. Cir.) (possession and transportation of alcohol is crime involving moral turpitude
warranting discontinuance of retired policeman's pension), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 559 (1925) and
State v. Bieber, 121 Kan. 536, 542-43, 247 P. 875, 878 (1926) (attorney possessing liquor disbarred
for misdemeanor involving moral turpitude).
269. For one of the rare recent instances of disbarment for a marijuana violation, see In re
Moore, 453 N.E.2d 971 (Ind. 1983).
270. Compare In re Burch, 73 Ohio App. 97, 103, 54 N.E.2d 803, 806 (1943) (no disbarment for
political offense) and In re Clifton, 33 Idaho 614, 623, 196 P. 670, 673 (1921) (no disbarment for
unpatriotic statement) and Lotto v. State, 208 S.W. 563, 563-64 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) (statement
that "Germany is going to win the war and I hope she will" held not ground for disbarment) with In
re Smith, 133 Wash. 145, 153, 233 P. 288, 291 (1925) (disbarment for advocating syndicalism under
auspices of I.W.W.) and Margolis' Case, 269 Pa. 206, 210-12, 112 A. 478, 480 (1921) (disbarment
for advocating anarchism and avoiding draft) and In re Arctander, 110 Wash. 296, 306, 188 P. 380,
383 (1920) (disbarment for assisting aliens to avoid military service by withdrawing citizenship
application).
271. See cases cited in In re Fahey, 8 Cal. 3d 842, 852-53 & nn.7-10, 505 P.2d 1369, 1375, 106
Cal. Rptr. 313, 319 (1973); see also Selinger & Schoen, "To Purify the Bar": A Constitutional Ap-
proach to Non-Professional Misconduct, 5 NAT. RESOURCES J. 299, 355-57 (1965); Comment, 1972
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Rules of Disciplinasy Enforcement: Relieving the Uncertainties of Mar-
ginal Attorney Crimes, 79 DICK. L. REV. 588, 611-12 (1975).
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file a return may be perceived as "a brave act of citizen's defiance against
an oppressive government.
'2 72
Throughout the century, promiscuity has been a perennial concern,
though the focus of inquiry has shifted somewhat. Early twentieth century
cases centered on prostitution and fornication, and generated a set of
somewhat murky moral mandates. Commercial relationships with fallen
women were permissible to a point; those who paid money for sexual fa-
vors were often forgiven, while those who accepted money for abetting
such activities were purged from the profession.2 73 Singled out for particu-
lar condemnation was a black attorney who managed a house of ill repute
where "white girls . . . consorted with negroes" and smoked opium. 274
To a 1929 Missouri court, seduction by an unfulfilled promise to marry
constituted "baseness and depravity" mandating disbarment. 275 By con-
trast, in the preceding year, New Jersey justices found fornication with a
fifteen-year-old to warrant only a six-month suspension, in light of the
victim's previously dissolute life and the attorney's reputation as an "up-
right and moral man. '276 Seducing one's secretary was discreditable but
not disabling; seducing the wife of a war hero was unforgivable.277 While
sexual advances toward the secretary were dismissed as part of the "weak-
nesses, passions and frailties possessed in some degree by all mankind,
'2 78
the adulterous liaison with a prominent society matron (notwithstanding
its subsequent legitimation through marriage) constituted an act of "in-
herent baseness without alleviation or excuse.
'279
Although current definitions of deviance are less inclusive, more recent
cases still reflect a broad spectrum of views. Embracing and fondling an
incarcerated client shocked the sensibilities of Idaho's 1979 disciplinary
committee.280 Carnal indecency with children has met with mixed results:
272. J. BARTLETT, THE LAW BUSINESS: A TIRED MONOPOLY 59-60 (1982).
273. Compare People ex rel Black v. Smith, 290 Ill. 241, 124 N.E. 807 (1919) (that attorney
visited disorderly houses does not, by itself, warrant disbarment) with In re Kosher, 61 Wash. 2d 206,
209, 377 P.2d 988, 990 (1963) (attorney's participation in operation of brothel grounds for disbar-
ment) and In re Okin, 272 A.D. 607, 73 N.Y.S.2d 861 (N.Y. App. 1947) (same) and In re Wilson,
76 Ariz. 49, 51-54, 258 P.2d 433, 435-37 (1953) (receipt of protection money from prostitute
grounds for disbarment).
274. In re Marsh, 42 Utah 186, 188, 129 P. 411, 412 (1913).
275. In re Wallace, 323 Mo. 203, 206, 19 S.W.2d 625, 625 (1929).
276. In re Isserman, 6 N.J. Misc. 146, 148, 140 A. 253, 253 (1928). The court in Isserman also
noted that the woman looked older than her age. Id.
277. Compare State v. Byrkett, 3 Ohio N.P. 28 (1896) (seducing secretary held not grounds for
disbarment) with Grievance Comm. v. Broder, 112 Conn. 263, 274-78, 152 A. 292, 294-95 (1930)
(seducing war hero's wife held grounds for disbarment).
278. State v. Byrkett, 3 Ohio N.P. 28, 36 (1896).
279. Grievance Comm. v. Broder, 112 Conn. 269, 275, 152 A. 292, 294 (1930); see also In re
Titus, 21 N.Y.S. 724, 727-29 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1892) (attorney disbarred for, inter alia, adultery).
280. Committee on Professional Ethics v. Durham, 279 N.W.2d 280 (Iowa 1979). Although the
state bar committee recommended a one year suspension from practice, the Supreme Court imposed
only a reprimand in light of the isolated nature of the attorney's "indiscretion." Id. at 286.
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Some courts have viewed it as a sickness warranting temporary suspen-
sion, others as a sign of irredeemable depravity.2"' The relationship be-
tween abusive acts and legal practice is rarely of itself controlling. Thus,
although a Florida lawyer lost his license following a conviction for inde-
cent exposure in a public lavatory, an Indiana practitioner received only a
year suspension for making sexual advances to one client and offering to
exchange his legal services for nude photographs of another client and her
daughter; only the latter attorney's activities were deemed "personal and
unrelated" to professional practice.282
One of the more consistent predictors of disbarment has been public
notoriety. Exclusion from the profession has resulted even from uninten-
tional offenses when adverse publicity is sufficiently intense. Accordingly,
a negligent Massachusetts nightclub owner and New Mexico drunk driver
both lost their license in the aftermath of highly publicized accidents.283 In
those and other instances, judicial assessment seemed colored as much by
the celebrity as the nature of the acts or their relevance to future profes-
sional performance. 28' Yet, as post-Watergate disciplinary cases reflected,
not even notoriety is a wholly reliable predictive device. Although most of
the attorneys involved in criminal conduct lost their licenses at least tem-
porarily, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals justified leniency to-
ward former Attorney General Kleindienst in part on the theory that he
had suffered enough through public opprobrium.
285
Whether any of these cases is an appropriate subject for bar oversight
will receive more extended analysis in Parts VI and VII. For present pur-
poses, the point is simply that the disciplinary process, as currently ad-
ministered, is not only irreconcilable with the assumptions of entry-level
certification, but unlikely to yield principled application. Moreover, inso-
far as both admissions and disciplinary procedures are intended to maxi-
mize public protection rather than professional status, their inadequacies
lie deeper. The central premise of moral oversight-that courts and com-
281. Compare In re Safran, 18 Cal. 3d 134, 136, 554 P.2d 329, 330, 133 Cal. Rptr. 9, 10 (1976)
(three-year suspension) and State v. Fleckenstein, 60 N.J. Super. 399, 159 A.2d 411 (suspension),
certif, dismissed, 33 N.J. 109, 162 A.2d 338 (1960) with In re McDonald, 269 S.C. 598, 599, 239
S.E.2d 83, 83 (1977) (disbarment).
282. Compare Florida Bar v. Kay, 232 So. 2d 378, 379, (Fla.) (disbarment), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 956 (1970) with In re Wood, 265 Ind. 616, 624, 358 N.E.2d 128, 133 (1976) (one year
suspension).
283. In re Welansky, 319 Mass. 205, 65 N.E.2d 202 (1946); In re Morris, 74 N.M. 679, 397
P.2d 475 (1965); see Note, supra note 260, at 493-94.
284. For a discussion of the effect of public notoriety, see H. DRINKER, supra note 23, at 44-46;
Selinger & Schoen, supra note 271, at 309, 347-51; see also Grievance Comm. v. Broder, 112 Conn.
269, 278, 152 A. 292, 295 (1930) (public notoriety makes court's duty "doubly imperative").
285. See District of Columbia Bar v. Kleindienst, 345 A.2d 146 (D.C. 1975); Morrison, supra
note 263, at 44.
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mittees can predict future misconduct from the prior offenses generally at
issue in character proceedings-bears closer scrutiny.
V. THE PREDICTIVE POWER OF PRIOR CONDUCT
A. Perceptions of the Process
Most bar examiners involved in the certification process express confi-
dence in its general effectiveness. About 60% (40/66) of respondents en-
gaged in initial character screening in all fifty states identified no
problems in the current system. Over half (8/15) of the chairmen at the
highest review level in selected jurisdictions found the process effective; a
quarter were unsure, but only fourteen percent believed that it was
ineffective.
In amplifying those assessments, a few individuals expressed serious
misgivings. Several were concerned about the subjectivity of standards or
inconsistencies in their application, and one was troubled by the disparity
between disciplinary and admissions criteria.186 The head of Maine's
Board of Examiners doubted that screening was "valid in terms of some
statistical sense" and the president-elect of Idaho's Board of Commission-
ers felt it accomplished "[z]ip; we do it because it is required by stat-
ute. ' 2 7 But most examiners were far more positive, and some gave glow-
ing testimonials: The Illinois system was deemed "95% effective" and
West Virginia's was "as near perfect as you can get."28" According to the
secretary of the Arkansas Board of Examiners, since "lawyers evaluate
other individuals such as witnesses, jurors, clients and adversaries on a
consistent basis, . . . we [attorneys] are the only ones who can make
moral determinations of our fellow men. After all, we know better than
anyone else if someone is lying." ' 9 Much of the bar's published commen-
tary has been equally Panglossian; Georgia's system has had "virtually no
286. Interview, Chairman, Va. Temporary Char. and Fitness Comm., 26th Dist. (June 21, 1983)
(subjectivity of standards); Interview, Chairman, Me. Bd. of B. Examiners (Aug. 2, 1983) (same);
Interview, Exec. Dir., Alaska B. (Oct. 5, 1982) (concern for disparity between disciplinary and admis-
sions criteria).
287. Interview, Chairman, Me. Bd. of B. Examiners (Aug. 2, 1983); Interview, President-Elect,
Idaho Bd. of Comm'rs (July 14, 1983); see also Interview, Member, Mich. Bd. of B. Examiners (July
12, 1983) ("There's no way I can believe [the process is] effective 100% or even close to it."); Inter-
view, Member, Ill. Char. and Fitness Comm., 3d Dist. (July 13, 1983) ("It's pretty easy for a person
to pull the wool over our eyes.").
288. Interview, Chairman, Ill. Char. and Fitness Comm., Ist Dist. (July 11, 1983); Interview,
Pres., W. Va. Bd. of B. Examiners (July 8, 1983); see also Interview, Chairman, N.J. Statewide
Comm. on Char. (July 20, 1983) ("statistically [the process] comes out pretty well"); Interview, Ass't
to Dir., Or. Bd. of B. Examiners (Oct. 18, 1982) ("very effective system in which we care about
applicants").
289. Interview, Sec., Ark. Bd. of Law Examiners (Aug. 25, 1982).
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problems" and Pennsylvania has been thought never to have wrongfully
excluded any applicant.2 90
Despite most bar examiners' confidence in their predictive capacities,
there have been no attempts, however primitive, to assess the effectiveness
of certification procedures. Not only is there an absence of controlled re-
search, no state bar has examined the records of disciplined or disbarred
attorneys to determine what, if anything, in their records as applicants
might have foreshadowed later problems."9 ' Nor have any studies at-
tempted to examine the careers of candidates denied admission for evi-
dence of subsequent moral lapses. Finally, and perhaps most disturbingly,
the courts and examiners involved in certification have failed to confront
the large volume of social science research that questions both the consis-
tency and predictability of moral behavior.
As the preceding discussion makes apparent, the public protection ra-
tionale for certifying applicants rests on two central premises. The first is
that the character required for practice is a consistent attribute: One has it
or one does not. A second, equally critical assumption is that bar examin-
ers can assess individual morality and fitness based on discrete prior acts
with sufficient accuracy to justify the costs of exclusionary procedures.
Both assumptions merit further empirical examination.
B. The Inconsistencies of Moral Behavior
Moral character is commonly assumed to be a function of consistent
personality traits. As David Rosenhan observes, "we expect people to
practice what they preach" and to behave consistently across various situ-
ations."' Thus, bar examiners presume that those who evidence lack of
candor or disrespect for law in one context will do so in another, and that
individuals who publicly acknowledge the wrongfulness of prior conduct
are less likely to commit subsequent offenses.
Such assumptions about character have a firm historical grounding and
considerable intuitive appeal. Moral and religious philosophers since Aris-
290. Hill, Appellate Review of Moral Character and Fitness Determinations, 51 B. EXAMINER,
Aug. 1982, at 22, 24; Littleton, Registration at Beginning of Law Study and Character Examination,
23 B. EXAMINER 44, 49 (1954) (Member, Pa. Bd. of Examiners doubting that "we ever keep any-
body out that should have been let in").
291. A committee of the ABA's section of Legal Education and Admissions recommended such a
hindsight study as a partial alternative to the "sheer guesswork" now characterizing bar predictive
processes. Dershowitz, Preventive Disbarment: The Numbers Are Against It, 58 A.B.A. J. 815,
815-16 (1972) (quoting ABA Committee). Of course, even if such studies were to reveal that all past
offenders possessed certain characteristics, it would not follow that most of those who possessed such
attributes would become offenders. Id. at 816. Examining the subsequent record of excluded appli-
cants might prove equally inconclusive. Even if most had no reported misconduct in other vocations,
that would not definitely demonstrate how they would perform in legal practice.
292. Rosenhan, Moral Character, 27 STAN. L. REv. 925, 925 (1975).
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totle have presupposed the existence of determinate character traits, lead-
ing to virtuous and nonvirtuous behavior.29 Much of the early work in
psychological theory began from the premise that fundamental personality
dispositions governed social conduct.29 4 And the perception that ethical be-
havior is consistent reinforces individuals' sense of predictability and con-
trol in making a vast range of legal and factual judgments.29 Nonetheless,
contemporary social science research suggests that these assumptions are
to some extent "a figment of our aspirations. '296 In this, as in other con-
texts involving character evidence, many of our central behavioral prem-
ises lack firm empirical foundations.297
Over the past half century, a vast array of social science research has
failed to find evidence of consistent character traits. Hartshorn and May's
seminal Studies in the Nature of Character found so little relationship
among conduct reflecting children's honesty, integrity, and self-control
that the authors concluded that moral behavior was more a function of
specific habits and contexts than of any general attributes .29  Lying and
cheating were essentially uncorrelated, and even the slightest change in
situational variables dramatically altered tendencies toward deceit; one
could not predict cheaters in one class on the basis of cheating in an-
other.299 While subsequent studies have not been entirely conclusive, most
have yielded similar results; their findings suggest that the person with a
293. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETmCS, Book 2, §§ 5-6. For discussion of the diver-
sity in definitions of virtue, see, e.g., A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1981); M. OSSOWSKA, SOCIAL
DETERMINANTS OF MORAL IDEAS (1970); J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELIAN MOMENT: FLOREN-
TINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975).
294. See G. ALLPORT, PERSONALITY: A PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 286 (1937).
295. See E. JONES & R. NISBETT, THE ACTOR AND OBSERVER: DIVERGENT PERCEPTIONS OF
THE CAUSES OF BEHAVIOR (1971); see also R. NISBETIT & L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATE-
GIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 31 (1980) (suggesting that such dispositional theo-
ries are shared by almost everyone socialized in western culture). Also, since individuals perceive
others in limited roles, evidence that refutes a presumed consistency in behavior is rare.
296. Rosenhan, supra note 292, at 926; accord W. MISCHEL, PERSONALITY AND ASSESSMENT
23-26 (1968).
297. Suppositions about the credibility of character evidence are open to many of the same criti-
cisms developed in this section. See Lawson, Credibility and Character: A Different Look at an Inter-
minable Problem, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 758, 776 (1975) (context of trial situation influences jurors'
perceptions of character of accused); Mendez, California's New Law on Character Evidence: Evi-
dence Code Section 352 and the Impact of Recent Psychological Studies, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1003
(1984).
298. 1 H. HARTSHORN & M. MAY, STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF CHARACTER: STUDIES IN
DECEIT Book 1, 377-90, 407-12; Book 2, 211-43 (1928); 3 H. HARTSHORNE, M. MAY & F. SHtrr-
TLEWORTH, STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF CHARACTER: STUDIES IN THE ORGANIZATION OF CHAR-
ACTER 153-212 (1930).
299. 1 H. HARTSHORN & M. MAY, supra note 298, at 211-21 (Book II). For discussion of
Hartshorn and May's findings, see, e.g., W. MISCHEL, supra note 296, at 25-26; Bern & Allen, On
Predicting Some of the People Some of the Time: The Search for Cross-Situational Consistencies in
Behavior, 81 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 506, 506-07 (1974); Rosenhan, supra note 292, at 926. A partial
revisionist interpretation of Hartshorn and May's data appears in Burton, Generality of Honesty Re-
considered, 70 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 481 (1963).
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"truly generalized conscience . . is a statistical rarity. ' 300 Although indi-
viduals clearly differ in their responses to temptation, contextual pressures
have a substantial effect on moral conduct independent of any generalized
predisposition.30' In some studies, even "seemingly trivial situational dif-
ferences may reduce [behavioral] correlations to zero.
'3 0 2
The potency of contextual factors has been reflected in a wide variety of
social science research. Taken together, the discomfiting import of these
studies is that many individuals will, under some circumstances, violate
those norms with which the bar is primarily concerned: honesty, integrity,
remorse for prior offenses, and respect for the rights of others. For exam-
ple, large percentages of individuals will cheat or steal in the face of op-
portunities to gain with little risk of loss, and will refuse to admit their
misconduct.303 Exposures to stress, strong competition, authority, or peer
influence can readily alter patterns of moral behavior.304 To cite only the
most notorious example, more than sixty percent of the subjects in Stanley
Milgram's obedience experiment complied with directions to administer
apparently dangerous electric shocks to co-participants, despite their cries
of pain. 0 5
Although empirical evidence on lawyers' ethics is fragmentary, it also
suggests that situational pressures play a critical role in shaping normative
300. W. MISCHEL, supra note 296, at 26.
301. Burton, Honesty and Dishonesty, in MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR: THEORY, RE-
SEARCH AND SOCIAL ISSUES 173, 176 (T. Lickona ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as MORAL DEVELOP-
MENT]; see D. CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 142-43 (1973) (finding no unusual personality
traits in embezzlers); Burton, supra note 299.
302. W. MISCHEL, supra note 296, at 177.
303. See L. NETTLER, LYING, CHEATING AND STEALING 75 (1982); Fischer, Levels of Cheating
Under Conditions of Informative Appeal to Honesty, Public Affirmation of Value, and Threats of
Punishment, 64 J. EDUC. RESEARCH 12, 14 (1970); Hetherington & Feldman, College Cheating as a
Function of Subject and Situational Variables, 55 J. EDUC. PSYCHOLOGY 212, 214 (1964); Kohlberg,
Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization, in HANDBOOK OF SO-
CIALIZATION THEORY AND RESEARCH 347, 395 (D. Goslin ed. 1969); McQueen, Examination De-
ception as a Function of Residual, Background, and Immediate Stimulus Factors, 25 J. PERSONAL-
rry 643, 650 (1957); cf. D. CRESSEY, supra note 301, at 140-42 (describing importance of situational
rather than attitudinal factors in influencing embezzlers).
304. See, e.g., J. ARONFREED, CONDUCT AND CONSCIENCE: THE SOCIALIZATION OF INTERNAL-
IZED CONTROL OVER BEHAVIOR 30-31, 40, 263 (1968) (citing studies); Bettleheim, Individual and
Mass Behavior in Extreme Situations, 38 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 417 (1943); Kelman,
Compliance, Identification, and Internalization: Three Processes of Attitude Change, in BASIC STUD-
IES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 140, 148 (H. Proshansky & B. Seidenberger eds. 1965); Zimbardo,
Involvement and Communication Discrepancy as Determinants of Opinion Conformity, 60 J. ABNOR-
MAL & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 86 (1960); see generally Rosenhan, Moore & Underwood, The Social
Psychology of Moral Behavior, in MORAL DEVELOPMENT, supra note 301, at 241 (situational charac-
teristics are powerful determinants of moral behavior); sources cited infra note 305 (experiments dem-
onstrating that stress and authority alter behavior patterns).
305. S. MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 35 (1974); Milgram,
Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 371 (1963); see also Orne &
Evans, Social Control in the Psychological Experiment: Antisocial Behavior and Hypnosis, 1 J. PER-
SONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 189, 194-95 (1965) (finding participants willing to throw nitric acid
in face of assistant).
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commitments and conduct. As Jerome Carlin's study of the Manhattan
bar and Joel Handler's research on small town practitioners make clear,
an attorney's willingness to violate legal or professional rules depends
heavily on the exposures to temptation, client pressures, and collegial atti-
tudes in his practice setting.30
C. Problems of Prediction
The situational nature of moral conduct makes predictions of behavior
uncertain under any circumstances, and the context of bar decisionmaking
presents particular difficulties. A threshhold problem springs from the in-
herent limitations of clinical predictive techniques, i.e., those based on
non-statistical information. Even trained psychiatrists, psychologists, and
mental health workers have been notably unsuccessful in projecting future
deviance, dishonesty, or other misconduct on the basis of similar prior
acts.10 7 For example, even in extreme cases, the best clinical research sug-
gests that such professionals will err in two out of three predictions of
violent behavior among institutionalized mental patients. 308 There are no
systematic data from which to predict white-collar offenses." 9 And with
respect to certain other forms of conduct that bar examiners find troub-
ling, such as homosexual activity, the correlations between prior conduct
and subsequent psychopathologies or nonconsensual sexual abuse are non-
existent or too insubstantial to permit reasonably accurate prognosis.310
Efforts to project psychological instability in individual cases have
proven equally problematic. Trained specialists will frequently disagree
about an appropriate diagnosis, the forms of behavior that will signifi-
cantly impair legal practice, and the likelihood that they will recur in a
particular case.311 At best, with respect to some chronic problems, such as
306. J. CARLIN, supra note 254, at 166-67; J. HANDLER, supra note 254, at 155.
307. See J. MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR (1981) (U.S. Dep't
of Health and Human Services Monograph); C. NETrER, RESPONDING TO CRIME 88-92 (1982);
American Psychological Association, Report of the Task Force on the Role of Psychology in the Crimi-
nal Justice System, 33 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1099, 1110 (1978); sources cited infra note 314.
308. See also Kaslow, Moral, Emotional, and Physical Fitness for the Bar: "Pondering (Seeming)
Imponderables," B. EXAMINER, Aug. 1982, at 38, 41 (mental health professionals cannot always
agree on diagnosis); Monahan, Prediction of Crime and Recidivism, 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND
JUSTICE 1170, 1174-75 (1981) (reviewing studies).
309. Most of the published research has focused on identifying situational variables that may help
in detecting or minimizing such offenses, see D. CRESSEY, supra note 301, at 153-54; L. NzErrsR,
supra note 303.
310. R. MITCHELL, THE HOMOSEXUAL AND THE LAW 12 (1969) (sexual violence); Clark, Ho-
mosexuality and Psychopathology in Nonpatient Males, 35 AM. J. PSYCHOANALYSIS 163, 167 (1975)
(properly controlled studies uniformly yield "convincing evidence that homosexuality is not a criterion
predictor of psychopathology"). The statistically slight link between child abuse and homosexual pref-
erence cannot justify broad preemptive screening measures. See, e.g., D. WESr, HOMOSEXUALITY
117-19 (1968).
311. Custer, supra note 120, at 17, 20; Kaslow, supra note 308, at 41.
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alcohol abuse, predictions of aggregate recurrence rates may be fairly ac-
curate, but the probability of determining which specific individuals will
have future difficulties remains quite low. 12 Given these indeterminacies,
together with many medical health professionals' disinclination to
prejudice patients who have sought their assistance, it is implausible to
expect conclusive assessments in any but the clearest cases of incapacity.
13
It is doubtful that many individuals fitting that diagnosis are capable of
successfully completing law school, passing a bar exam, and establishing a
practice in which unsuspecting clients or colleagues will be at risk.
Despite most bar examiners' confidence in their intuitive capabilities,
there is reason to doubt they will achieve substantially greater accuracy
than trained clinicians in predicting future misconduct or incapacity. Not
only do examiners and judges generally lack clinical expertise, they are
dealing with highly circumscribed data. Decisionmakers are frequently
drawing inferences about how individuals will cope with the pressures
and temptations of uncertain future practice contexts based on one or two
prior acts committed under vastly different circumstances. Yet, as just
noted, a half century of behavioral research underscores the variability
and contextual nature of moral behavior: A single incident or small num-
ber of acts committed in dissimilar social settings affords no basis for reli-
able generalization. 1" Neither common sense nor common experience
suggest that those who have violated drug laws or avoided military service
are likely to commit professional abuses, or that applicants who on occa-
sion have mismanaged their own financial affairs are destined to become
comminglers3 15 Indeed, if we cannot with reasonable accuracy predict
cheaters in French from cheaters in math, it is difficult to entertain the far
more attenuated inferences implicit in much bar decisionmaking.
It is equally problematic to assume, as do most courts and commenta-
tors, that individuals willing to acknowledge the error of prior misconduct
are less likely to stray from the path of righteousness in the future. De-
spite our historic faith in the confessional, current research reflects that
individuals' resistance to temptation and remorse for past transgressions
are "completely independent or at best minimally interrelated."31 None-
312. See Kaslow, supra note 308, at 44.
313. Interview with Jack Zusman, Dir., Fla. Mental Health Inst. (Mar. 2, 1984).
314. Bern & Allen, supra note 299; Burton, supra note 301, at 193. Even the most sophisticated
nonclinical predictive techniques have proven highly inadequate for identifying future criminal offend-
ers unless they have high rates of recidivism. See Note, Selective Incapacitation: Reducing Crime
through Predictions of Recidivism, 96 HARV. L. REV. 511, 518 (1982) and sources cited therein.
315. But see Barnes, supra note 77, at 71, 78 (applicant with bad credit history might be tempted
to appropriate client's money); supra pp. 541-43.
316. W. MISCHEL, supra note 296, at 26; see Becker, Consequences of Different Kinds of Paren-
tal Discipline, in 1 REVIEW OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 169 (M. Hoffman & L. Hoffman
eds. 1964); Hoffman, Child Rearing Practices and Moral Development: Generalizations from Empir-
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theless, under contemporary procedures, a candidate's inclination and
ability to stage a convincing mea culpa are frequently controlling.
317
As these examples suggest, bar decisionmaking is constrained not only
by limitations of data but also by biases in evaluation. Character predic-
tions relying on intuitive judgments have repeatedly proved less accurate
than those based on statistical correlations; 318 human inferences are sub-
ject to seemingly infinite and inescapable forms of distortion. To cite only
the most well-documented illustrations, individuals frequently make char-
acter assessments based on stereotyped notions about particular social
groups, forms of conduct, or the relationship between certain personality
traits.3  Thus, for example, teachers' predictions of student honesty have
been shown to correlate with grades, IQ, and social class.
320
Nor do bar examiners appear exempt from such tendencies. Applicants'
law schools, law firm affiliations, and domestic living arrangements fre-
quently have affected character predictions, and examiners' own
prejudices about drugs, alcohol, sex, psychiatry, and redemption inevitably
will bias their perceptions.321 Moreover, once individuals have formed a
judgment, they tend selectively to assimilate information that will confirm
their original impression. Conflicting data are undervalued, and certain
vivid personal information is overvalued.3 22 In general, individuals tend to
give greater weight to evidence of unfavorable personal attributes than to
positive ones, and to assess other individuals on the basis of one salient
quality.3 23
Thus, the inherent limitations in predicting moral behavior, coupled
with the subjectivity of bar standards, leave substantial room for error.
ical Research, 34 CHILD DEv. 295 (1963). The evaluation of our "singularly confessing society," and
the role of ritualized admissions in ostensibly evoking truth are traced in M. FOUCAULT, THE HIS-
TORY OF SEXUALITY 58-65 (R. Hurley trans. 1978).
317. See supra pp. 546-47.
318. P. MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND
A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE (1954); R. NISBETr & L. Ross, supra note 295, at 140-41; Dawes,
The Robust Beauty of Improper Linear Models in Decision Making, 34 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 571, 573
(1979); see also Burton, supra note 301, at 183 (single most consistent measure of cheating is father's
occupation). I do not mean to imply that statistical correlations would provide a preferable means of
evaluating applicants. See supra note 291.
319. G. ALLPORT, supra note 294, at 499-509; R. NISBETr & L. Ross, supra note 295, at
141-92 (citing and discussing studies); Bem & Allen, supra note 299, at 508 (citing studies);
Kahneman & Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 237 (1973); Tver-
sky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974).
320. See Burton, supra note 301, at 182, and studies cited therein.
321. See supra pp. 538-41.
322. R. NISBETT & L. Ross, supra note 295, at 167-92; sources cited supra note 319; Lord,
Ross & Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on
Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 2098-99 (1979).
323. See G. ALLPORT, supra note 294, at 520-21; Hamilton & Huffman, Generality of Impres-
sion-Formation Processes for Evaluative and Nonevaluative Judgments, 20 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOLOGY 200, 201, 204 (1971); Weinstein & Crowdus, The Effects of Positive and Negative
Information on Person Perception, 21 HuM. REL. 383 (1968).
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Those errors run in two directions: False positives result when applicants
are deterred or denied on the belief that they will commit future abuses
and they do not; false negatives occur when individuals are admitted on
the belief that they will not engage in abusive conduct and they do. Stud-
ies of bar disciplinary processes confirm the frequency of errors of the
latter sort.324  And the structural features of current admission
processes-limitations of timing, investigatory resources and predictive ca-
pacity-make such inaccuracies inevitable.
The number of false positives is obviously lower, given the infrequency
of formal denials of admission. Nonetheless, the cumulative impact of law
school and bar screening, coupled with its deterrent potential, is not in-
substantial. As Alan Dershowitz has demonstrated, even if bar examiners
achieve far greater predictive accuracy than trained clinicians, the absolute
number of wrongful exclusions spread over a period of years would re-
main quite significant. 2 ' And, certainly, there are enough celebrated ex-
amples of dubious character determinations to give one pause. Individuals
denied by some state bars on political grounds have nonetheless managed
to achieve distinguished legal careers elsewhere, and one recent candidate
whose "paranoid personality" allegedly disabled him from practice in Ari-
zona succeeded not only in immediately securing admission elsewhere, but
also in orchestrating the only antitrust challenge to bar licensing authority
ever to reach the Supreme Court. 2 '
Of course, to acknowledge the inadequacy of predictive techniques is
not to indict their use in all contexts. The issue is always the costs of error
and of the plausible alternatives. In certain occupational contexts involv-
ing health and safety, our tolerance for erroneous exclusions generally in-
creases. For purposes of bar certification, however, where the conse-
quences of granting a license are less likely to be irreparable, the
argument for broad prophylactic screening becomes correspondingly less
compelling. To evaluate the merits of that argument, we need a fuller
analysis of the price of prediction and the availability of alternatives.
324. See, e.g., studies cited supra note 250 and infra note 449 (documenting abuses of lawyer-
client relationship).
325. Dershowitz, supra note 291.
326. For example, George Anastaplo, who was denied admission for failure to disclose his politi-
cal associations, became a highly respected scholar on constitutional history. See Patner, supra note
226, at 230, and discussion infra p. 567. Clyde Summers, who was excluded because his conscientious
objector status restricted his ability to support the U.S. Constitution, see discussion infra p. 567, is a
member in good standing of the New York bar and a distinguished labor law professor at the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania. Robert Cover, one of the plaintiffs in Law Students Research Council v.
Wadmond, discussed infra pp. 567-69, is the Chancellor Kent Professor of Law and Legal History at
Yale Law School. For discussion of the Arizona application, see Application of Ronwin, 113 Ariz.
357, 555 P.2d 315 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 907 (1977); Ronwin v. State Bar of Arizona, 686
F.2d 692 (1981), rev'd sub nom. Hoover v. Ronwin, 104 S. Ct. 1989 (1984).
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VI. THE COSTS OF MORAL OVERSIGHT
A. The Misdirection of Resources
Taken as a whole, the current certification process is an extraordinarily
expensive means of providing a dubious level of public protection. Al-
though it proved impossible to obtain reliable measures of state bar out-
lays, many jurisdictions expend substantial amounts of paid and volunteer
time in screening routine applications which present no serious character
questions. 2 With respect to other applicants, courts and committees have
often invested significant resources pursuing matters of marginal predic-
tive value and significance.
According to the national Bar Examiners' Handbook, the most time-
consuming investigations historically have been those where the appli-
cant's "ideological holdings are in question." 2 8 As an example, the Hand-
book recounts one case in which inquiry centered not on the applicant's
political philosophy, but rather on his assertion that no family member
had ever been associated with the Communist Party. To evaluate this con-
tention, examiners found it "necessary" to conduct an exhaustive review
of state records and newspaper archives in a jurisdiction that the family
had left some fifteen years prior to the filing of the application. Although
"for many weeks [the task] looked hopeless," committee members man-
aged ultimately to brand the candidate's father as a bona fide party orga-
nizer.3 9 Nor was the scope of inquiry in that proceeding unique, as the
records in other protracted political cases demonstrate. 30 During the late
1960's and early 1970's, investigations of campus activists consumed sub-
stantial public and private resources. One prominent antiwar organizer
submitted to eight prolonged hearings, spanning fourteen months, before
finally gaining admission.3
Such delays are by no means confined to political inquiries. For exam-
ple, New York examiners have been known "to defer decision endlessly,
until the applicant withdraws or abandons his application. '"33' This strat-
egy has the administrative advantage of avoiding direct confrontation with
the candidate, the possibility of reversal on appeal, and tedious
paperwork. 3 Although meaningful statistics on the length of the review
process proved unavailable, only five states (14%, N=36) reported formal
time limits on screening. In some jurisdictions, an application may not
327. See supra p. 513.
328. BAR EXAMINERS' HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 93.
329. Id.
330. See, e.g., cases discussed at note 326 supra and note 334 infra.
331. See Papke, supra note 86, at 21.
332. N.Y. Comm. Rep., supra note 101, at 27.
333. Id.
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reach the final level of administrative review for two years; adjudicated
proceedings have ranged from two and a half months to over a decade.334
Taken together, the anxiety, stigma, and fianancial expenses resulting
from such protracted inquiries can be substantial.
Of equal concern is the amount of state and applicant resources con-
sumed by routine as well as problem cases. For the vast majority of candi-
dates, the certification process is a highly burdensome mechanism for
identifying the tiny number of individuals with serious offenses. As subse-
quent discussion and Appendix 1 reflect, state bar applications generally
demand an extended array of personal information and supplemental doc-
umentary submissions. Every jurisdiction requests extensive information
about prior residences. A quarter demand a ten-year itinerary, which for
many law school graduates will commence at age fourteen or earlier. 335 A
substantial number of applications require employment histories for com-
parable periods and accounts of all, or all but the most minor traffic viola-
tions.336 A minority of states also require photographs (25%), birth certifi-
cates (6%), physicians' certificates (4%), law school applications (2%), and
high school grade transcripts (2%). Yet, given the limitations of staff and
resources described earlier, little of this material is ever verified. 33 1 Thus,
as the Report evaluating New York's certification process noted, "after an
applicant has performed the laborious task of assembling detailed infor-
mation about his past, virtually no effort is made to do anything with that
information," apart from a check of local law enforcement records.
338
Almost all states require personal references of varying form and num-
ber, often exceeding three or more individuals from each locality in which
the applicant has lived. 39 Such requirements generate an enormous paper
flow, which is time consuming for all concerned and ill-designed to gener-
334. Interview, Member, Mich. Bd. of B. Examiners (July 12, 1983) (2 years). Other jurisdic-
tions are far more efficient. Compare Application of Kiser, 107 Ariz. 326, 487 P.2d 393 (1971) (3
months) and Application of Levine, 97 Ariz. 88, 397 P.2d 205 (1964) (5 months) with Willner v.
Committee on Character, 373 U.S. 96 (1963) (27 years) and In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961) (11
years) and Application of Kellar, 81 Nev. 240, 401 P.2d 616 (1965) (5 years).
335. Another quarter specify all residences since ages ranging from 12 to 17, a requirement par-
ticularly onerous for applicants entering law as a second career.
336. Over a quarter (27%) of all states ask for all employers since age 16, and 8% ask for an
account of all activities since age 18. Sixteen percent of bar applications ask about all traffic violations.
Although over half the states (59%) disclaim interest in minor violations, the definition of minor is not
necessarily expansive or unambiguous. For example, 18% exclude all or "occasional" parking viola-
tions and 6% exclude only non-moving violations which resulted in a penalty under $25.00.
337. Efforts at confirmation are usually limited to a check of local police and motor vehicle
records and some employers; half the states do not even routinely make these efforts. See supra pp.
513-14.
338. N.Y. Comm. Rep., supra note 101, at 26.
339. Of the nine states requiring three references from each locality, six jurisdictions demand an
additional two recommendations and references, and one application requires another five. According
to interviews with bar administrators, the average number of references solicited is five; the range is
between zero and eighteen.
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ate useful information. As the former National Secretary of the Board of
Examiners once acknowleged, these references "usually mean[] little as it
is a man of indeed poor character and few friends who cannot get signa-
tures for such a purpose."3 " Moreover, all but a few jurisdictions com-
pound the absurdity by allowing applicants to collect and submit com-
pleted reference forms.341 Presumably, the "man of indeed poor
character" will engage in his own screening prior to submission.
A minority of states impose further, largely formalistic requirements
open to a comparable critique. About a quarter of the states ask if the
applicant will comply with the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
question that one character oversight committee has characterized as tan-
tamount to "asking a child whether he intends to be good for all time." '42
Another eleven states inquire if the applicant has read the Code without
asking whether he will comply, while three states ask about compliance
but not about familiarity with the document. To obtain a handwriting
sample, North Carolina has applicants explain why they desire to practice
in the state. 4" Maryland demands a short essay on one Canon of Ethics
that the candidate thinks is important for the profession.344 Defenders of
the requirement, while conceding that it seems "sort of juvenile in a way,"
nonetheless maintain that "sometimes [examiners] can tell from that very
selection what kind of a man you are dealing with."3 45
A similar justification has been advanced for mandatory applicant inter-
views, and with equally dubious empirical grounding." 6 Each year, over
11,000 individuals-more than a quarter of those admitted to prac-
tice-submit to character interviews.3, 7 Conventional explanations for the
interview process-that it provides a significant ceremonial rite and an
opportunity for seasoned guidance by elder statesmen-are belied by the
cursory and frequently pontifical nature of the interchange. Particularly
in less urban areas, applicants may be required to travel substantial dis-
tances at inconvenient times in order to confirm their residency or make
small talk about life as a lawyer.348 It is doubtful that the New York
candidates who have traveled three and a half hours in order to engage in
340. Shafroth, supra note 116, at 202. The limited utility of references is discussed supra p. 514.
341. In 21 states, the applicant submits recommendations with his application. Only three juris-
dictions request separate letters. In four states, it is unclear who sends in the forms.
342. N.Y. Comm. Rep., supra note 101, at 67.
343. BAR EXAMINERS' HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 161-62.
344. Barnes, supra note 77, at 79.
345. Id.
346. See supra pp. 514-15.
347. That figure is based on the number of applicants subject to character review in the twelve
states that require interviews. See supra notes 68 & 102. Since not all Illinois districts require inter-
views and Virginia requires them only for graduates of out-of-state schools, appropriate adjustments
were made in the statistics for those jurisdictions.
348. See supra pp. 514-15 (discussing interview format and focus).
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a two-minute colloquy emerge with greater appreciation of their profes-
sional responsibilities. 49 If, as one New York Committee Chairman
maintained, the interview's function is to provide some applicants' "closest
contact with an active member of the practicing bar," 350 that is more an
indictment of current legal education than a justification for a largely vac-
uous initiation rite.
Moreover, assessments of current certification expenditures cannot pro-
ceed in a vacuum. A critical question, to which discussion in Part VII will
return, is whether resources now directed toward predicting future mis-
conduct would be better expended in identifying and responding to the
abuses that actually occur. The merits of that alternative focus must also
be evaluated in light of certain other costs of moral oversight. To the ex-
tent that prevailing certification procedures legitimate the bar's regulatory
autonomy or deflect attention from its sorry record in policing practition-
ers, the system ill serves its primary prophylactic objectives. And insofar
as pursuit of those objectives compromises fundamental constitutional val-
ues, its necessity warrants reexamination.
B. First Amendment Concerns
Throughout this century, the moral character requirement has placed a
price on nonconformist political commitments. Conscientious objectors, re-
ligious "fanatics," suspected subversives, and student radicals have been
exhaustively investigated, frequently delayed, and occasionally denied ad-
mission.351 Unsurprisingly, the intensity and focus of inquiry has shifted
with the national mood, with greatest concern surfacing in the 1950's.
During the Cold War era, committees routinely grilled candidates about
radical views or associations, including, in some instances, affiliation with
allegedly "pinkish" organizations such as Americans for Democratic Ac-
tion. 52 Recurrent questions were whether the applicant believed Commu-
nists were eligible to practice law or whether he had ever read Das
Kapital outside of school. An affirmative response to the first inquiry was
likely to result in protracted scrutiny, while confessions of intellectual cu-
riosity met with mixed results. The extracurricular reader might be ex-
349. Baris, supra note 84, at 15, col. 4.
350. Interview, Sec., N.Y. Char. Comm., 2d Jud. Dep't (July 1983).
351. In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961) (refusal to discuss possible Communist Party member-
ship); Application of Patterson, 210 Or. 495, 302 P.2d 227 (1956) (belief in positive attributes of
Communism), vacated, 353 U.S. 952 (1957); Application of Cassidy, 268 A.D. 282, 51 N.Y.S.2d 202
(N.Y. App. Div. 1944) (member of Christian Front Organization), affd, 296 N.Y. 926, 73 N.E.2d 41
(1947); Application of Stone, 74 Wyo. 389, 398, 288 P.2d 767, 771 (1955) (religious fanaticism), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 815 (1956); Green, Procedures for Character Investigations, 35 B. EXAMINER 10,
11 (1966) (rabble rouser ultimately allowed to take bar examination on split decision).
352. Brown & Fassett, supra note 116, at 494.
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haustively examined for sympathies with the heretical work, or alterna-
tively "commended for acquainting himself with the Communist
menace. ' 353 Other committees have intermittently monitored the content
of applicants' political speeches and solicited views on subjects such as
God, pacifists, the Marshall Plan, and campus activism.35 4
Such interrogations prompted a series of Supreme Court decisions that,
although delimiting to some extent the ideological grounds justifying non-
certification, still leave substantial scope for bar inquiry.355 Political activ-
ity culminating in arrest or academic discipline remains a legitimate con-
cern, since it could evidence disrespect for law. 5  And political beliefs
may prompt denial for candidates who are unwilling to uphold the Con-
stitution or who have knowingly joined organizations advocating violent
overthrow of the government coupled with intent to do so. 5 Accordingly,
Illinois examiners could exclude conscientious objector Clyde Summers for
failure to support a state constitutional provision requiring service in the
state militia.358 Also subject to exclusion are those who refuse on principle
to answer questions regarding radical political involvement, though the
precise bounds of legitimate inquiry remain murky. Nothing in the
Court's most recent pronouncements repudiates earlier decisions denying
admission to George Anastopolo and Ralph Konigsberg for failure to sup-
ply information on Communist Party membership, even though such
membership could not of itself have justified denial. 59
As Appendix 1 reflects, political involvement is of continuing concern to
many examiners. About a quarter of all state bar applications (24%) ask
353. Id.
354. In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 85 n.5 (1961) (questions regarding God), discussed in Kalven
& Steffen, The Bar Admission Cases: An Unfinished Debate Between Justice Harlan and Justice
Black, 21 LAW IN TRANSITION 155, 187-88 (1961) (question regarding God withdrawn after pro-
test); Papke, supra note 86, at 17 (discussing Iowa Character Committee's questions regarding paci-
fists; examiners "always want to know what you would do if your wife was being raped"); Brown &
Fasset, supra note 116, at 488 (Marshall Plan); N.Y. Comm. Rep., supra note 101, at 19 (campus
activism). For example, one applicant received guidance in the form of a lecture why "students should
keep their mouths shut and just study while at the university, and leave government to the more
mature." Id. See also supra pp. 543-44.
355. See Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971) (plural-
ity opinion); Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1 (1971); In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971).
356. For example, in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 241-43 (1957), the
Court gave serious consideration to arrests arising from labor activism and an indictment for soliciting
volunteers to assist Spanish Loyalists occurring some 15 years prior to application for the bar. State
Supreme Court cases and reports of bar examiners reflect similar concern. See supra notes 218-25
and accompanying text, and infra notes 361-62 and accompanying text.
357. See cases cited supra note 355; In re Application of Cassidy, 268 A.D. 282, 51 N.Y.S.2d 202
(N.Y. App. Div. 1944) (denying admission to applicant belonging to Father Coughlin's Christian
Front Organization).
358. In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
359. In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); see also
Special Project, Admission to the Bar: A Constitutional Analysis, 34 VAND. L. REv. 655, 683-92
(1981) (analysis of extent to which Anastoplo and Konigsberg remain good law).
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about membership in groups with aims to overthrow the government;
twenty-five percent demand an affirmation of loyalty to the government or
state and U.S. constitutions. Nevada inquires if the candidate is a member
of the Communist Party, and Tennessee requires disclosure of all organi-
zations to which the applicant belongs, a question flatly inconsistent with
Supreme Court holdings. 360 Eighty percent of all jurisdictions would or
might investigate conduct such as sit-ins resulting in misdemeanor convic-
tions or membership in radical organizations, although prevailing prece-
dents suggest that such activities could not legitimately warrant exclu-
sion. 61 Similarly, campus activism remains of interest to some committees,
despite the absence of any reported decisions denying admission' to candi-
dates on that basis.
3 8 2
This political oversight is troubling on two dimensions. From a consti-
tutional perspective, character review may inhibit a range of expressive
activity by potential applicants, or may deter those with political offenses
from seeking admission to the bar. Although the record before the Court
in Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond failed to persuade the
majority that "careful administration of such a system as New York's
need result in chilling effects upon the exercise of constitutional free-
doms," 363 certain data reviewed for this study suggest otherwise. Appli-
cants who have denounced government policy, law school administrators,
bar certification processes, or the ABA Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity have not found favor with local committees . 64 Also, since most state
360. Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1, 6 (1971) (plurality opinion); In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23, 30
(1971); see also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (overbroad inquiry into teacher's past as-
sociations); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (anonymity of membership
lists).
361. There have been no reported cases over the past half century denying admission solely on the
basis of sit-in misdemeanor convictions, and the Supreme Court has held that Communist Party mem-
bership will not of itself justify eyclusion. See sources cited supra note 360.
362. See Tables 5 & 6, supra pp. 535, 536.
363. 401 U.S. 154, 167 (1971).
364. Siegel v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 10 Cal. 3d 156, 514 P.2d 967, 110 Cal. Rptr. 15
(1973) (reversing committee's denial of applicant who had allegedly not been candid in describing his
political speeches). One basis on which the Arizona Character Committee found Edward Ronwin
mentally unfit was his "irresponsible and highly derogatory untrue public accusations" against law
school administrators and faculty. Application of Ronwin, 113 Ariz. 357, 359, 555 P.2d 315, 317
(1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 907 (1977). A New York applicant ran into problems by stating that he
believed the Code of Professional Responsibility was "phony" (since lawyers did not adhere to it), and
that attorneys charged too much and rendered too little public service. Chairman, N.Y. Char. and
Fitness Comm., 7th Dist. (Dec. 20, 1982). Any evidence that the candidate does not share the profes-
sion's official views on unauthorized practice will almost certainly result in further investigation. See
Interview, Member, Ill. Char. and Fitness Comm., 3d Dist. (July 18, 1983) (unauthorized practice);
Interview, Chairman, N.Y. Char. and Fitness Comm., 8th Dist. (July 18, 1983) (same). Public criti-
cism of certification processes has also adversely affected judicial determinations. Application of Stone,
74 Wyo. 389, 288 P.2d 767 (1955). It may well be that Edwin Ronwin's challenge to the Arizona
bar's grading of his exam did not enhance his case in subsequent character certification proceedings,
see Application of Ronwin, 113 Ariz. at 357, 556 P.2d at 315; Mann, Low Comedy at the High Court,
AM. LAw., Apr. 1984, at 114, 115.
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bars demand disclosure of all arrests and criminal charges, and since
protesters frequently run the risk of unlawful arrest, the chilling effects of
certification may extend to protected political conduct.3"5 While the degree
of such deterrence is difficult to assess, a third of the respondents in one
law student survey reportedly had refrained from certain activities because
of the impending character review. Among the activities cited were attend-
ing political rallies, signing petitions, and seeking an Army deferment on
psychological grounds.366
Whatever the effect on constitutionally-protected activity, the bar's
oversight process remains disturbing on other grounds. To constitutional
scholars such as Harry Kalven, "[w]hat is really at stake" in certification
procedures is the "image of what kind of conformity the Bar will re-
quire. 3617 And the image now cultivated reflects an insular and impover-
ished concept of character. For two millenia, philosophers have viewed
steadfast adherence to principle as one of the cardinal virtues.36 ' So too,
contemporary developmental psychologists have defined the highest stage
of moral development in terms of commitment to individualized principles
of justice, dignity, and equality that supersede social norms and legal
codes.3 6 9 Yet it is precisely the candidates who display such commitment
whose character is suspect under bar standards.
What initially triggered committee scrutiny of George Anastaplo was
his personal essay defending the right to revolution as articulated in the
Declaration of Independence. What prevented his certification was a prin-
cipled refusal to deny associations for which there was no basis in the
record.370 In other cases, conscientious objectors have been damned as
shirkers or subversives, and nonviolent civil disobedience has been de-
nounced as disrespect for law. In a profession devoted to preserving
365. See Appendix I. For discussion of the frequency of unlawful arrests, see Brief for Appellants
at 35-37, Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971) and
sources cited therein; A.C.L.U. OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, DAY OF PROTEST, NIGHT OF VIO-
LENCE: THE CENTURY CITY PEACE MARCH (1967); see also Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,
353 U.S. 232, 241 (1957) ("fact that a man has been arrested has very little, if any, probative value in
showing that he has engaged in any misconduct").
366. Papke, supra note 86, at 18-19.
367. Kalven & Steffen, supra note 354, at 178.
368. See generally P. FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 2
(1978) (cardinal virtues courage, temperance, wisdom, and justice); P. GEACH, THE VIRTUES (1977);
J. POCOCK, supra note 293; G. VON WRIGHT, THE VARIETIES OF GOODNESS 133 (1963) ("function
proper to man . . . is activity in accordance with a rational principle").
369. The seminal work is that of Harvard psychologist Laurence Kohlberg. See, e.g., L.
KOHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT (1981); Kohlberg, supra note 303. See
also C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982) (stressing values of care and concern for others
that transcend abstract legal requirements).
370. See In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 98-102 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); J. LIEBERMAN,
THE TYRANNY OF THE EXPERTS: How PROFESSIONALS ARE CLOSING THE OPEN SOCIETY 97-99
(1970).
371. See In re Application of Brooks, 57 Wash. 2d 66, 68, 355 P.2d 840, 841 (1960) (conscien-
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principle over expediency, and to maintaining the spirit as well as the
letter of the law, the value judgments implicit in these proceedings verge
on perversity. The records in cases such as Anastaplo, Konigsberg, and
Summers were replete with evidence of intellectual distinction, personal
integrity, and commitment to democratic principles." 2
By penalizing a show of character in proceedings nominally designed to
detect it, the bar has enshrined a morality manqug. To view subservience
to authority as a requisite for virtue is to ignore a history rich in counter-
examples. American ideals of liberty, equality, and dignity have some-
times found their highest expression in peaceful defiance of legal man-
dates. Abolitionists, civil rights activists, suffragists and labor
organizers-indeed, the architects of our constitutional framework-all
were guilty of "disrespect for law" in precisely the sense that bar examin-
ers employ it. As long as that criterion remains an indice of moral merit,
the certification process will exemplify a commitment to conformity that
makes a mockery of the bar's highest traditions.
C. Due Process Values
As the Supreme Court has long recognized, pursuit of a chosen vocation
is one of the core liberties protected by the due process clause of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments." 3 Accordingly, certification and discipli-
nary procedures must satisfy the requirements of specificity and regularity
that give content to those constitutional guaranteees. In addition, the scope
of bar inquiry into personal affairs implicates concerns of privacy and
substantive rationality that are also subject to due process constraints. The
significance of these constitutional issues cannot be assessed solely or even
primarily in doctrinal terms. As a policy matter, the societal values from
which due process mandates draw should inform any judgments about the
legitimacy of current character proceedings.
tious objector's failure to report for alternative duty constituted ground for denial), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 813 (1961); Papke, supra note 86, at 17-18 (discussing Ohio committee's equation of pacifists
and communists, and its exclusion of Clyde Summers for failure to answer questions regarding Com-
munist Party membership); Application of Walker, 112 Ariz. 134, 138, 539 P.2d 891, 895-96 (1975)
(denying admission for failure to register for draft), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 956 (1976); Hallinan v.
Committee of Bar Examiners, 65 Cal. 2d 447, 421 P.2d 76, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1966) (reversing
committee decision to exclude applicant, in part because of civil disobedience conviction).
372. For example, Konigsberg had 42 character references, and Anastaplo was a war veteran who
had graduated at the top of his class and had earned impeccable recommendations. See J. LIEBERMAN,
supra note 370; Kalven & Steffen, supra note 354, at 178; Patner, supra note 226, at 188.
373. Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 103 (1963); In re Ruffalo, 390
U.S. 544, 550 (1968).
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1. Vagueness
Although the Supreme Court has summarily dismissed vagueness chal-
lenges to the moral character requirement on the theory that "long usage"
has given "well-defined contours" to the term,3" 4 the survey data reviewed
above afford little support for that determination. Prevailing standards
have raised precisely the problems of fair notice and consistency in appli-
cation that the void-for-vagueness doctrine was meant to curb.
As the Supreme Court has frequently made plain in other contexts, a
legal mandate that is phrased "in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its ap-
plication, violates the first essential of due process ... .""' By this stan-
dard, character mandates raise obvious difficulties. Surely moral merit is
at least as elusive as other terms the Court has declared infirm, such as
"gangsters," "sacreligious," "humane," and "credible and reliable. 3 76
On its face, the bar's character requirement is-in Justice Black's
phrase-"unusually ambiguous, ' 3 77 and court and committee amplifica-
tion have done little to refine analysis. Prevailing definitions of virtue are
circular or conclusory, and there is broad disagreement regarding particu-
lar conduct within and across jurisdictions. Individuals of "common intel-
ligence" clearly do differ in their normative assessment of a vast range of
conduct, including bankruptcy, barroom brawls, bounced checks, sexual
activity, drug or alcohol usage, civil disobedience, and psychological
problems.37M Given such inconsistencies in application, the standard
scarcely affords adequate notice of "conduct to avoid"' 79 or of the profes-
sional consequences of prior activities. Indeed, as lower courts have recog-
nized in other contexts, the character requirement is so "imprecise as to be
virtually unreviewable."380
Moreover, current certification structures have proven largely unre-
sponsive to those indeterminacies. Only a tiny percentage of disputed cases
generate written opinions by either courts or bar examiners, and not all
374. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 159 (1971), dis-
cussed supra pp. 567-68.
375. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (citations omitted).
376. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2504 (1983)
(ordinance requiring physicians to dispose of unborn child after abortion in humane and sanitary
manner); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358-61 (1983) (California statute requiring persons
who loiter or wander on streets to provide credible and reliable identification to police); Burstyn, Inc.
v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 504-05 (1952); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
377. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 263 (1957).
378. See supra p. 532-46.
379. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972); Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 & n.3 (1972) and cases cited therein.
380. Genusa v. City of Peoria, 475 F. Supp. 1199, 1206 (C.D. Il1. 1979) (quoting Bayside Enters.
v. Carson, 450 F. Supp. 696, 707 (M.D. Fla. 1978)).
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bar decisions are readily available.38' Only three states have published
policies regarding the types of conduct that would prompt investigation;
the general assumption, as the California Board candidly concedes, is that
no "meaningful guidelines can be stated." 8 2 Nor does any jurisdiction
publish statistics on the number of character investigations, hearings, or
denials of certification. This reticence may not be entirely inadvertent. A
commission charged with reviewing New York's character and fitness pro-
cedures concluded that committees appeared to fear that public disclosure
of the low incidence of denials would "ruin the mystique" of the process
and "interfere with the deterrent function . . .[of] discouraging individu-
als from going to law school if 'they have something to worry about.' ",383
Few jurisdictions provide definitive advice to applicants wondering if
they do, in fact, have something to worry about. Only nine states make
some systematic attempt to flag difficulties through a law school registra-
tion process. Although a third permit an applicant to petition the bar for
guidance, preliminary rulings are binding in only six states (12%). Gener-
ally, committee members prefer to give personal opinions rather than for-
mal assurances. For example, one Illinois applicant learned only that his
arrest and incarceration during a 1970's protest movement would "proba-
bly not be held against him," although the committee chairman "couldn't
say for sure. ' 38 4 Similarly, a Maine bar examiner recalled telling candi-
dates who had evaded military service that he couldn't "speak for the
Board" but that these problems "didn't bother him too much." 3 5 In the
majority of states, the prospective law student takes his chances and, even
where advance determinations are theoretically possible, few applicants
apparently find them useful. Jurisdictions which permit such rulings cur-
rently make an average of only 1.6 per year (N=14).
Moreover, the vices of vagueness include not only the absence of notice,
but also the absence of constraints on arbitrary government action. Im-
plicit in our concept of ordered liberty is the ideal of a "government of
381. The infrequency of judicial determinations is discussed supra p. 517. Among the 14 adminis-
trative hearing processes surveyed in depth, practices regarding written opinions vary widely. Only
one jurisdiction issues such opinions if a problem candidate is admitted, and several do not explain
their denials. Maine theoretically would issue an opinion if it witheld certification, but has not done
so in recent years. Interview, Chairman, Me. Bd. of B. Examiners (Aug. 21, 1983). Even states that
provide written decisions in instances of denial do not necessarily circulate them. In Michigan, Board
opinions are available to the public in the Bar Examiner's office. Interview, Member, Mich. Bd. of B.
Examiners (July 12, 1983).
382. California Board of Bar Examiners' Letter to Law Schools and Applicants (1970), reprinted
in Note, The Good Moral Character Requirement for Admission to the Bar, 4 SAN FERN. V.L. REV.
317, 330-31 (1975).
383. N.Y. Comm. Rep., supra note 101, at 28.
384. Interview, Chairman, I1l. Char. and Fitness Comm., 1st Dist. (July 11, 1983).
385. Interview, Chairman, Me. Bd. of B. Examiners (Aug. 21, 1983).
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laws, and not of men."386 One primary function of the due process clause
is to limit state departures from that ideal. By requiring some specificity
in standards, the void-for-vagueness doctrine seeks to restrain erratic and
capricious governmental oversight. Given the limitations and expense of
ad hoc appellate review, legal mandates must be framed with sufficient
precision to afford a certain regularity in administration as well as the
"appearance of even-handed justice.138 7 Such precision also serves to en-
sure that fundamental policy choices underlying the exercise of state
power rest with publicly accountable representatives.
By these criteria, both the certification and disciplinary process remain
troubling. Assessments of virtue have proved highly idiosyncratic. In the
absence of meaningful standards, courts and committees have simply aired
their preferences and prejudices. Applicants within and across jurisdic-
tions receive different treatment depending on the decisionmaker's subjec-
tive evaluation of their attitudes, mores, lifestyle, and professional associa-
tions. Of course, in a sense, the very arbitrariness of the system provides
some protection against lasting injustice. If damned by one tribunal, indi-
viduals with stamina and resources may find a more sympathetic forum
elsewhere-in an appellate court, a different jurisdiction, or (after time
has passed) a changed local committee. But that possibility scarcely re-
deems the current enterprise. To the contrary, it underscores the point-
lessness of expending vast resources on a structure that cannot hope to
accomplish any consistent or coherent screening function.
Moreover, the vices of vagueness are by no means confined to substan-
tive standards regarding character. As Appendix I reflects, many ques-
tions on bar applications are phrased so ambiguously that applicants must
speculate, under peril of perjury, as to what precisely is subject to disclos-
ure. For example, a number of jurisdictions (6%) ask about any "charges
made" or "claims against [the applicant] that were not the subject of legal
proceedings," an inquiry broad enough to encompass innumerable private
disputes. About a fifth of all states (22%) inquire about dismissals and
resignations because of "unsatisfactory" work, or conduct constituting
"unauthorized practice of law," both of which call for characterizations
386. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803); see also Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 179 (1951) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[Pirocedure...
spells much of the difference between rule by law and rule by whim or caprice.").
387. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 469 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also
Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 89 (1960)
(procedures must assure "a certain overall probability of regularity"). For general accounts of the role
of due process in ensuring governmental regularity, see Gray, Procedural Fairness and Substantive
Rights, in XVIII NoMos 182 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977); Kadish, Methodology and
Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319 (1957); Summers,
Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes-A Plea for "Process Values," 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1
(1974); Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269 (1975).
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open to competing interpretations. 8' Several states (8%) demand informa-
tion about any "immoral," "dishonorable," or "improper" conduct, and
one-third contain a catch-all question concerning all "other unfavorable
incidents" not previously disclosed that could bear on the applicant's
"character or fitness to practice."
Of course, the vagueness of prevailing certification standards and in-
quiries does not of itself establish a constitutional claim. A central ques-
tion, to which discussion in Part VII is addressed, is the feasibility of
alternatives. But before that issue is analyzed in any depth, certain other
costs of moral oversight bear emphasis.
2. Privacy and Substantive Rationality
To extend privacy's penumbra into yet another regulatory arena is an
enterprise to be approached with considerable caution. As Judith Thom-
son has observed, "the most striking thing about the right to privacy is
that nobody seems to have any clear idea what it is."38 The doctrine's
easy elasticity renders it an already "over-burdened camel" carrying ill-
defined conceptual freight. 9 ' Yet one cannot evaluate the merits of moral
oversight without some attention to the invasive character of character in-
quiries. Nor is it possible to assess the need for such intrusions without
reference to the most basic constitutional constraint on licensing crite-
ria-that they be rationally related to fitness for practice.
The evolution of the Supreme Court's privacy decisions has been alter-
nately celebrated'and condemned elsewhere, and need not be reassessed
here. For present purposes, what bears note is the general thrust of those
decisions, which gives force to certain core notions of individual autonomy,
intimacy, and identity. 91 In cases dealing with contraception, procreation,
family life, and public surveillance, the Court has carved out sanctuaries
from state intrusion. 92 While the invasiveness common in bar character
388. See N.Y. Comm. Rep., supra note 101, at 58 (unauthorized practice too ambiguous a term to
be retained); Rhode, supra note 93, at 45-53 (describing ambiguity and inclusiveness of prevailing
definitions of unauthorized practice).
389. Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 295, 295 (1975).
390. Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 296 (1977). See generally
Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
326 (1966) (privacy imprecise, probably incapable of delimiting public sphere).
391. See A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1970); Craven, Personhood: The Right to be Let
Alone, 1976 DUKE L.J. 699; Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980);
Gerety, supra note 390; Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26
(1976).
392. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Fourth
Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures are grounded on similar values.
See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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proceedings seldom rises to the dimensions presented in those seminal pri-
vacy cases, the values implicated are of the same general order.
Most certification processes operate without any formal boundaries on
their scope of inquiry. Only about a fifth of the sampled states apply rules
of evidence or formal constraints on questions examiners are authorized to
ask. 93 In general, committee inquiry ranges as broadly as members wish,
and hearings may last anywhere from fifteen minutes to ten days. 94 In all
but one sampled jurisdiction, these hearings are not necessarily restricted
to the areas that triggered review.
So too, as Appendix I and the following overview reflect, most state bar
applications display equally unbounded interest in candidates' personal
backgrounds. Yet a vast amount of the biographical data demanded bears
no meaningful relationship to the legitimate objectives of bar certification.
And the undisciplined scope of inquiry opens opportunities not only for
unwarranted intrusions, but also for capricious and prejudicial inferences
from irrelevant information.
a. Family, Educational, and Employment Background
Most bar applications begin with an extended series of questions re-
garding family and early academic background. More than half the states
(57%) want to know who the candidate's parents are; over a quarter
(29%) ask about parental occupations, and a few have questions about
parental birthplaces (4%), mother's maiden name (10%), and siblings'
names or occupations (6%). Some jurisdictions are interested in what
grade school (10%) or junior high school (24%) the candidates attended, or
in their high school scholastic performance and extracurricular activities
(4%). Disciplinary sanctions received in high school (63%) and college
(86%) are of common concern; since only three states limit their questions
to matters involving dishonesty, many scholastic problems or petty pranks
will fall within disclosure obligations. Several states, including New York,
inquire whether applicants have ever been denied admission to academic
institutions for reasons relating to character, although how candidates are
expected to have such information is unclear.
Many questions regarding employment history are equally intrusive.
About a third of the states demand employment histories beginning for
most applicants at age sixteen or earlier. Almost half the states want to
know about dismissals, or resignations for unsatisfactory work (22%) or
any other causes (24%), and a number inquire about all accusations of
393. New Jersey does not ask about political or religious beliefs, sexual conduct, or psychiatric
treatment short of hospitalization. Idaho does not inquire into bankruptcies.
394. The average hearing lasts about six hours.
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dishonesty (10%). Several states (8%), including California, ask applicants
to account for all time periods since age eighteen; every candidate must
disclose "where you were and what you did" during any interval not cov-
ered by other questions regarding education and employment. In other
jurisdictions, the candidate must identify future employers (6%).
The necessity for such scrutiny of all applicants is not self-evident. It is
inconceivable that most of this information could ever prove relevant, let
alone determinative, in certification disputes; published decisions are not
replete with references to applicants' high school extracurricular activities
or teenage employment. Disclosures concerning parental occupation,
maiden name, and birthplace, or candidates' employment or pre-college
school affiliations may invite the kind of class and ethnic biases that once
figured all too heavily in the bar's admission policies.195 Even questions
more closely related to practice are often phrased in such overinclusive
form as to defy reasoned justification. Not every resignation from employ-
ment warrants explication. And remote incidents of minor misconduct
have so little predictive force that their inclusion may be more prejudicial
than probative.
b. Legal Involvement and Financial History
All jurisdictions inquire about involvement in criminal proceedings, and
most have concerns that extend well beyond felony offenses. As noted ear-
lier, over half the states (59%) demand disclosure of all convictions, in-
cluding misdemeanors, and all arrests (51%); many jurisdictions specifi-
cally include expunged (24%) or juvenile (20%) offenses, and parking
violations (14%). Some states also inquire about questioning (14%), accu-
sations (8%), warnings (4%), testimony (6%), refusals to testify (6%), and
requests to appear before a prosecutor or investigative agency (6%). New
York demands to know the number of unpaid traffic tickets.
About two-thirds of the states ask if the applicant has been involved in
any civil proceedings (63%) or has any unsatisfied judgments against him
(67%). Some jurisdictions specifically inquire about certain types of action,
such as bankruptcy (63%), divorce (43%), or unauthorized practice of law
(20%). In a significant minority of jurisdictions, applicants must also pro-
vide extended personal financial information, including debts past due
(27%), dishonored checks (4%), and institutions or individuals with whom
credit has been established over the past five years (10%).
Such inquiries are scarcely well-tailored to minimize intrusive or capri-
cious administration of character requirements. The breadth of these
standard application forms licenses the kind of arbitrary and empirically
395. See supra pp. 500-03.
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unwarranted assessments detailed above. Since relatively few questions in-
clude any time constraints, their scope includes conduct that may be so
remote at the time of application as to bear no rational relationship to
current fitness to practice. It is by no means apparent why violation of a
fishing license statute a decade earlier remains an appropriate subject of
professional concern. 398 Nor is it clear that the certification process is an
appropriate vehicle for collecting parking fines, child support payments,
and student loans.3 7 A willingness to discharge such obligations under
threat of non-certification is indicative perhaps of prudence but scarcely of
moral fiber. Forcing candidates in character interviews to explore the sta-
tus of their credit card accounts simply trivializes the enterprise.398
Moreover, the scope of bar inquiry compromises other societal interests.
Requiring revelation of all arrests, or of juvenile or expunged offenses, is
particularly troubling in light of the statutory provisions in most states
generally shielding such information from compelled disclosure.399 The
public policies underlying such legislation-that adverse inferences should
not be drawn from conduct of marginal probative value-are as applicable
to bar certification decisions as to other licensing and employment deter-
minations. And, as a practical matter, certain bar inquiries penalize pro-
tected conduct such as cooperation as a witness in criminal proceedings or
recourse to civil remedies. Risk-averse applicants who wish to serve the
system of justice would be well advised to avoid contact with it prior to
certification. To be sure, it is unclear how many applicants are suffi-
ciently aware of bar policies to shape their conduct accordingly. Yet to the
extent that certification processes discourage direct legal involvement, the
result may be a loss of perspective among potential practitioners.
c. Marital Relations and Sexual Conduct
Interest in applicants' sex lives and marital status has dimished over
time, but a certain degree of intrusiveness remains acceptable in many
quarters. Almost half (43%) the state bar applications ask about divorce,
and over a third (39%) specifically demand legal records of the proceed-
396. See supra p. 538.
397. See supra p. 541.
398. N.Y. Comm. Rep., supra note 101, at 35.
399. Every jurisdiction has laws or regulations concerning the privacy, security, and accuracy of
criminal history records. See Crim. Justice Newsletter, Aug. 16, 1982, at 7 (citing Bureau of Justice
statistics, criminal justice information policies). Many states, including New York, have statutory
prohibitions that ban discrimination based upon, or inquiries relating to, juvenile offenses and arrests
that terminated in favor of the accused. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 160.60 (McKinney 1981);
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296.14 (McKinney 1982); N.Y. JuD. LAW §§ 781-784 (McKinney 1983); see
also Note, Criminal Procedure: Expunging the Arrest Record When There Is No Conviction, 28
OK.A. L. REv. 377, 386-87 (1975) (citing statutes).
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ing. A minority of applications inquire whether married couples are living
together (14%) and if not, why not (4%).
Although current projections indicate that almost half of all marriages
will end in divorce,4 °0 some examiners nonetheless find the experience in-
dicative of character difficulties. Several committee members expressed
concern about divorces that could "interfere with the ability to practice
law," or "reflect badly on professional trust and [applicants'] ability to
control their personal lives." 4 1 And some applicants have reported humil-
iating interchanges concerning their "breach[ing] the most sacred contract
of them all."402
The increasing incidence of open cohabitation and homosexuality has
also not been regarded indulgently in many jurisdictions. Recent surveys
indicate that some 3.6 million individuals are living with unmarried per-
sons of the opposite sex; approximately twenty-five percent of all college
undergraduates have engaged in such conduct, and another fifty percent
reportedly would do so if the opportunity arose.403 An estimated one-third
of all adult males have had homosexual experiences.404 Nevertheless, al-
most forty percent of all surveyed jurisdictions would or might investigate
such conduct.405 As the executive director of one board of bar examiners
explained:
There is nothing on our application which inquires into this area.
However, if it were brought to our attention, from the personal in-
terview or elsewhere, it may well be something the Board would
want to follow up on. I would like to think that there are those
forms of lifestyles that [any jurisdiction] would find unacceptable in
an attorney.
408
To some courts and committee members, "living in sin" has qualified
as one such "unacceptable" lifestyle. A 1977 Committee Report on New
York procedures found that cohabitation (or separate residences for mar-
ried couples) continued to be a "basis for deferring an application, sub-
jecting an applicant to a more thorough investigation, and, in some judi-
400. A. CHERLIN, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, REMARRIAGE 25 (1981) (estimating that if current
rates remain constant, 48% of those married will eventually obtain divorces).
401. Interview, Chairman, Va. Temporary Char. and Fitness Comm., 26th Dist. (June 21,
1983); see also Interview, Chairman, N.Y. Char. and Fitness Comm., 2d, 10th & 11th Dists. (June
11, 1983) (indicating that his interview might include discussions of divorce).
402. Papke, supra note 86, at 20 (quoting New York Comm. member).
403. See Macklin, Non-Marital Heterosexual Cohabitation, 1 MARRIAGE & FAMILY REV. 1, 2
(1978) (citing surveys); Spanier, Married and Unmarried Cohabitation in the United States: 1980,
45 J. MARRIAGE & FAMILY 277 (1983).
404. A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 623
(1948).
405. See Table 4, supra p. 534, at cols. 1 & 2.
406. Interview, Exec. Dir., Ind. Bd. Bar Examiners (no date).
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cial districts, certifying the facts relating to an applicant's living
arrangements to the appropriate Appellate Division ... . Such prac-
tices reportedly "scare[d] the hell" out of unmarried female candidates in
New York as well as in certain other states.408 One celebrated case in-
volved a 1975 Arizona applicant who was cohabiting with an admitted
male attorney. Although no disciplinary inquiry was ever commenced
against her fellow sinner, the female candidate submitted to formal and
informal hearings exploring the intimate details of her sex life.409 The
couple ultimately agreed to get married, which allayed the concerns of the
bar but not of other candidates. During subsequent application periods,
some applicants reportedly obtained separate residences or telephones.410
Living in sin would also raise problems in certain Virginia districts
despite a recent ruling by the state supreme court reversing a denial of
certification made on that basis.41 Without any reference to this pre-
sumptively controlling precedent, one Virginia interviewer explained that
cohabitors "may have been violating a statute," which could show a "con-
tumacious attitude toward the law."4 2 On similar reasoning, the West
Virginia state bar committee initially denied admission to two unmarried
applicants who listed the same residence.41 The decision was reversed
only after the applicants insisted that, while they shared an apartment,
they "really weren't living together" and the "girl" appeared "very in-
sulted" by insinuations of immorality.414 Although the committee "only
had their word," it felt bound to admit the applicants, since "how else are
you going to prove this kind of thing?"4""
Comparable evidentiary difficulties have contributed to a reluctant lais-
sez-faire attitude in other jurisdictions as well. At least one examiner who
sees indications of cohabitation feels "there isn't much you can do about
407. N.Y. Comm. Rep., supra note 101, at 28.
408. Baris, supra note 84, at 15, col. 4 (New York).
409. Interview, July 1, 1984. The attorney preferred not to be identified by name.
Among the questions asked at the hearings were the number of bedrooms the couple had, the
frequency with which they had sexual relations, and their sexual relationships with other individuals.
Since the woman could not find employment without bar certification and was facing substantial loan
obligations as well as attorney fees in contesting her denial, the couple determined that marriage was
the expedient course. At the time the case began, cohabitation was a felony in Arizona, although no
one had been prosecuted under the statute for 47 years. Id.
410. Id.
411. Interview, Member, Va. B. Comm. on Char. and Fitness, 13th Dist. (July 8, 1983); Inter-
view, Chairman, Va. Temporary Char. and Fitness Comm., 26th Dist. (June 21, 1983); Cord v.
Gibb, 219 Va. 1019, 254 S.E.2d 71 (1979).
412. Interview, Chairman, Va. Temporary Char. and Fitness Comm., 26th Dist. (June 21,
1983).
413. Interview, Sec., W. Va. Bd. of Law Examiners (July 7, 1983).
414. Id.
415. Id.
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it.' 14  As one respondent explained, "As bar counsel, I could raid people's
bedrooms, but I'm not sure I want to get into that.
417
Yet why applicants should have to rely on individual examiners' sense
of self-restraint is not self-evident. States have ample other, more publicly
accountable, means of enforcing divorce and fornication laws than humili-
ating bar applicants. Given the sexual privacy interests recognized in Su-
preme Court decisions concerning both married and unmarried couples," 8
such proctoring by the bar's self-appointed spokesmen exceeds rational
limits. In a variety of other employment contexts, courts have increasingly
demanded tangible evidence of a relation between alleged "immorality"
and ineffective job performance.41 9 Absent any plausible basis for assum-
ing that divorced or cohabiting lawyers are unfit to practice, the domestic
arrangements of bar applicants should not be open to professional
scrutiny.
Similar considerations apply to homosexual behavior. Since disrespect
for law remains a rationale for non-certification, and since noncommercial
homosexual conduct between consenting adults is unlawful in forty-three
states and the District of Columbia, the potential for intrusive and capri-
cious committee action remains substantial . 20 Only California has a for-
mal policy declaring sexual preference irrelevant to practice. Although
some state courts have come to similar conclusions with respect to particu-
lar applicants, their holdings by no means foreclose extensive and degrad-
ing interrogation.42" ' For example, in one of these jurisdictions, a 1981
applicant who had been excluded from military service on grounds of ho-
416. Interview, Sec., Me. Bd. of B. Examiners (Aug. 19, 1982).
417. Interview, Counsel, Idaho B. (Aug. 17, 1982).
418. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs., 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (minors have right to buy contra-
ceptives); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (married and unmarried couples both have right to
use contraceptives); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right of married couples to
purchase or use contraceptives).
419. See, e.g., Andrews v. Drew Mun. Separate School Dist., 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1975)
(status as unwed mother has no rational relation to teaching ability), cert. dismissed, 425 U.S. 559
(1976); Fisher v. Snyder, 476 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1973) (divorced female teacher who entertained
overnight guests reinstated after being fired for conduct unbecoming a teacher); Drake v. Covington
County Bd. of Educ., 371 F. Supp. 974 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (unwed pregnant school teacher reinstated);
see also Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969)
(homosexual act by teacher not sufficient to justify license revocation). But see Dronenburg v. Zech,
741 F.2d 1388 (dismissal of homosexual Navy officer proper because "private, consensual, homosex-
ual conduct is not constitutionally protected"); Singer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d
247 (9th Cir.) (dismissal of activist homosexual civil servant proper and constitutional), vacated, 429
U.S. 1034 (1976); Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980) (upholding discharge of homo-
sexual from Navy); Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist., 88 Wash. 2d 286, 559 P.2d 1340 (teacher's
homosexuality immoral and impairs fitness to teach), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977).
420. See Note, The Constitutionality of Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual Conduct, 72 MICH.
L. REV. 1613, 1613 n.1 (1974) and statutes cited therein.
421. See Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners Re N.R.S., 403 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 1981); In re Kimball,
40 A.D.2d 252, 339 N.Y.S.2d 302, rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 33 N.Y.2d 586, 347
N.Y.S.2d 453, 301 N.E. 2d 436 (1973).
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mosexuality submitted to an hour and a half of "every tricky question
about his sex life [examiners] could dream of." '422
Such inquiries, which can occur in disciplinary as well as certification
proceedings, offend the most basic principles of due process. As noted ear-
lier, homosexuality is an unreliable predictor of conduct relevant to prac-
tice.423 And other forms of sexual behavior, which bar disciplinary au-
thorities have occasionally monitored, bear an equally attenuated
relationship to professional capacities.
To be sure, the data compiled in this study do not reveal pervasive
scrutiny of sexual conduct; examiners are seldom in a position to know of
consensual behavior. Nonetheless, the potential for intrusiveness remains.
Bar oversight may subject applicants to fear of blackmail or delay, or pe-
nalize those with the courage to acknowledge their status openly. To the
extent that certification processes carry symbolic freight, the current bag-
gage is highly objectionable. The implication that homosexuality repre-
sents a defect in moral character helps to legitimate a form of prejudice
inconsistent with evolving concepts of individual dignity and autonomy.
d. Mental and Emotional Fitness
A final area in which bar inquiry is particularly invasive concerns
mental and emotional stability. Ninety percent of all bar applications in-
clude questions regarding mental health, such as involuntary (43%) or
voluntary (39%) commitment to mental institutions, treatment or diagnosis
of mental illness (27%), and treatment or diagnosis of emotional distur-
bance (12%). Other common questions concern drug or alcohol depen-
dence (67%) and treatment (69%), and general health problems (10%).
Although the effect of such information on character committee deliber-
ations varies widely,424 applicants with a history of treatment clearly risk
extended inquiries and delay, and in some instances, a possibility of exclu-
sion. Evidence of religious fanaticism, schizophrenia, unwarranted suspi-
cion, unspecified "mental problems," and "undue contentiousness" have
all supported findings of unfitness. 42 5 Yet while mental stability is obvi-
422. Brookie, Florida Court Prohibits Ban on Gay Lawyers, Gay Community News, Aug. 22,
1981; see also Papke, supra note 86, at 20 (indicating that delays and interrogation of homosexuals is
"almost certain"; quoting former executive secretary of Manhattan committee: "We have to take a
close look.")
423. See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
424. See supra pp. 540-41.
425. See, e.g., Application of Ronwin, 113 Ariz. 357, 555 P.2d 315 (1976) (rejecting committee's
finding that applicant persistently brought "groundless claims" in court proceedings, though still find-
ing him "paranoid" and "not mentally able" to practice), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 907 (1977); In re
Martin-Trigona, 55 Ill. 2d 301, 302 N.E.2d 68 (1973) (denying admission to attorney applicant in
part on basis of irrational behavior regarding pending lawsuit), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974);
Application of Stone, 74 Wyo. 389, 397, 288 P.2d 767, 771 (1955) (attorney applicant's initiation of
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ously relevant to practice, current certification standards license untrained
examiners to draw inferences that the mental health community would
itself find highly dubious. As noted earlier, even trained clinicians cannot
accurately predict psychological incapacities based on past treatment in
most individual cases. 426 To the extent that bar oversight deters psycho-
logical or psychiatric treatment, the current approach is simply perverse.
Penalizing those who recognize a need for assistance is unlikely to yield
greater mental health among the practicing bar.
Moreover, even with respect to problems most likely significantly to
affect an individual's professional practice, forecasts in individual cases
rarely will be conclusive. 427 Given such indeterminacy, the desirability of
preemptive screening is equally open to dispute. Some of those deterred or
denied admission may have considerable potential as legal practitioners.
4 28
Indeed, the irony, if not hypocrisy, of excluding individuals on the ground
of "contentiousness" from a profession that generally rewards it, should
not escape notice.
Nor should the bar's anomalous posture with respect to confidentiality
pass without comment. When the attorney-client privilege is at issue, law-
yers have consistently maintained that compelled disclosures will chill the
kind of candid interchange necessary for informed assistance. 42 9 Yet the
profession is entirely comfortable requiring applicants with histories of
psychological treatment to waive the privilege for therapeutic communica-
tion that is recognized to varying degrees in most states.43 Such a policy is
scarcely conducive to fostering the candor and trust on which effective
therapeutic relationships depend. 31 It is also flatly at odds with mandates
suits for recovery of fees evidence of "unduly contentious spirit"), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 815 (1956);
see also sources cited supra notes 205 & 308.
426. See supra p. 560.
427. Id.
428. For cases in point, see supra note 326.
429. For discussion of the bar's conventional position, see Rhode, supra note 217, and sources
cited therein.
430. Twenty-six states have statutes recognizing a psychologist- or psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege. In addition, Connecticut has a specific psychiatrist-patient privilege. The privilege available in
most states applies to psychologists. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw §§ 2286
n.23, 2380 n.5 (1961 & Supp. 1984). For general discussion of the policies underlying these statutes,
see Krattenmaker, Interpersonal Testimonial Privileges Under the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Sug-
gested Approach, 64 GEO. L.J. 613, 647-68 (1976); Levinson, Testimonial Privileges and the Prefer-
ences of Friendship, 1984 DuKE L.J. 631.
431. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (justification for privileges "rooted in the
imperative need for confidence and trust"); Elliston, Character and Fitness Tests: An Ethical Perspec-
tive, B. EXAMINER, Aug. 1982, at 8, 13 (bar policy on disclosure of psychological assistance received
may discourage lawyers from seeking help); Goldstein & Katz, Psychiatrist-Patient Privilege: The
GAP Proposal and the Connecticut Statute, 118 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 773, 734 (1962) ("the over-
whelming view of psychiatrists is that patients need and expect assurance that their disclosures will
remain confidential"); Kaslow, supra note 308, at 43 ("person who has the insight and strength to
seek help may be more vulnerable to additional inquiries . . . than another person . . . much less
stable but with no psychiatric history"); Note, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other
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of the American Psychiatric Association and the American Psychological
Association, which authorize disclosure of confidences only to prevent
clear and immediate danger, a circumstance rarely applicable in certifica-
tion contexts."3 2 To be sure, not all individuals undergoing treatment will
be aware of the risk of compelled disclosures in subsequent bar certifica-
tion proceedings. But forcing those individuals who are aware to choose
between developing adequate therapeutic relationships and minimizing
certification difficulties is not readily justified given the limited value of
the information likely to be provided.433 That licensed attorneys undergo-
ing treatment are not forced to make comparable tradeoffs, despite the
temporally more relevant nature of any disclosures, again underscores the
perversity of current procedures.
e. Converging Vagueness and Privacy Concerns
Under prevailing certification standards, elusive notions of virtue make
for expansive state interrogation. As long as the applicant's entire "life
history" is thought relevant in admissions, the scope of bar inquiry is not
readily cabined."'3 Given the vagueness of prevailing standards, applicants
are understandably wary of failing to answer any questions, no matter
how tenuously related to practice.
In theory, Supreme Court precedent protects applicants who refuse to
respond to an inappropriate inquiry, unless they have clear notice of the
potential consequences of such refusals.4 5 In practice, however, it is
doubtful that most applicants or even examiners have a firm sense of what
those consequences are, or of what constitutes an inappropriate inquiry.
Over three-quarters of respondents in the sampled states reported that ap-
plicants never declined to answer any questions, and the remainder indi-
cated that such refusals virtually never occurred. When asked whether
candidates knew the consequences of a refusal, only one respondent said
yes; four said no, and others were unsure. In fact, the repercussions of
remaining silent can be quite severe. In the view of many bar examiners,
individuals unwilling to respond have not discharged their burden of es-
tablishing character and "should not be practicing law.)
43 6
Professionals: Its Implications for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1262
(1962) (for every two laymen who indicated they would be unaffected by a privilege for psychiatrists,
psychologists, or the like, nearly five claimed they would be less likely to make full disclosure).
432. Kaslow, supra note 308, at 43.
433. See supra p. 560.
434. See supra pp. 531-44.
435. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Calif., 353 U.S. 252, 261 (1957).
436. Interview, Chairman, S. Ala. Char. and Fitness Comm. (July 7, 1983); see also Interview,
Chairman, Mich. Char. and Fitness Comm. (July 8, 1983) (applicant who persisted in refusing to
answer relevant question would not be admitted); Interview, Chairman, N.J. Statewide Comm. on
Char. (July 20, 1983) (refusals might reflect on applicant's ability to "come clean"); Interview, Pres.-
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Given the uncertain price of standing on principle, many applicants un-
doubtedly acquiesce in unnecessarily intrusive inquiries. Indeed, a favorite
anecdote of the former Executive Secretary of Manhattan's character com-
mittee involves a candidate described as "a cum laude Harvard type, a
real intellectual" who "refused to answer some questions because he
thought they were unconstitutional. . . . I kept telling him to forget about
constitutionality and get admitted, but he wouldn't listen. Finally his firm
put the pressure on him, and he answered like a lamb. '4 37 In a context
designed to assess character, the bar encourages prudence rather than
principle.
Such spectacles devalue the concept of morality they purport to main-
tain. To enlist applicants, their counselors, and references in disclosure of
highly personal information compromises fundamental notions of dignity
and autonomy. Moreover, the current system, which affords no meaning-
ful notice of the criteria applied and no assurance that similar cases will
be treated similarly within or across jurisdictions, violates the most basic
premise of due process. Such intrusive and idiosyncratic oversight ought
not to be tolerated if there are alternative means of protecting the public.
VII. ALTERNATIVES
It is somewhat ironic that a profession so adamantly agnostic with re-
spect to most client conduct is so comfortable passing judgment on aspir-
ing practitioners. Too often, the bar has abdicated moral responsibility in
practice contexts that demand it,"8 while embracing such responsibility in
licensing contexts that do not.
The current administration of moral character criteria is, in effect, a
form of Kadi justice with a procedural overlay. 39 Politically non-
accountable decisionmakers render intuitive judgments, largely uncon-
strained by formal standards and uninformed by a vast array of research
that controverts the premises on which such adjudication proceeds. This
process is a costly as well as empirically dubious means of securing public
protection. Substantial resources are consumed in vacuous formalities for
routine applications, and non-routine cases yield intrusive, inconsistent,
and idiosyncratic decisionmaking. Examiners generally lack the resources,
information, and techniques to predict subsequent abuses with any degree
Elect, Idaho Bd. of Comm'rs (July 17, 1983) (problems coupled with refusal to answer could result in
denial).
437. Papke, supra note 86, at 19-20.
438. See supra pp. 548-49.
439. See M. WEBER, Bureaucracy, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 196, 216-21
(H. Gerth & C. Mills eds. 1946) (defining Kadi justice as informal judgments rendered according to
individual decisionmaker's ethical or practical valuations).
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of accuracy. Only a minimal number of applicants are permanently ex-
cluded from practice, and the rationale for many of those exclusions is
highly questionable.
Disciplinary oversight for non-professional offenses has been equally
erratic, but the overall infrequency of sanctions has enshrined a curious
double standard. Much activity that prompts delay or denial of aspiring
attorneys carries no risk for practitioners. The amount of attention di-
rected at predicting misconduct is difficult to justify when compared with
the grossly inadequate responses to demonstrated professional abuses. The
bar's continued failure to cope with incompetence, dishonesty, and dilatory
tactics by licensed practitioners belies the premises of its certification
ceremonies.
This indictment suggests a variety of possible correctives. The most fun-
damental would be to abandon character inquiries; the bar would cease to
monitor the moral conduct of applicants and most non-professional behav-
ior of practitioners, and would concentrate its resources on policing pro-
fessional abuses. The merits of that approach become clearer upon consid-
eration of less sweeping alternatives, such as more stringent procedural or
substantive regulation of character certification by statutory or judicial
mandate.44 o
A. Process Constraints
One means of addressing certain of the due process difficulties with cur-
rent certification structures is through procedural renovation. For exam-
ple, in an effort to minimize inconsistency and uncertainties in bar deci-
sionmaking, states might publish more stringent regulations governing the
scope and format of character inquiries, as well as statistical profiles of the
number of applications processed, deferred, accepted, and denied. Central
examining boards could also be required to issue definitive advance rul-
ings, as well as written decisions in any case of non-certification or rever-
sal of a lower committee determination.441 Those dispositions, together
with judicial rulings, could be compiled in a form that would safeguard
the privacy of individual applicants while making substantive determina-
tions available to applicants, law schools, and examiners. To prevent com-
mittees from delaying decisions on problem cases in the hope that appli-
440. Although courts have asserted inherent power to determine standards for practice, state legis-
lation has been sustained insofar as it is consistent with judicial objectives. See Rhode, supra note 93,
at 11-12 and sources cited therein.
441. For example, applicants seeking an advance ruling could submit a statement of facts and
relevant records to the committee. Assuming those facts to be true, the committee would issue a ruling
that would be binding if favorable to the applicant, and subject to reconsideration if unfavorable. See
N.Y. Comm. Rep., supra note 101, at 45. Inconclusive dispositions, such as "probably admitted," see
supra pp. 572-73, would not be an option.
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cants will withdraw from the process, states might prescribe fixed time
periods for completing certification inquiries.
Finally, the entire review process could be streamlined to minimize in-
essential and intrusive formalities. To that end, a committee charged with
reviewing New York's procedures recommended elimination of mandatory
interviews and personal references. In addition, the committee proposed
appointment of an ombudsman to investigate applicant complaints and
monitor procedural compliance. 2
Such structural adjustments would respond to a number of the constitu-
tional concerns discussed earlier. By rendering the certification process
more visible and by mandating clearer articulation of its governing stan-
dards, states may somewhat increase the consistency and predictability of
decisionmaking. Applicants would have a better sense of the relevant crite-
ria and scope of inquiry, and less effort and expense would be consumed
in arid rituals.
The danger, however, is that a more acceptable procedural facade will
simply shore up a fundamentally bankrupt structure. The current disci-
plinary system is replete with process safeguards, which have done little to
mitigate intrusive and irrational applications of character criteria regard-
ing nonprofessional offenses. Without attention to the substantive
problems in oversight structures, procedural renovations are of limited
value.
B. Substantive Constraints
A second, to some extent complimentary, strategy for restructuring
character inquiries would involve a move from open-textured standards to
more precisely delineated rules. The least radical leap might entail for-
malization along the lines of some state licensing statutes. For example,
New York provides that no license shall be denied for lack of good moral
character or previous criminal conviction absent a "direct relationship"
between the offenses committed and the employment sought, or an "un-
reasonable risk" to property or to public safety or welfare if the license
were granted. 8 In making that determination, public agencies must con-
sider a range of factors including the remoteness and seriousness of prior
offenses, their relationship to the specific duties entailed by licensure, the
rehabilitation of the applicant, and public policies encouraging employ-
ment of former offenders.
44 4
Such a formulation would have the virtue of focusing inquiry on public
442. N.Y. Comm. Rep., supra note 101, at 48.
443. N.Y. CORREar. LAW § 752 (McKinney Supp. 1984).
444. Id.
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safety and the functional characteristics of employment rather than on
more elusive concerns such as the profession's general reputation or the
applicant's respect for law. In practice, however, it is doubtful that such
standards would ensure less indeterminate decisions, particularly since the
criteria prescribed are those now frequently invoked in certification and
disciplinary proceedings.
A more plausible means of constraining discretion would be to specify
conduct that might-or alternatively must-warrant exclusion. For exam-
ple, in the certification context, applicants could submit affidavits indicat-
ing whether they had committed certain criminal or civil offenses involv-
ing violence, dishonesty, or theft.4"5 Individuals with a record of such
convictions would submit more detailed personal information; the remain-
ing candidates would be certified absent evidence controverting the affida-
vits. Alternatively, certain misconduct could operate as a per se disqualifi-
cation for a given period. Applicants guilty of specified offenses or
patterns of offenses would be temporarily foreclosed from practice; those
who committed no further abuses during the prescribed interval would
then automatically be certified.
Analogous, though not necessarily identical, requirements could govern
discipline for attorneys' nonprofessional misconduct. Clearly the rationale
for monitoring practitioners' personal behavior is somewhat stronger than
the justification for screening candidates' conduct. Attorney actions, unlike
much applicant misconduct, cannot be discounted as remote in time or the
product of youthful indiscretion. Moreover, violations of the law assume a
different symbolic dimension when committed by those sworn to uphold it.
Perjury by an officer of the court seems equally damning whether com-
mitted in a private or representative capacity.
Yet although the boundary between personal and professional miscon-
duct will in some individual instances appear arbitrary, the general dis-
tinction remains significant. Abuses in a lawyer-client relationship are
more likely to predict future conduct in that capacity than many of the
personal offenses for which attorneys have been sanctioned. Of course,
problems of erroneous prediction arise in the context of professional as
well as nonprofessional abuses. But part of the function of disciplinary
sanctions lies in general deterrence; even if it is unclear whether a particu-
lar attorney will commit future offenses, the censure stands as a warning
to other practitioners. With respect to nonprofessional abuses, that deter-
rent function is already served by the penal system. Society has ample
means for denouncing such misconduct; licensing structures need not be
445. For a comparable proposal, see N.Y. Comm. Rep., supra note 101, at 51.
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harnessed to replicate the stigmatizing functions of criminal and commu-
nity sanctions.
Given these considerations, states could confine the bar's disciplinary
jurisdiction to certain specified acts that would trigger discretionary or
mandatory sanctions. Such offenses either could be limited to activities
performed as a lawyer, or could also encompass related conduct that di-
rectly implicated the legal system or involved service as a fiduciary or
public official.
The relative merits of formalization have been exhaustively canvassed
elsewhere and need not be rehearsed at length here. The conventional as-
sumption is that the sharper the lines confining judicial and administra-
tive discretion, the greater the predictability, consistency, and accountabil-
ity of decisionmaking.446 Limiting the conduct that will occasion inquiry
may mitigate the intrusive aspect of oversight, while increasing the corre-
spondence between individual judgments and common values.
Yet, in the licensing context, those virtues are not readily realized. Two
threshold difficulties are determining who formulates the classifications
and on what basis. In the absence of public consensus or empirical foun-
dations, by what criteria should we identify disqualifying offenses? It is
easy to posit clear cases, to hypothesize individuals whom almost any deci-
sionmaker would prefer not to certify. The fourth-time embezzler is a
logical candidate for exclusion. But such candidates do not comprise an
appreciable percentage of the applicant pool. The difficulty arises in for-
mulating rules that will ensure principled resolution of the vast majority
of contested cases. Equally problematic is determining which decisionmak-
ing body to entrust with that task. State control over bar membership
presents obvious risks; should those charged with maintaining counterma-
joritarian values be selected by reference to majority sentiment? As experi-
ence in other countries makes clear, where the government monitors the
profession, the profession has greater difficulty monitoring the govern-
ment. Yet, as the prior discussion suggests, neither is the bar itself well-
situated to police the mores of its membership. Where its own status is so
directly implicated, the bar cannot make disinterested judgments about the
public's interest in character criteria.
Moreover, there are difficulties with implementing as well as delineat-
ing any bright-line disqualifications. The more precise the formulations,
the more under- and over-inclusive their application becomes. As Duncan
Kennedy has noted, any per se approach not only permits but mandates
446. See, e.g., L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-44 (1964); P. NONEr & P. SELZNICK,
LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION 61-62 (1978); Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals, 71 HARv. L. REv. 593 (1958); Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1973).
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arbitrariness.4417 And for purposes of character assessment, such formaliza-
tion seems almost self-defeating. Concepts of virtue do not readily reduce
to mechanical formulae. A single act of misconduct, abstracted from its
social context, is a highly imperfect measure of moral fiber. But the more
life history the rules take into account, the less functional they become as
rules. Enlarging the scope for individualized determinations also enlarges
the potential for intrusive and inconsistent discriminations. A formal
structure that incorporates concepts such as mitigation and rehabilitation
relinquishes the values on which formalization is premised. Yet to exclude
such concepts may in some cases simply be to exchange the arbitrariness
of individual decisionmakers for the arbitrariness of individual events.
That is not to imply that such an exchange would prove pointless. On
balance, the history of character certification suggests that rigid rules are
preferable to elastic standards. Given the considerable costs and dubious
value of current licensing standards, the virtues of a nondiscretionary,
bright-line alternative appear to be substantial. Yet equally significant is
the risk that greater substantive as well as procedural constraints will help
legitimate a fundamentally illegitimate system. Structural tinkering may
mitigate the worst abuses of screening, but cannot redeem its premises.
The inherent inadequacies of predictive techniques render any plausible
certification system a highly inadequate means of safeguarding the public.
Thus, preserving the pretense of character certification may simply but-
tress the profession's claims to social status, economic monopoly, and reg-
ulatory autonomy, while deflecting attention from more meaningful forms
of oversight.
C. The Retreat from Omniscience
In its latest pronouncement on the subject, the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that "wise policy," if not constitutional prescription, might dictate
reliance on post-admission sanctions rather than preliminary screening as
a means of policing the bar.448 Particularly in a context where neither
state nor professional oversight is an attractive alternative, abandoning the
enterprise has much to commend it. In essence, the bar would cease moni-
toring character for purposes of admitting attorneys or of disciplining non-
professional abuses. Such an approach would avoid the indeterminacies of
standards, the rigidity of rules, and the pretense that either promises ade-
quate public protection.
That is not to suggest that decertification would come without costs, or
447. Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685
(1976).
448. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. at 167.
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that the market would prove an ideal regulator. Letting clients determine
what character credentials are relevant assumes that consumers can gain
access to the relevant information, and that only they are affected by
purchasing decisions. Neither condition holds in the market for legal ser-
vices. Certain externalities, such as the effects on third parties and on the
administration of justice, are always present. And information barriers
cannot be wholly removed, although they might to some extent be miti-
gated. For example, central licensing authorities could require attorneys to
disclose certain criminal and civil misconduct as well as prior disciplinary
sanctions. Such information could be compiled and made available to cli-
ents and employers through public and professional agencies, consumer
groups, and lawyer directory services.
Of course, that approach is by no means wholly satisfactory. There re-
mains the problem of who decides what conduct warrants disclosure and
what criteria govern that decision. It is also likely that some segments of
the public would overvalue matters of little probative significance, while
the bulk of consumers would remain uninformed. Although such difficul-
ties cannot be discounted, neither should they be exaggerated. Removal of
entry barriers is unlikely to alter the composition of the bar significantly.
As it stands, certification and disciplinary procedures rarely result in per-
manent exclusion on character grounds, and it is by no means clear how
many or what sorts of applicants are deterred by current standards. Nor is
the public now well-informed about the abuses of applicants or licensed
attorneys. Moreover, even in the absence of state certification, other insti-
tutions would undoubtedly continue to exercise some screening function.
Law schools' academic criteria already exclude a large percentage of seri-
ous offenders, and their own institutional concerns dictate a certain degree
of scrutiny, irrespective of what the bar formally requires. Since public
and private employers of attorneys have similar interests, one would not
expect to find habitual embezzlers flocking to the profession if the bar
abandoned formal certification procedures.
In any case, from the standpoint of public protection, the issue is not
how many former felons would become or remain practitioners, absent
character inquiries. Rather, the question is whether resources now con-
sumed in predicting professional misconduct would be better expended in
detecting, deterring, and redressing it. Given the inherent inadequacies of
screening procedures, and the woefully inadequate funding for discipli-
nary and client compensation systems, such a reorientation of efforts could
yield significant improvements.
Much, of course, would depend on where the resources were rechannel-
led. And, while this is not the occasion for a comprehensive analysis of the
disciplinary process, two general points bear emphasis. If the bar is seri-
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ously committed to maximizing public protection, control over the discipli-
nary process should be vested in less partisan quarters. Professional atten-
tion should also center on less fundamental reforms, such as stiffer
sanctions, increased client security funds, mandatory arbitration and audit
procedures, adjustments in malpractice standards, and expansions in disci-
plinary agency jurisdiction.4 9
So too, if the profession's regulatory process is to assume meaningful
symbolic dimensions, its force should be conserved for acts bearing directly
on professional practice. Insofar as designating deviance has any legiti-
mate role in reaffirming professional values, the bar's current designations
seem seriously askew. For example, in 1983,'the Indiana Supreme Court
merely suspended for forty-five days an attorney who habitually neglected
cases, deceived his clients, and withheld their funds.4 50 That same year,
the court disbarred a lawyer for growing his own marijuana,'451 and pre-
sided over a certification system concerned with bounced checks, political
commitments, and consensual sexual activity.
Nor is that state an isolated example. As much of the preceding analy-
sis reflects, the bar's moral outrage has been largely exhausted by ceremo-
nial inquiries and occasional oustings of petty transgressors and former
felons. Most garden variety professional misconduct-incompetence, har-
assment, deception, and delay-is rarely reported or sanctioned. 52 Until
those priorities are reversed, the bar can lay no special claim to character
as a professional credential. Whatever the profession's interest in defining
a moral community, current admission and disciplinary procedures are ill-
suited to that end.
To some extent, the evolution of current oversight structures parallels
the growth of societies for the suppression of vice. Beginning with "the
best intentions," such organizations almost inevitably degenerate, often
into "receptacle[s] for . . . tittle-tattle [and] impertinence," and ultimately
into bureaucracies; the administrators become tradesmen, and moral senti-
ments are "swallowed up in the pursuit of a daily occupation . .. .,,53
So too, as concepts of professional character become bureaucratized, they
449. See supra pp. 548-49. Attorney negligence does not fall within the jurisdiction of most bar
disciplinary agencies, and the difficulties of proving malpractice have been frequently noted. Marks &
Cathcart, supra note 251, at 216-17; Martyn, Informed Consent in the Practice .of Law, 48 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 307 (1980); Martyn, supra note 250, at 733. For discussion of the gross inadequacy
of client security funds, see A.B.A. STANDING COMMISSION ON CLIENT'S SECURITY FUND, REPORT
TO THE A.B.A. HOUSE OF DELEGATES (Aug. 1976); Winter, Client Security Funds: That Sinking
Feeling, B. LEADER, Sept.-Oct. 1981, at 28; Note, Attorney Misappropriation of Clients' Funds: A
Study in Professional Responsibility, 10 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 415, 425-29 (1977).
450. In re Holloway, 452 N.E.2d 934 (Ind. 1983).
451. In re Moore, 453 N.E.2d 971 (Ind. 1983).
452. See supra pp. 548-49.
453. S. SMITH, The Society for the Suppression of Vice, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF SYDNEY
SMITH 287, 292 (W. Auden ed. 1956).
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readily become devalued. Administrators' ad hoc denunciations are un-
likely to suppress vice or encourage virtue. As currently implemented, the
moral fitness requirement both subverts and trivializes the professional
ideals it purports to sustain. In seeking to express our aspirations, such
rituals succeed only in exposing our pretenses. While hypocrisy is often
the bow vice pays to virtue, better forms of tribute may be available.
Moral Character as Professional Credential
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B. Citizenship and Residency
U.S. citizenship




Junior high school attended
High school attended
High school awards, honors, or
extra-curricular activities
High school discipline
College/Law school awards, honors, or
extra-curricular activities
College probation or discipline




Type of discharge/non-honorable discharge
Military offenses or discipline
Court-martial
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Account for all activities since
age 17 or 18 8%
Future employment (next year or
next employer) 6%
Employment dismissals or resignation 49%
Due to unsatisfactory work/misconduct 22%
Due to dishonesty 6%
All dismissals or resignations' 24%
Accused of dishonesty on the job 10%
License requiring character denied
or revoked 73%
Denied admission to other state bar 92%
State bar disciplinary actions 75%
Professional disciplinary proceedings 63%
Disciplined or removed from public office 47%
Held a bonded position7  53%
Bond refused, revoked, canceled, or
subject to litigation7  65%
Surety ever required to pay on bond 12%
F. Criminal Proceedings
Party to criminal action7  24%
Arrested/taken into custody 51%
Charged 49%
Questioned 14%
Accused of a crime" 8%
Subject of investigation 2%
Served with a criminal summons 14%
Requested to appear before any prosecutor




Pled guilty or no contest 29%
Received warning 4%
Charge pending or awaiting trial 10%
Immunity granted or offered 10%
Refused to testify/pled the Fifth Amendment 6%
Testified or involved as a witness in a
criminal case 6%
Juvenile offenses specifically included 10%
Moving violations/serious traffic
offenses specifically included1" 8%
Expunged records specifically included 24%
Expunged records specifically excluded 12%
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G. Non-criminal legal proceedings
Involved as a party or claimed an interest
in any civil proceeding" 63%
Charged with fraud or misrepresentation 12  59%
Charged with dishonorable, dishonest, or
improper conduct 12%
Charged with perjury, forgery, or false
swearing 8%
Charged with immorality 4%
Charged with embezzlement, conversion, or
breach of fiduciary duty'" 18%
Charged with extortion 2%
Bankruptcy7 63%
Creditor judgments against applicant,
or unsatisfied judgments 69%
Default of court ordered duty 14%
Involvement in guardianship proceedings' 29%
Declared ward of court 35%
Accusations of, or involvement in
unauthorized practice of law6  20%
Suits pending against applicant 6%
Any judgments or court orders of
continuing effect against applicant 22%
Subject to alimony or child support
judgments 6%
Accusations or judgment of legal
malpractice 12%
Contempt orders against applicant 7%
H. Financial Affairs
List all debts over $200 4%
List debts past due' 27%
List all student loans 4%
Any check dishonored 7%
Principal stockholder of private
corporation 2%
I. Physical, Mental and Emotional Fitness
Physical ailments 10%
Adjudicated incompetent or insane 76%
Committed to mental institution' 5  43%
Voluntary patient in mental
institution'" 39%
Treatment for, diagnosis of, or suffering
from mental illness1  27%
Treatment for, diagnosis of, or suffering
from emotional disturbance 1" 12%
The Yale Law Journal
Any health problem bearing on fitness to
practice law' 8  6%
Drug addiction or dependence'9  67%
Alcohol addiction or dependence' 9  67%
Treatment for drug use2 0  69%
Treatment for alcohol use 0  69%
Accusation of drug or alcohol addiction 4%
Adjudicated an alcoholic or addict 2%
Committed to an institution for drug and
or alcohol problems 4%
Discharged from employment for drug and
or alcohol problems 4%
J. Associations and Beliefs
Intent to overthrow the government 24%
Loyal to State constitution 24%
Loyal to U.S. government or constitution 25%
List organizations in which member 2%
Membership in group aiming to overthrow
government 27%
Member of Communist Party 2%
Membership in any organization terminated 2%
Approval of attorney's oath 10%
K. Materials Requested2'






Law student registration form 16%
Certificate of graduation from law school 43%
Certificate of law school dean 29%
With questions concerning moral
character 18%
With questions concerning disciplinary
action 14%
Attorney references required2  31%
Personal references required"3  73%
Attorney recommendations (between one & four)
required 29%
Personal recommendations (between one & five)
required 39%
Recommendation form supplied by state 43%
Including general character questions 25%
Including specific character questions 22%
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L. General Information
List all other incidents that might reflect
unfavorably on applicant's character 35%
Fifty or one hundred word statement of
reasons for practicing law 4%
Attests to reading code of professional
responsibility 37%
Willingness to comply with code 22%
Footnotes
1. Missouri seeks such information only from female applicants.
2. Ten percent of all jurisdictions also request the mother's maiden name. West Virginia requires
only parents' occupations for past ten years.
3. A quarter of the states demand all residences since age 16 or younger, another quarter demand
them for the past 10 years, and a fifth specify 5 or 6 years. The remainder request information
ranging from all residences to residences since age 18 or 5 years, whichever is shorter.
4. Four percent restrict inquiry to reasons reflecting on character.
5. States request employment history for varying periods, e.g., the past 5 years (22%); the past 10
years (8%); since age 16 (27%); since age 18 (14%). One state requires listing of all employment.
6. The most common questions are whether the applicant's conduct or any of his employers' conduct
has been "called into question" regarding unauthorized practice of law.
7. Hawaii restricts inquiry to the past 10 years.
8. Massachusetts restricts inquiry to felonies within the last 7 years and misdemeanors in the last 5
years.
9. South Carolina includes informal accusations.
10. Colorado restricts inquiry to the past 7 years.
11. California excludes adoption. Hawaii restricts inquiry to the last 10 years. Louisiana asks only
about involvement as a defendant. Massachusetts excludes divorce.
12. Six percent restrict inquiry to actions in which the applicant was adjudged liable.
13. Four percent restrict inquiry to actions in which the applicant was adjudged liable.
14. Some states restrict inquiry to debts more than 60 days due; New York asks only about debts
over $300.00,
15. Ten percent restrict inquiry to time periods ranging from 3 to 10 years or since the age of 18.
16. Four percent restrict inquiry to periods ranging from 5 to 10 years or since the age of 18.
17. Mississippi restricts inquiry to the past 5 years.
18. Montana restricts inquiry to the past 5 years.
19. Twelve percent restrict inquiry to periods ranging from 1 to 10 years or since the age of 18.
20. Some states restrict inquiry to varying time periods.
21. A typical form will require the applicant to authorize and request every medical doctor, school
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official, or other person and organization to give information pertaining to fitness to the Board of Bar
Examiners. The applicant must agree to waive any privilege of confidentiality and to release all indi-
viduals from liability in connection with their disclosures.
22. The number varies from I law professor to 3 references from each place the applicant has lived.
23. The number varies from 2 to 5 references plus, in some instances, 3 from each place applicant
has lived.
24. These percentages may understate the materials requested since not all jurisdictions may have
included such requests in the application package sent for use in this study.
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APPENDIX II
CHARACTER AND FITNESS INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE
(Hearings)
State District
Name of individual respondent
Position and address, including phone number
Length of time individual has served in that position
Date questionnaire completed
I. The Character and Fitness Review Process
How long is the typical interview/hearing?
What is the range (the longest and shortest) of interviews/hearings?
What would be the normal format?
What are the standard hearing procedures?
(Check applicable procedures)
- Rules of evidence apply
- Applicant may be represented by counsel
- Bar is represented by a prosecutor
If yes, who performs this function?
Formal record is kept
- Bar presents evidence
- Other (please describe).
How many committee members would meet with the applicant?
How are decisions made after the interview/hearings?
How many interviews/hearings would a typical case require?
About how long does the process take in the typical case?
What would be the range? (Length of shortest and longest cases).
What information is routinely available for the committee members
concerning each applicant?
The Yale Law Journal
Are there any questions or general subjects that an interviewer is
instructed to cover?
- Yes No
If yes, please describe.
What questions do you normally ask during the interview/hearing?
a) Do you restrict yourself to the issues that triggered the interview/
hearing? - Yes - No
If no, please explain.
b) Are there standard questions? - Yes No
If yes, please describe.
Are there any published policies or guidelines concerning the character and
fitness review process?
Yes No
If yes, please send a copy.
Are there any unpublished or informal guidelines?
- Yes - No
If yes, please explain and send copies.
Does the applicant receive any information in advance concerning the
content of the interview/hearing?
- Yes - No
If yes, please explain.
Have there been changes over the past five years concerning the
character review procedures or content?
. Yes - No
If yes, please explain.
Do applicants ever refuse to answer particular questions? If so, how
frequently?
- Never - Occasionally
Virtually Never - Frequently
-Rarely
What types of questions trigger refusal?
What are the consequences of such refusal?
Do the applicants know of those consequences in advance of the
interview/hearing?
What, if any, action is taken if an applicant's answers are evasive or
unconvincing?
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Do law schools ever contact you or your committee for general guidance
or for an opinion on a particular case? If so, how frequently?
General Guidelines: Particular Case:
- Never - Never
- Virtually Never - Virtually Never
- Rarely - Rarely
- Occasionally - Occasionally
- Frequently - Frequently
Please describe the last two or three cases in which you gave an opinion to
an applicant. Are they typical? Please explain.
What sort of responses do you make?
- Formal - Committee
Informal - Individual
- Other - Other
Do law school applicants contact you for an opinion on their likely
admissibility? If so, how frequently?
- Never - Occasionally
- Virtually Never - Frequently
- Rarely
Please describe the last two or three cases in which you gave an opin-
ion. Are they typical? Please explain.
What sort of responses do you make?
- Formal - Informal
- Committee - Individual
- Other
II. Review of Committee Recommendations
Approximately how many hearings or interviews did your committee
conduct?
- in 1982
- over the past 5 years.
Approximately how many times did your committee recommend denying
certification to an applicant?
- in 1982
- over the past 5 years.
What board(s), committee(s) or court(s) would review the committee's
recommendations of denial of certification?
The Yale Law Journal
How often are your committee's recommendations of denial of
certification accepted by this reviewing body?
In 1982, -% of recommendations were accepted.
Over the past 5 years, -% of recommendations were accepted.
In 1982, what types of conduct caused the committee to recommend, or
seriously consider recommending, denial? What happened in those cases?
Are those cases typical?
What sorts of conduct has the committee generally found the most
troubling?
Although obviously every decision turns on a variety of factors, can you
indicate how the committee would treat the following conduct and
whether such conduct has been presented by any specific cases during
your term? If such cases have arisen, was the individual admitted?
Criminal conviction such as assault, theft.
Conviction for drug offense (e.g., marijuana, cocaine).
Draft related offense.
Traffic offenses (driving while intoxicated, parking violation).
Sexual relationships (e.g., homosexuality, cohabitation).
Activist political activity (e.g., membership in a radical political
organization).
Unauthorized practice of law.
Academic misconduct (e.g., cheating in college or law school).
Lack of candor on bar application.
Psychiatric treatment.
Financial mismanagement such as history of bounced checks.
Bankruptcy.
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III. The Character and Fitness Committee
Who are the members of the committee?
a) - Number of Lawyers - Number of Laymen
b) - Single Interviewer - Multiple Interviews
c) Approximately what percent of interviewers are:
- Males - Minorities
- Over 35 - Over 55
Nature of Legal Practice:
-Large Law Firm (20 or more attorneys)
-Small Law Firm (Less than 20 attorneys)
-Sole practitioner
-Other.
How are the members of the committee chosen?
How long do they serve?
How many interviews/hearings do they typically conduct each year?
Please estimate the amount of time you devote annually to the character
and fitness committee.
What, if any, training, orientation or materials do the members of the
committee receive? Please send copies of all published material.
What, if any, monetary compensation do you receive for your services?
Comments
How and why did you become involved in the character review process?
Did you volunteer or were you asked to serve?
Do you think your reasons for involvement are typical of most
interviewers?
What do you see as the main purposes of the character and fitness
review process?
How effective do you think it is in accomplishing these objectives?
What, if any, problems do you perceive in the review process?
How do you think the process is viewed by most applicants?
